PACE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
PROPERTY I -- VERSION A
PROFESSOR HUMBACH December 12, 1994
FINAL EXAMINATION TIME LIMIT: 3 1/2 HOURS
IN TAKING THIS EXAMINATION,
YOU ARE REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH THE SCHOOL OF LAW RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR
FINAL EXAMINATIONS. YOU ARE REMINDED TO
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THE CONCLUSION OF THE EXAMINATION.
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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:
This examination consists of multiple choice questions and true-false questions. Answer the questions on the answer sheet provided. Write your examination number and the version (A or B) on the answer sheet. Write them NOW.
Answer each question selecting the BEST answer. Mark your choice on the answer sheet with the special pencil provided. Select only one answer per question or else the question will be marked wrong. If you change an answer, be sure to FULLY erase your original answer or the question may be marked wrong. Make sure your answer marks are dark. You may be penalized if you do not mark darkly enough.
When you complete the examination, turn in the answer sheet together with this question booklet.
Every even-numbered multiple choice question asks you to reanswer the preceding odd-numbered question. Question 2, for example, asks you to reanswer question 1. If you are fairly confident about your answer to the principal question, mark the same answer for the "reanswer" question. If you can narrow the choice down to two answers, however, and cannot decide which of the two is the better one, you may wish to mark a different answer on the "reanswer" question. IMPORTANT NOTE: If you decide to mark a different answer on a "reanswer" question, at least one of your two answers will be wrong.
Unless the context otherwise requires (such as where the facts are specifically stated to arise in New York), base your answers on general common law principles as generally applied in American common law jurisdictions. Do not assume the existence of any facts or agreements not set forth in the questions. Assume that the period of limitations on ejectment is 10 years.
Except as
otherwise specified, all conveyances are to be considered as if made, in each
case, by a deed having the effect of a bargain and sale, after the Statute of
Uses, but ignoring the effects of "modernizing" statutes and rules
(e.g. which eliminate the Rule in Shelley's Case, the Doctrine of Worthier
Title or the destructibility of contingent remainders). Ignore the possibility
of dower.
1. Bent Ottashape bought six acres of land that contained approximately two acres of wetlands. Local zoning allows residential structures only, permitting the construction of one dwelling unit per acre in Bent's zone. Last week, the municipality adopted a wetlands law that prohibits building on wetlands and certain specified buffers.
a. If, previous to the wetlands law, Bent had sold the two acres of wetlands to Sump as two (rather soggy) lots, the wetlands law may well be unconstitutional as applied to the lots acquired by Sump.
b. If Bent still retains all six acres as a single tract, the wetlands law would probably be considered unconstitutional as applied to the unbuildable portions of the tract, even if Bent can lawfully build at least 4 houses elsewhere on his land.
c. Even if the effect of the wetlands law were to totally prohibit all valuable uses of the six acre tract, it would not be considered unconstitutional as long as the municipal legislature had a strong public interest rationale for preserving wetlands and their surrounding buffers.
d. Unless building on wetlands can be considered a "nuisance" under common law, the wetlands law prohibiting such construction looks to be presumptively unconstitutional as a taking.
2. Reanswer the previous question.
Facts for Bent-Grizz questions
To compound his problems, Bent has recently discovered that a "squatter" named Grizz has been living in a makeshift cabin on a remote corner of Bent's six acres of land. Although the cabin and the squatter's occupancy have been in no way hidden, Bent (who had bought the land as a long term investment) just hasn't been paying much attention to it.
3. If Grizz has been in possession of a corner area of Bent's property for more than 10 years:
a. It is likely that Grizz would be now be the owner of the six acres.
b. It is likely that Grizz would now be entitled to receive a deed to the land that he has been possessing.
c. Both of the above.
d. Any ripened title that Grizz may have acquired by adverse possession would be limited to the corner land that Grizz actually possessed for at least 10 continuous years.
4. Reanswer the previous question.
5. Even if Grizz has been in possession of the corner of Bent's property for more than 10 years, Bent's ownership of the whole six acres would probably still be safe:
a. If Bent could prove that, in fact, he had no knowledge of Grizz's possessory activities on the land.
b. If, during Grizz's possession, Bent came under a disability (3 years imprisonment for wetlands violations) and did not get out until just 6 months ago.
c. If, four years ago, some of Bent's construction workers discovered Grizz's cabin in late November, and they bulldozed it to the ground, forcing Grizz to live with his mother (in another state) for the rest of that winter.
d. All of the above.
