PACE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PROPERTY I -- VERSION A

PROFESSOR HUMBACH December 17, 1993

FINAL EXAMINATION TIME LIMIT: 3 1/2 HOURS

IN TAKING THIS EXAMINATION, YOU ARE REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH THE SCHOOL OF LAW RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR FINAL EXAMINATIONS. YOU ARE REMINDED TO PLACE YOUR EXAMINATION NUMBER ON EACH EXAMINATION BOOK AND SIGN OUT WITH THE PROCTOR, SUBMITTING TO HIM OR HER YOUR EXAMINATION BOOK(S) AND THE QUESTIONS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE EXAMINATION.

DO NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES REVEAL YOUR IDENTITY ON YOUR EXAMINATION PAPERS OTHER THAN BY YOUR EXAMINATION NUMBER. ACTIONS BY A STUDENT TO DEFEAT THE ANONYMITY POLICY IS A MATTER OF ACADEMIC DISHONESTY.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

This examination consists of multiple choice questions and true-false questions. Answer the questions on the answer sheet provided. Write your examination number and the version (A or B) on the answer sheet. Write them NOW.

Answer each question selecting the BEST answer. Mark your choice on the answer sheet with the special pencil provided. Select only one answer per question or else the question will be marked wrong. If you change an answer, be sure to FULLY erase your original answer or the question may be marked wrong. Do not mark in the left margin of the answer sheet (where the little black lines appear). You may be penalized if you do.

When you complete the examination, turn in the answer sheet together with this question booklet.

Every even-numbered multiple choice question asks you to reanswer the preceding odd-numbered question. Question 2, for example, asks you to reanswer question 1. If you are fairly confident about your answer to the principal question, mark the same answer for the "reanswer" question. If you can narrow the choice down to two answers, however, and cannot decide which of the two is the better one, you may wish to mark a different answer on the "reanswer" question. IMPORTANT NOTE: If you decide to mark a different answer on a "reanswer" question, at least one of your two answers will be wrong.

Unless the context otherwise requires (such as where the facts are specifically stated to arise in New York), base your answers on general common law principles as generally applied in American common law jurisdictions. Do not assume the existence of any facts or agreements not set forth in the questions. Assume that the period of limitations on ejectment is 10 years.

Except as otherwise specified, all conveyances are to be considered as if made, in each case, by a deed having the effect of a bargain and sale, after the Statute of Uses, but ignoring the effects of "modernizing" statutes and rules (e.g. which eliminate the Rule in Shelley's Case, the Doctrine of Worthier Title or the destructibility of contingent remainders). Ignore the possibility of dower.

Facts for Longpole-Rodd questions

Longpole and Rodd were out flyfishing when Rodd's line got tangled up in some brush on the far side of a deep pool. Longpole said he would try to retrieve the valuable artificial fly at the end of the line. Rodd said: "I think it's impossible. But if you can unsnarl that fly, it's yours--my gift to you."

1. A few minutes later, Longpole succeeded in unsnarling the fly, which he held up for Rodd to see. At that moment:

a. There could not be a completed gift of the fly because Rodd still has not actually made a "delivery" of the fly to Longpole.

b. Longpole is the owner of the fly.

c. There is probably not a completed gift of the fly because Longpole has not done anything to indicate acceptance (he was going to try to unsnarl the fly anyway).

d. At the time Rodd said "[I]t's yours--my gift to you," Longpole had a valid future interest in the fly.

2. Reanswer the previous question.

3. Suppose that, right after Longpole succeeded in recovering the fly, he handed it over to Rodd, who said: "You've got yourself a nice lure here."

a. The donor would be the bailee of the donee.

b. The "delivery" requirement would have already been met by Longpole's recovering and briefly possessing the fly because the "delivery" requirement works as an operative fact rather than as an evidentiary fact.

c. Both of the above.

d. Since there was nobody else present to witness any of the actions that transpired between Rodd and Longpole, there would technically be no valid gift of the fly to Longpole unless, at the end of the day, Longpole was the one in actual possession of the fly.