6. Reanswer the previous question.
7. If Grizz acquired a ripened title by adverse possession to land (formerly) belonging to Bent:
a. Bent would still have a trespess action against Grizz for damages occurring during at least a portion of the time before the title actually ripened.
b. Bent would still have an action against Grizz for mesne profits for at least a portion of the time before the title actually ripened.
c. Such ripened title would be the legal result of the running of the statute of limitations on ejectment.
d. Bent would have an action against Grizz for trespass damages, but under the Winkfield principle he could not recover damages for permanent depreciation of the land.
8. Reanswer the previous question.
9. After he was booted off Bent's land, Grizz needed to find a new spot to squat. He lighted upon some nearby land that appeared abandoned. In fact, the land was originally owned by Lefty Will, who devised the land "to Temp for life, remainder to Perm and his heirs." Grizz can acquire a ripened in fee simple to this land after just 10 years of adverse possession:
a. If Grizz entered before the death of Lefty, while the fee simple in the land was still held by Lefty.
b. If Grizz entered after the death of Lefty, while the fee simple in the land was divided between Temp, as life tenant, and Perm, as remainderman.
c. Both of the above.
d. Only if Grizz manages to convince a court to "tack" his possession onto the possession of Lefty.
10. Reanswer the previous question.
11. Suppose that Grizz chopped down some trees on certain other land that the late Lefty Will had also devised "to Temp for life, remainder to Perm and his heirs." Temp, who was in possession of the land as life tenant at the time, now sues Grizz. A court applying the principle of the Winkfield case:
a. Should not allow Temp to recover anything, because Temp has not personally suffered any loss (since, as a life tenant, Temp could not lawfully cut the trees himself).
b. Should allow Temp to recover full damages from Grizz, the same amount as Temp could recover if he were the sole owner of the land.
c. Should allow Temp to recover damages from Grizz, but not damages attributable to Perm's interest in the land.
d. Should not allow Perm to intervene or separately sue Grizz, because a mere future interest holder does not acquire rights in the land until the life estate comes to an end.
12. Reanswer the previous question.
Facts for Orin-Nuff questions
Orin DeWaters, an avid fisherman, rowed his small boat down a stream to a place where he was floating within the boundaries of land belonging to Haddon Nuff. While there, Orin caught several large trout. Nuff discovered Orin, trout in boat, and desires to know what rights he has as a landowner.
13. If the stream is found to be navigable in fact:
a. Nuff would presumptively be deemed to own the stream bed under the rules applied in all or nearly all states.
b. Nuff would probably not be considered to own the stream bed under the rules applied in any state.
c. Nuff would be considered to own the stream bed under the usual presumptions applied in some states.
d. None of the above. The question of whether Nuff owns the stream bed would have nothing to do with the navigation capacity (if any) of the stream.
14. Reanswer the previous question.
15. If the stream is found to be navigable in fact and Nuff owns the bed of the stream:
a. Orin could be considered to be a trespasser for merely boating over Nuff's land even though Orin stayed in his boat and never touched shore, because Nuff's ownership would include the water flowing over his land.
b. Orin could be considered to be a trespasser for merely boating over Nuff's land even though Orin stayed in his boat and never touched shore, because Nuff's ownership extends "ad coelum" (to heaven).
c. Orin would not be a trespasser for merely boating over Nuff's land, provided that Orin stayed in his boat, and never touched the bottom, the shore, or anything else constituting a permanent part of Nuff's land
d. Orin would not be a trespasser for merely boating over Nuff's land, provided that Orin confined his activities within Nuff's boundaries to navigation and acts that the law deems to be incidental to navigation.
16. Reanswer the previous question.
17. If fish are ferae naturae, then the fish caught by Orin DeWaters while floating over stretches of stream bed belonging to Nuff:
a. Would properly belong to Orin, as first captor, if Orin's presence and fishing activities were in no way legally wrongful as against Nuff.
b. Would properly belong to Nuff, as owner of the locus in quo, if Orin's presence or fishing activities constituted a trespass against Nuff.
c. Both of the above.
d. Would properly belong to Nuff, as opposed to Orin, only if Nuff could prove that the fish caught by Orin were ones that Nuff had stocked the stream with.
18. Reanswer the previous question.
19. If Nuff had stocked the stream with trout prior to Orin DeWaters' fishing trip, that fact should weigh heavily in favor of Nuff's recovering the value of the trout that Orin caught within Nuff's boundaries:
a. If trout of that same species commonly occur naturally in the stream.
b. If trout of that same species never occur naturally in the stream.
c. Whether or not trout of that same species occur naturally in the stream.
d. If Nuff had long acquiesced in recreational boaters passing through his land by floating over his stream bed.
20. Reanswer the previous question.
21. Assuming that the stream is not considered to be navigable in fact, but that Nuff has long acquiesced in recreational boaters passing through his land by floating over his stream bed:
a. Such acquiescence by Nuff could form a basis for Orin to contend that boating over Nuff's stream bed is not a trespass.
b. People may now have a license from such acquiescence to boat over Nuff's stream bed, and there would be no legal way for Nuff to stop boaters from floating in, as Orin did.
c. Both of the above.
d. There would no way for such acquiescence by Nuff to result in a "license" to fish within Nuff's boundaries, because fishing licenses can only be issued by the state.
22. Reanswer the previous question.
Facts for Allhart questions
Ellen Allhart donated a bag of old clothes to a charity that operates a "thrift shop" where second-hand apparel is sold. Both Allhart and the charity assumed that bag's contents had little value. However, a diamond pin belonging to Allhart was concealed in the lining of a tweed jacket that Allhart had included in the bag.
23. Under these circumstances:
a. It is highly probable that the charity became the owner of the pin.
b. There is no logical way to say that the charity became the possessor or bailee of the pin.
c. The charity could not have received a valid gift of the pin because you cannot have donative intent unless you know exactly what it is that you are giving (i.e., a donor cannot "give" the unknown contents of a bag).
d. It is doubtful that the charity became the owner of the pin.
24. Reanswer the previous question.
25. Freda Frugal, shopping in the thrift shop, paid $15 for the tweed jacket that Allhart had donated. When Frugal got the jacket home, she discovered the diamond pin in the lining.
a. Fairly clearly, Frugal the finder now has a better claim to the pin than either Allhart or the charity.
b. Frugal would have no legal rights whatsoever to the pin.
c. Even if the charity never had legal ownership of the pin, it may be able to recover the pin from Frugal (particularly in jurisdictions that follow the so-called "English rule" on finders).
d. Even if the charity never had legal ownership of the pin, Frugal would have received a good title to the pin if she was a bona fide purchaser, for value, of the jacket.
26. Reanswer the previous question.
Facts for Sue Spender questions
Sue Spender was shopping at the Big Mart department store. In order to try on a pullover, she asked one of the store clerks to hold her coat.
27. Suppose that, on taking back her coat, Spender announced: "My wallet is gone. Somebody took my wallet from my coat." At the time when the store clerk received the coat from Spender, the clerk didn't know (or have reason to believe) that there was a wallet in it. You represent Big Mart in an action brought by Spender to recover the value of the wallet and its contents (allegedly, $527). Your best and most logical defense would be:
a. There was no bailment of the wallet because a person cannot be a bailee of something that he or she does not know exists.
b. Even if Big Mart was bailee of the wallet, it met its duty of care because ordinarily prudent persons in its position would not expend any effort to protect a thing that they have no reason to believe exists.
c. The bailment in this case, if any, was a gratuitous bailment, for which there can be no liability.
d. Spender assumed all risk of loss by freely choosing to entrust the coat and its contents to the Big Mart clerk.
28. Reanswer the previous question.
29. Suppose that, while the coat was in the clerk's possession, an unknown person stole it. When Spender asked for her coat, the clerk stated (with great embarrassment) that the coat had "disappeared"
--and suggested that Spender check out the fine selection of new coats on the third floor.
a. Because the bailment was for the reciprocal benefit of the parties, Big Mart should be liable for the value of the coat if the clerk did not exercise ordinary care to protect the coat from theft.
b. Under the generally applicable rules, Spender can establish a prima facie case of Big Mart's liability for the coat merely by pleading and proving that the clerk took possession of the coat and failed to return it, subject to rebuttal evidence by Big Mart.
c. Both of the above
d. The bailment was gratuitous. Therefore, in some states Big Mart would only be held liable if the loss was caused by its gross negligence.