4. Reanswer the previous question.

5. Suppose that, some months later, Rodd wrote a note saying: "I won't be needing my fishing gear anymore, so I hereby give my entire trout fly collection to my dear friend, Longpole. Signed, Rodd." He handed the note to Longpole saying: "You can pick it up from my garage when you get a chance. This note will keep you from getting into trouble."

a. The note could probably serve as a valid will, giving the trout flies to Longpole.

b. The note could probably serve as a valid deed of gift, giving the trout flies to Longpole.

c. Both of the above.

d. The note could not be given any legal effect whatsoever.

6. Reanswer the previous question.

7. Suppose that Rodd, about to undergo a dangerous operation, actually handed over his fly collection, in a small box, to Longpole, saying: "It looks like I may not be needing this anymore, but I want to be sure it will be in good hands. If I die from this operation, I want you to have it." Longpole said: "Thank you." Under the usual presumption for "deathbed" gifts:

a. If Rodd survives the operation and gets well again, Longpole would have a legal obligation to return the fly collection to Rodd.

b. If Rodd survives the operation and gets well again, the gift to Longpole would be revocable only if Rodd actually expressed an intention to make a revocable gift.

c. If, shortly before the operation was to occur, Rodd passes away due unrelated causes (he chokes on a fish bone), the more sensible result would be for Longpole to have a legal obligation to return the fly collection to Rodd's estate.

d. None of the above. There was a completed gift to Longpole, and completed gifts are final.

8. Reanswer the previous question.

9. Suppose that Rodd made a gift causa mortis of his fly collection to Longpole. A few days later, Rodd died.

a. If, previously to making the gift, Rodd had made a will specifically bequeathing the very same fly collection to another friend, Shortpole, the flies would nevertheless go to Longpole because a "a will only speaks at death."

b. If, after the purported gift to Longpole, Rodd made a will with a provision specifically bequeathing the very same fly collection to Shortpole, the better interpretation of such a will provision would be to award to the flies to Shortpole.

c. Both of the above.

d. If, previously to making the gift, Rodd had made a will specifically bequeathing the very same fly collection to Shortpole, the flies would go to Shortpole under the principle of "first in time, first in right."

10. Reanswer the previous question.

11. Suppose that Rodd, while in good health, had orally declared: "I want my 3000 shares of Snapple stock to be used for Tessie's education. I'm giving it to her. It belongs to her, now." Rodd did not, however, part with possession of the stock, for even a moment.

a. Rodd's declaration, if witnessed, would probably have constituted a valid legal gift of the stock to Tessie.

b. Rodd's declaration would probably have failed as a legal gift, but courts will often "rescue" a failed legal gift (such as this one) by interpreting it as an equitable gift, which does not require delivery.

c. Rodd's declaration would not create an equitable gift because his words do not show any intent to create a trust with the Rodd as trustee (as holder of legal title, while beneficial ownership is in Tessie).

d. Rodd's declaration would not create an equitable gift because his words do not show any intent to create a trust with the Rodd as the holder of equitable title, as trustee, while legal ownership is in Tessie.

12. Reanswer the previous question.

13. Suppose that Rodd, while in good health, handed Longpole a key saying, "This is the key to a safe deposit box in which there are 3000 shares of Snapple stock. I want you to see that your granddaughter, Tessie, gets that stock. It's hers now." Longpole said: "You can rely on me to do it." Later, Rodd died. (Assume that Longpole would be deemed to be "acting for" Tessie).

a. The gift to Tessie would be complete if Longpole retrieved the Snapple stock from the box before Rodd's death.

b. The gift to Tessie would be complete if Longpole retrieved the Snapple stock from the box after Rodd's death.

c. Both of the above.

d. The gift to Tessie would be complete even if Rodd retained a second key to the box.

e. All of the above.

14. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Turnupp-Railroad questions

Turnupp has long owned a piece of land abutting a railroad right-of-way owned by the Longhaul Railroad Co. The railroad owned a 25' buffer "strip" on each side of its tracks. Although there was a 3' wide cinderbed running right next to the track, there were never any markers showing the boundary between Turnupp's land and the railroad's land. In the past Turnupp maintained a vegetable garden right up to the cinderbed. In fact, most of the garden was on the 25' buffer "strip" that belonged to the railroad. Summer gardening could be considered a normal and suitable full use for land of the particular type and locale.