30. Reanswer the previous question.
31. Astro found a gold wristwatch in the street. The true owner cannot be located. Astro should be entitled to keep the watch:
a. In states that follow the so-called "English rule" on finders.
b. In states that follow the so-called "American rule" on finders.
c. Both of the above.
d. None of the above.
32. Reanswer the previous question.
33. Assume that Astro found a watch while shopping in the Big Mart department store. The true owner cannot be located. Astro would probably have to relinquish the watch to Big Mart:
a. If he found the watch in a "public" part of the store.
b. If he found the watch while passing without permission through a section of the store that was not open to the public.
c. Both of above.
d. Only if he found the watch while searching with the express permission of an authorized representative of the Big Mart.
34. Reanswer the previous question.
35. Pastell was moving to Boston. He didn't trust the movers with a valuable art work, a drawing by van der Mirror, so he asked his friend, Doop, to keep it for a few days--until Pastell could pick it up. Pastell didn't inform Doop that the drawing was worth $750,000. Doop hung the drawing over his mantel, but grave damage occurred when one of Doop's children shook a bottle of soda pop nearby and squirted sticky fluid all over the van der Mirror. Pastell is suing Doop for the diminution in value of the badly stained drawing (amounting to six times Doop's net worth).
a. Doop should not be held liable as a bailee because bailment requires an agreement, and Doop never agreed to be liable for so valuable an object.
b. The maximum that Doop should be held liable for (assuming he is liable at all) is the "apparent" value of the drawing--as such value would appear to an ordinarily prudent person.
c. The actual value of the drawing is irrelevant to whether there was a bailment and is also irrelevant to the amount of recovery, if any.
d. Even if, by taking different precautions, Doop might have prevented the loss, he will not be liable if he used the care that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in similar circumstances.
36. Reanswer the previous question.
37. Suppose, in the preceding question, that Pastell was not the actual owner of the drawing but held it on loan from a friend who owned a gallery. Under the Winkfield principle:
a. Pastell should not be able to recover anything for the damage to the drawing because Pastell has not personally suffered any loss.
b. Pastell should not be able to recover anything for the damage to the drawing because he should not be allowed to assert a jus tertii (right of a third party) under which he cannot claim.
c. Both of the above.
d. Pastell may have an action against Doop, but he could not recover damages for permanent depreciation of the drawing.
e. None of the above.
38. Reanswer the previous question.
Facts for Dasson-Doc questions
Dasson owns an old farmhouse and some surrounding land in fee simple absolute. Dasson conveyed a possessory interest in this real property to an old Army buddy, Doc, who needed a place to live.
39. The least estate that Dasson could have conveyed to Doc would have been a:
a. Tenancy at will
b. Tenancy from week to week
c. Life estate
d. Term of years
40. Reanswer the previous question.
41. On investigation, you discover that the estate conveyed by Dasson to Doc was a freehold estate but not a fee. The estate that Doc received must have been a:
a. Tenancy at will
b. Periodic tenancy
c. Life estate
d. Term of years
42. Reanswer the previous question.
43. Assume that Dasson had desired to convey a life estate to Doc. Which of the following words would not have created the desired life estate in Doc?
a. "to Doc for life"
b. "to Doc so long as he lives on the land"
c. "to Doc for 500 years, or until his death, whichever first occurs"
d. Any of the above would have created a life estate in Doc.
44. Reanswer the previous question.
45. Assume that Dasson had conveyed a tenancy from month to month to Doc, whose estate runs from the 10th of each month the 9th of the following month. As of today (December 12, 1994), the earliest date as of which Dasson can unilaterally terminate Doc's right of possession would be:
a. January 1, 1995
b. January 9, 1995
c. January 31, 1995
d. February 9, 1995
46. Reanswer the previous question.
47. In the preceding question, in order for Dasson to terminate Doc's tenancy as of the earliest possible date, Dasson's notice of termination to Doc would:
a. Have to be given immediately.
b. Have to be given on or before December 31, 1994.
c. Have to be given on or before January 9, 1995.
d. Have to be given on or before January 31, 1995.