15. Assume that Turnupp maintained his encroaching garden in the "strip" during eight summers in the late 1970's and early 1980's, and that, after several years of no gardening, Turnupp started planting his annual garden again four years ago. He has gardened at that same location each summer for the last 4 years. Under these facts:

a. It is unlikely that Turnupp could successfully claim a ripened title to any railroad land because he gardened on the "strip" only during the summer.

b. It is unlikely that Turnupp could successfully claim a ripened title to any railroad land because he has not used the railroad's land for 10 continuous years in a row.

c. It is unlikely that Turnupp could successfully claim a ripened title to any railroad land because mere gardening, without a fence or something, does not constitute "possession."

d. Turnupp appears to have an excellent case for asserting a claim to ripened title to the railroad land that he has been using.

16. Reanswer the previous question.

17. Assume now that Turnupp has planted his encroaching garden every summer since the late 1970's but that, during all of that time, Turnupp honestly assumed that his property included the "strip" and went right up to the edge of the cinders. He would have removed the encroaching garden if someone had pointed out to him the real location of the boundary:

a. In all (or almost all) states, the fact that Turnupp's possession was pursuant to an honest mistake of fact would prevent him from getting a ripened title by adverse possession because, almost everywhere, "hostile" possession means that you know your occupancy is legally wrongful.

b. In some states, the fact that Turnupp's possession was pursuant to an honest mistake of fact would mean that he would not get a ripened title by adverse possession because such possession is not considered "hostile."

c. Both of the above.

d. The fact that Turnupp's possession may have been pursuant to an honest mistake of fact would be legally irrelevant to the question of whether he gets a ripened title by adverse possession in every (or almost every) state.

18. Reanswer the previous question.

19. Assume again that Turnupp has planted his encroaching garden in the "strip" every summer since the late 1970's but that the garden only occupied a portion of the "strip" of railroad property abutting his land. The portion of the railroad's "strip" not planted as a garden was vacant land that neither the railroad nor Turnupp ever did anything with, whatsoever:

a. In general, if Turnupp had adverse possession of a substantial part of the railroad's "strip" (sufficient to acquire a ripened title), he would be deemed to acquire a ripened title to the entirety of the "strip" abutting his land.

b. The fact that Turnupp might have had a deed erroneously purporting to make him owner of the entire "strip" abutting his land has no bearing. Based on his gardening, Turnupp will get a ripened title (if to anything at all) only to the portion of the railroad land that he actually occupied with his garden or with other uses.

c. If Turnupp has a deed erroneously purporting to convey to him the entire "strip" of railroad property abutting his land, right up to the cinder edge, Turnupp could acquire a ripened title to the entire area purportedly (but not actually) conveyed by the deed based on adverse possession of a part of that area.

d. None of the above.

20. Reanswer the previous question.

21. Assume that, as a result of Turnupp's adverse possession, he gets a ripened title to a substantial portion of the railroad's (former) land in 1993. If the period of limitations on trespass is 4 years:

a. The railroad cannot recover trespass damages from Turnupp based on his activities during the last 4 years before title ripened because only a possessor can sue in trespass and the railroad no longer has (nor can it lawfully obtain) possession.

b. The railroad cannot recover trespass damages from Turnupp based on his activities during the last 4 years before title ripened because the acts of the adverse possessor that contributed to the ripening of title are retroactively privileged (that is, title "relates back").

c. The railroad cannot recover trespass damages from Turnupp based on his activities during the last 4 years before title ripened because such a recovery would tend to defeat the purpose of adverse possession doctrine--to protect expectations based on longstanding patterns of land occupation.

d. All of the above.

e. None of the above. The railroad can still recover damages from Turnupp in trespass based on his activities during the last 4 years before title ripened.

22. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Songacre questions

Cadwallider died in 1985 owning Songacre in fee simple absolute. He left a will that devised Songacre "to Lisbeth for life, remainder to Raymondo and his heirs."

23. The portion of the whole value of Songacre attributable to Lisbeth's life estate would be:

a. By far the lion's share of the total value if Lisbeth were a young woman at the time of Cadwallider's death.

b. By far the lion's share of the total value if Raymondo was very elderly at the time of Cadwallider's death, pretty much irrespective of Lisbeth's age at the time.

c. By far the lion's share of the total value if Lisbeth was very elderly at the time of Cadwallider's death.

d. It is impossible to estimate the proportionate value of Lisbeth's life estate in Songacre based on the information given.

24. Reanswer the previous question.

25. Although Cadwallider died in 1985, Lisbeth has never possessed Songacre. The land has been occupied by Cadwallider's nephew, Joachim, who is an adverse possessor, while Lisbeth has been living elsewhere.

a. A title in fee simple absolute can ripen in Joachim in 1994 if Joachim entered into adverse possession in 1984, before Cadwallider's death.

b. A title in fee simple absolute can ripen in Joachim in 1996 if Joachim entered into adverse possession in 1986, after Cadwallider's death.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. A title in fee simple absolute cannot ripen in an adverse possessor when the person actually entitled to possession only has a life estate.

26. Reanswer the previous question.

27. Assume Lisbeth has possessed Songacre ever since Cadwallider's death in 1985. Joachim, as a trespasser, recently intruded and cut down substantial timber on Songacre. If Lisbeth alone were to bring an action against Joachim, then (applying the Winkfield principle):

a. Lisbeth ought to be able to recover, and retain for her own personal benefit, the whole amount of damages caused by Joachim's unlawful cutting of the trees.

b. Lisbeth ought to be able to recover the whole amount of damages caused by Joachim's unlawful cutting of the trees, but she would have to share such a recovery with Raymondo, according to their respective interests.

c. Lisbeth ought to be able to recover the portion of the whole amount of damages actually sustained by her as life tenant, but no more.

d. Lisbeth ought to be able to recover the value of reasonable estovers, but no more.

28. Reanswer the previous question.

29. Olmstead and Wally orally agreed that Olmstead would lease an apartment to Wally, reserving a rent of $400 per month. Wally moved in. The agreed term of the lease was 3 years. Under the local Statute of Frauds, a lease for a term in excess of one year must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged.

a. Wally is entitled to possession of the apartment for 3 years.

b. Wally is entitled to possession of the apartment for 1 year.

c. Wally has an estate in land, but it is not a term of years.

d. The oral lease is void, so Wally does not have any "estate" at all.

30. Reanswer the previous question.

31. Assume that Olmstead and Wally orally agreed that Olmstead would lease the apartment to Wally on a month to month basis, for no particular duration, with Olmstead reserving a rent of $400 per month. Wally moved in on the 16th on September, paying the first month's rent in advance. He has paid rent regularly ever since. As of today (December 17), the earliest date as of which either party can terminate this lease would be:

a. December 31.

b. January 15.

c. January 31.

d. February 15.

32. Reanswer the previous question.

In answering the following TRUE/FALSE questions, assume (unless otherwise specified) that each conveyance is made by O, an owner in fee simple absolute. Remember that the conveyances are to be interpreted as set forth in the last two paragraphs on the instruction page. Assume that all life estates end at the death of the named life tenant.

33. If O conveys "to A for life," O would have a remainder.

34. O conveyed "to A for life." If O then died before A, the land would go to A's heirs upon A's death.

35. If O conveys "to A and his heirs," A would have a fee simple absolute.

36. If O conveys "to A for life, then to B and her heirs," B would have a remainder.

37. If O conveys "to A for life, then to B and her heirs," B would have to outlive A in order for her remainder to take effect.

38. If O conveys "to A and his heirs," A's heirs would have a contingent remainder.

39. If O conveys "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A," B would have a contingent remainder.

40. If O conveys "to A for life, then one day after A dies to B and her heirs provided B survives A," B would have a contingent remainder.

41. If O conveys "to A for life, then to B for life," B would have a remainder.

42. If O conveys "to A for life, then to B for life," O would have a reversion.

43. O conveyed "to A for two years, then to B and her heirs." B would have an executory interest.

44. O conveyed "to A for two years, then to B and her heirs if B marries C." B would have an executory interest (if B has not yet married C).

45. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C." If B were still unmarried at the death of A, possession would revert to O.

46. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C." If, thereafter, C dies, never having married, B would then have no remainder.

47. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C." Thereafter, B marries C before the death of A, then B dies childless. The land would revert to O.

48. A conveyance "to A for life, then to B's first child born after the death of A, and his or her heirs" would create an executory interest.

49. The Statute of Uses was enacted in order to make it possible to convey land by deed instead of by the cumbersome livery of seisin.