48. Reanswer the previous question.
49. Assume that Dasson had conveyed an estate to Doc using the words "to Doc for 36 months."
a. Dasson would not have to give any advance notice to terminate this estate at the end of the 36 months.
b. Because its duration is measured in months, this would be considered a month to month tenancy rather than a term of years.
c. If Doc did not pay the rent when due, Dasson could terminate the lease under a "conditional limitation" implied by the common law, although it would be good practice to put an express conditional limitation in the lease.
d. Doc would be considered to have the seisin for the 36 months.
50. Reanswer the previous question.
51. Assume again that Dasson had conveyed an estate to Doc using the words "to Doc for 36 months." Under the traditional common law rules:
a. Doc's liability for rent would terminate if Dasson evicted Doc without cause prior to the end of the 36 months.
b. Doc's liability for rent would terminate if a breach of the lease by Dasson rendered the premises untenantable and, as a result, Doc was forced to move out.
c. Both of the above.
d. Doc's liability for rent would be abated, as least partially, if Dasson failed to meet a substantial part of his services obligations under the lease, greatly reducing the value of the premises to Doc.
e. All of the above.
52. Reanswer the previous question.
53. Assume again that Dasson had conveyed an estate to Doc using the words "to Doc for 36 months." If Doc desired to transfer possession of the premises to Locke:
a. He could utilize a sublease, in which case Doc would become the landlord of Locke.
b. He could utilize an assignment, in which case Dasson would become the landlord of Locke.
c. Both of the above.
d. In the case of either an assignment or a sublease, Doc would remain liable to Dasson for rent.
e. All of the above.
54. Reanswer the previous question.
Facts for Rita-Harley questions
Rita Booke had an extensive personal library. One day, her friend, Harley, paid a social visit and, as he was admiring Rita's library, he asked if he could borrow a book "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance." Rita agreed and Harley took the book with him when he left.
55. The legal result of the events described so far is:
a. A bailment.
b. A transfer of ownership and possession.
c. A gift.
d. Accession.
56. Reanswer the previous question.
57. Later, after reading the book, Harley decided that he wanted to keep it because he found it so inspiring. If Harley refused to return the book when Rita demanded it, and if he denied that he even had it, he would be:
a. Guilty of common law larceny.
b. A converter.
c. A constructive possessor.
d. All of the above.
58. Reanswer the previous question.
59. In the preceding question, Rita would have:
a. An action in trover to recover the value of the book.
b. An action in replevin to recover possession of the book.
c. Both of the above.
d. An indefinite time to sue Harley once she makes a demand for the book (if Harley refuses).
60. Reanswer the previous question.
61. Suppose that, having decided that he wants to keep the book, Harley telephones Rita and asks if he can purchase it from her. It's an autographed copy, which is why Harley wants that particular one. Rita is very touched and says: "If you want it so bad, you can just keep it, my gift to you." Wordless with joy, Harley rushes to the next room to admire his new "acquisition."
a. Harley should immediately take the book to Rita's so that she can properly deliver it to him, thus completing the gift.
b. Harley should immediately go back to the phone and say that he "accepts," in order to complete the elements of a valid gift.
c. Both of the above.
d. None of the above. Harley has become the legal owner of the book.
62. Reanswer the previous question.
63. In light of the facts that we have before us, the gift in the preceding question (assuming that it was validly completed) would presumptively be:
a. An inter vivos gift.
b. A gift causa mortis.
c. A testamentary gift, since proof of that the gift occurred would have to rely entirely on oral testimony.
d. An equitable gift.
64. Reanswer the previous question.
65. Ima Gonner, lying on her deathbed, desired to give certain bonds to her nephew, Harry Upp. For security reasons, the bonds were located in a safe deposit box, and it would be relatively inconvenient for Ima to get physical possession of them. Ima handed Harry a key to the safe deposit box and said: "The bonds in the box are yours."
a. At this point there would probably be a completed gift of the bonds, provided that the key handed to Harry was the only key to the box.
b. At this point there would probably be a completed gift of the bonds, even if Ima still retained a duplicate key to the box.
c. Ordinarily, handing over a key under circumstances such as these would be regarded as an effective symbolical delivery of the donated thing itself--the key legally serving as a "deed."
d. At this point there would probably be a completed gift of the bonds, provided that Harry had actually handled the bonds at some time in the past.