50. If O conveys "to A for life, then one day after A's death to B and her heirs," O would have a possibility of reverter.

51. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B reaches age 25." B's remainder will be destroyed if B has not reached age 25 at the death of A.

52. If O conveys "to A and his heirs so long as the land is used for educational purposes," O would probably have a possibility of reverter.

53. O conveyed "to A and his heirs, but if A dies without any children surviving him, then to B and his heirs." B has a shifting interest.

54. O conveyed "to A for life, remainder to A's first child to reach age 25, and his or her heirs." A has one child, age 10, at the time of the conveyance. The remainder would be invalid under the Rule Against Perpetuities.

55. O conveyed "to A and his heirs, but if alcohol is sold commercially on the land, the grantor or his successors may reenter as of their previous estate." A would probably have a fee simple on condition subsequent.

56. O conveyed "to A for life, remainder to A's heirs." Under the Rule in Shelley's Case, this conveyance would give A's heirs a contingent remainder.

57. If O conveys a fee simple determinable to A, then A would receive a fee simple on special limitation.

58. If O conveys "to A for 10 years, then to B and his heirs," B could be considered the landlord of A.

59. O conveyed "to A and his heirs, but if A dies without any children surviving him, then to B and his heirs." A has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation.

60. If O conveys "to A for life, remainder to my heirs," O would have a reversion.

61. If, during B's lifetime, O conveys "to A for life, then to B's heirs," the result would be a contingent remainder following A's life estate.

62. The Statute of Uses made it possible to convey land by deed instead of by the cumbersome livery of seisin.

Facts for Cranberry questions

Cranberry owns a tract of open land with a stream flowing through it. He owns both banks and the bed of the stream. Cranberry does not allow fishing on his land, and whenever he has caught people fishing there he has ordered them to leave.

63. Last week a fleet of weekend canoeists came paddling down the stream on a recreational excursion.

a. If the stream is legally considered not "navigable," then the canoeists were trespassing while paddling through Cranberry's property even if they never once touched the banks or bottom of the stream.

b. If Cranberry had previously always acquiesced in similar canoeing excursions through his property, he probably could not, without warning, hold the canoeists liable for trespass based on last week's excursion -- whether or not the stream is legally considered "navigable."

c. If the stream is legally considered "navigable," Cranberry cannot lawfully prevent the canoeists from paddling through his property on the stream even though he owns both banks and the bed of the stream.

d. All of the above.

64. Reanswer the previous question.

65. Yesterday Cranberry saw a newspaper article about a guy named Biff who won a fishing contest by catching the largest fish of the season in Castor County. The fish had been caught from Cranberry's section of the stream.

a. Cranberry should be entitled to the fish provided he can prove that it is the same fish that he had caught a few days earlier but which escaped accidentally while Cranberry was washing out his bait bucket.

b. Cranberry should be entitled to the fish if Biff had reached the location where he caught the fish by walking across the back of Cranberry's land.

c. Both of the above.

d. Under no circumstances should Cranberry be entitled to the fish, because wild fish living in a natural stream are ferae naturae and, as such, they belong to the captor.

66. Reanswer the previous question.

67. Assume again that Biff won a fishing contest by catching a large fish from Cranberry's section of the stream. Suppose, however, that Biff had requested and obtained Cranberry's permission before going fishing in the stream on Cranberry's land.

a. Cranberry should still be entitled to the fish caught by Biff because it was caught on his land and, therefore, it belonged to Cranberry (like everything else naturally occurring on his land).

b. If, just before Biff caught the big fish, Cranberry saw Biff use live bait and ordered Biff to leave immediately, Biff should still be entitled to keep the fish he caught after being ordered to leave. Cranberry can't just revoke permission over something trivial like using live bait.

c. Even if Biff's fishing activities on Cranberry's land would generally be considered a trespass, Biff would not be a trespasser in this situation because Cranberry gave him a "license" to fish there.

d. Cranberry could not, by giving Biff a "license" to fish, change the fact that Biff's use of the property for fishing was a trespass because fishing licenses can only be issued by the state.

68. Reanswer the previous question.

69. Suppose that Biff was, indeed, a trespasser on Cranberry's land at the time he caught a contest-winning fish there. In the meantime the fish has been fileted and mounted (a taxidermic process that combines the skin of the fish, some filler material and a lot a paint--plus a board). Cranberry is interested in recovering the filets and the mounted trophy from Biff.

a. If removing the filets from the fish is not considered a change in kind, then Cranberry should be entitled to get the filets in replevin even though it cost Biff $3.00 worth of effort to have the fish fileted.

b. If removing the filets from the fish is not considered a change in kind, then Cranberry should be entitled to get the filets in trover even though it cost Biff $3.00 worth of effort to have the fish fileted.

c. Both of the above.

d. Despite the fact that Biff was a trespasser at the time he caught the fish, it is Biff who should be entitled to it (or what it has become), because it was Biff's industry and labor that actually caught the fish.

70. Reanswer the previous question.

71. Suppose that Cranberry definitely could have recovered a contest-winning fish caught by Biff from a stream on Cranberry's land but that now the fish has been fileted and mounted as a trophy. Assume also that labor accounts for a very small part of the value of the trophy:

a. Even if the fish skin cannot be considered the "principal component" of the trophy, Cranberry should be able to recover possession of the trophy.

b. If the fish skin cannot be considered the "principal component" of the trophy, Cranberry should at least be able to get back the skin itself, even if returning just the skin would mean destroying the trophy.

c. Both of above.

d. If the fish skin is considered the "principal component" of the trophy, Cranberry should be able to recover possession of the trophy, including the parts he never owned (assuming that constructing the trophy did not change the skin in kind).

72. Reanswer the previous question.

73. Jenny and Frank recently moved into their newly purchased home, an old structure that needs a lot of fixing up. While replacing some floorboards, a carpenter engaged by the couple found a valuable original letter from President Lincoln hidden in the floor. The carpenter handed the letter over to Jenny "for the time being." The previous owner of house, who lived there without knowledge of the letter, has now come forward to claim it. Assuming that the carpenter was not an "employee" of Jenny and Frank, and that no one knows who is the letter's true owner:

a. In states following the so-called English rule with respect to finding, Jenny and Frank would logically have to turn over the letter to the previous owner of house.

b. In states that follow the so-called American rule with respect to finding, Jenny and Frank would logically have to turn over the letter to the carpenter.

c. Both of the above.

d. In most states, Jenny and Frank would have a better right to the letter than either the carpenter or the previous possessor of the house.

74. Reanswer the previous question.

75. Benny Ketchup, lead singer for the hot rock group, Sublime, was surrounded by autograph seekers when his ballpoint pen gave out. He borrowed a pen from Pat, one of the excited fans, and signed an autograph for Pat and for about 25 others. Turning to leave, Benny shoved Pat's pen into the hand of a person who looked somewhat like Pat, and that person ran off with the pen, as a souvenir of Benny. Pat's pen wasn't very valuable, but Pat felt victimized by the slight and has sued Benny.

a. Benny is liable to Pat for the value of the pen.

b. Benny would be liable to Pat for the value of the pen only if he was negligent in handing Pat's pen to the other person.

c. Pat's only action here is against the person who actually got the pen.

d. There is no basis for Pat to recover the value of the pen from anybody.

76. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Karen-Jim questions

Karen and Jim were buying soft drinks at a machine that accepts $1 bills. Lacking change, Karen asked Jim if she could borrow a dollar, saying she would "pay it back tomorrow." Jim handed her a one-dollar bill. When the machine refused to accept the money, Karen noticed that the serial number was printed upside down, making the bill worth $600 or more. Karen refused to return the dollar bill to Jim, but the next day she tendered another, ordinary dollar bill, which Jim refused.

77. Under the best analysis of these facts:

a. Karen should be regarded as the owner of the bill from the moment Jim handed it to her--and, as such, she was not in a position to commit common-law larceny with respect to it.

b. Karen should not be regarded as a bailee of the bill until she knew what she had got--at which point she committed common-law larceny by deciding to keep it.

c. Karen should be regarded as a bailee of the bill from the moment Jim handed it to her--and, as such, she was not in a position to commit common-law larceny with respect to it.

d. Jim intended to make a bailment of the bill to Karen and, as a bailee, Karen was wrong to tender back a different dollar bill from the one she had received from Jim.

78. Reanswer the previous question.

79. Karen, still in possession of the dollar bill with the upside-down serial number, took it to a stamp and coin dealer to have it appraised. The dealer noted the rarity of the upside-down serial number and asked to keep the bill overnight. During the night, a thief broke into the dealer's shop and stole the dollar bill. Karen has sued the dealer for the value of the dollar bill:

a. Assuming Karen had wrongfully obtained the dollar bill from Jim, the dealer's best defense would be to prove that Karen did not have any right to possess the bill in the first place.

b. If the dealer is liable as a bailee for the loss of the dollar bill, then Karen is an appropriate party plaintiff to assert that liability.

c. As a bailee, the dealer is absolutely liable to Karen for the value of the dollar bill.

d. In order to make a prima facie case for a monetary recovery, Karen would need to marshall evidence to prove that the theft was a result of the dealer's negligence.

80. Reanswer the previous question.

81. Assume again that Karen left the dollar bill in the possession of a dealer, and that it was stolen from the dealer's shop during the night. Also assume that Karen sued the dealer and recovered the full value of the stolen dollar bill. If it was later determined that Jim, not Karen, was the true owner of the bill at the time it was stolen from the dealer's shop:

a. The dealer could probably be held liable a second time for the value of the dollar bill.

b. Jim can now sue the dealer and recover the value of the dollar bill, but Jim's suit will be successful only if Jim did not authorize Karen to sue on his behalf.

c. The dealer has a defense if Jim tries to sue the dealer for the value of the dollar bill.

d. The dealer should have required Karen to demonstrate her title in the action she brought, and he may held responsible for not doing so.

82. Reanswer the previous question.

83. Suppose that Karen and Jim amicably agreed to sell the dollar bill with the upside-down serial number and then split the proceeds. The dealer to whom they took it induced them to sell him the dollar bill for $60 by fraudulently assuring them that it was worth only that much. As the dealer knew full well, however, it was actually worth at least $600. By the time Karen and Jim learned of the fraud, the dealer had resold the dollar bill to a collector who paid full value without any knowledge of how the dealer got it. Under common law:

a. The collector got a good title from the dealer.

b. Karen and Jim can rescind the sale to the dealer, and then sue to recover the dollar bill from the collector.

c. Nobody can transfer a better title than he or she has and, therefore, the collector got no better title than the dealer--a voidable title.

d. The dealer had a void title due the fact that he used fraud in order to obtain the dollar bill from Karen and Jim.

84. Reanswer the previous question.

85. Durlyn desired to make a gift of a small statuette to Kim. He called in the servant he employed, Fabio, and instructed Fabio to carefully wrap the statuette and take to Kim, who lived some distance away. Fabio complied. While Fabio was on the way to Kim's:

a. Fabio was the bailee of the statuette.

b. Fabio would be legally considered to be in possession of the statuette.

c. Kim was already the owner of the statuette.

d. Durlyn was in constructive possession of the statuette.

86. Reanswer the previous question.

87. Suppose again that Durlyn instructed his servant, Fabio, to take a statuette to Kim, as a gift from Durlyn, and Fabio complied. If Durlyn changed his mind while Fabio was still on his way to Kim's with the statuette, and Durlyn called Fabio on the car phone and told him to turn around:

a. The gift would still almost certainly already be complete, and Kim would be the owner of the statuette, by virtue of the delivery to Fabio.

b. The gift could still probably be completed, making Kim owner of the statuette, if Fabio (feeling that Durlyn was making a miserly mistake) went ahead and followed the original instructions and took the statuette to Kim.

c. There would be no valid gift of the statuette.

d. There would be no valid legal gift of the statuette, but Kim probably could successfully assert that there had been a valid equitable gift.

88. Reanswer the previous question.

89. Suppose that Durlyn (not in apprehension of death) had written and handed a note to Kim, saying: "You have always admired my statuette, and I want you to have it after my death. It is now yours, subject only to my right to retain possession of it during my lifetime. As soon as I die, just show this note to the executors, and they will let you have it." The best way to interpret this transaction would be as:

a. A valid inter vivos gift of a future interest in the statuette.

b. A valid gift of equitable title to the statuette.

c. A valid gift causa mortis of the statuette.

d. A attempted gift that failed due to a lack of in praesenti donative intent.

90. Reanswer the previous question.

<END OF EXAMINATION>