66. Reanswer the previous question.
67. Assume that Ima Gonner, gravely ill on her deathbed, made an effective gift of certain IBM bonds to her nephew, Harry Upp. Applying the usual presumption, the gift by Ima would be:
a. A gift causa mortis.
b. Revocable by Ima at any time prior to her death.
c. Automatically revoked if Ima fully recovered from the illness and returned to perfect health.
d. All of the above.
68. Reanswer the previous question.
69. Assume again that Ima Gonner, gravely ill on her deathbed, made an effective gift of certain IBM bonds to her nephew, Harry Upp. A week later, Ima died leaving a will that arguably bequeathed the very same bonds to her sister, Stella Livven.
a. If Ima made the will after the gift to Harry, and the will specifically bequeathed those particular IBM bonds to Stella, then Stella should have a better claim to the bonds than Harry.
b. If Ima made the will before the gift to Harry, and the will specifically bequeathed those particular IBM bonds to Stella, then Harry should have a better claim to the bonds than Stella.
c. Both of the above.
d. If Ima made the will after the gift to Harry, and the will only generally bequeathed "all of my stocks and bonds to Stella," then Harry should have a better claim to the bonds than Stella.
e. All of the above.
70. Reanswer the previous question.
71. Suppose that, years ago, while Ima was still in good health, she had visited her safe deposit bank with nephew Harry, who was a child at the time. Ima showed Harry the IBM bonds, and let him hold them, saying: "When I die, these bonds will be yours." On many family occasions, Ima reiterated to various relatives present that the IBM bonds were to become Harry's at her death. After Ima's death:
a. The bonds should go to Harry, because this was Ima's express wish.
b. The bonds should go to Harry, there having been both an expressed in praesenti donative intent and a "delivery."
c. The bonds should be part of Ima's estate, for the benefit of the persons entitled to that estate.
d. There should, in any event, be deemed to have been an enforceable equitable gift of the bonds to Harry, with Ima having made herself the trustee.
72. Reanswer the previous question.
73. Suppose that, while Ima was in good health and facing no particular peril, she handed some of her bonds to her niece, Mary, saying: "I have decided to give these to your brother, Harry. Please take them and see that he gets them." Shortly thereafter, while Mary still had the bonds, Ima learned that Harry was living like a libertine. Ima developed strong second thoughts about giving him the bonds.
a. Ima should still be able to revoke the gift if Mary was acting as agent for Harry.
b. Ima should still be able to revoke the gift if Mary was acting as agent for Ima.
c. Ima should still be able to revoke the gift no matter who Mary was acting as "agent" for, as long as the delivery to Harry has not yet been made.
d. This appears to have been an inter vivos gift and, therefore, Ima would not have a right to prevent Harry from getting the bonds no matter who Mary was acting as "agent" for.
74. Reanswer the previous question.
In answering the following TRUE/FALSE questions, assume (unless otherwise specified) that each conveyance is made by O, an owner in fee simple absolute. Remember that the conveyances are to be interpreted as set forth in the last two paragraphs on the instruction page. Assume that all life estates end at the death of the named life tenant.
75. If O conveys "to A for life," O would have a reversion.
76. O conveyed "to A for life, remainder to B and his heirs." B then died before A. Because O's conveyance did not provide for this possibility, the land will revert to O upon A's death.
77. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A by more than six months." B would have a contingent remainder.
78. O conveys "to A and his heirs." A's heirs would receive no interest in the land under this conveyance.
79. If O conveys "to A for life, then one day after A dies to B and her heirs," B would have an executory interest.
80. If O conveys "to A for life, then one day after A dies to B and her heirs if B marries C," B would have a contingent remainder.
81. If O conveys "to A for life, then to B for life," O would have a reversion.
82. O conveyed "to A for two years, then to B and her heirs." B would be construed to be the landlord of A.
83. O conveyed "to A for two years, then to B and her heirs if B marries C." B would have a contingent remainder (if B has not yet married C).
84. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C." The land will go to B when she marries C irrespective of whether she does so before or after A's death.
85. A conveyance "to A for life, then to B's first child born after the death of A, and his or her heirs" would create an executory interest of the springing kind.
86. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B reaches age 25." If B is 23 years old when A dies, B's remainder would be destroyed at A's death.
87. If O conveys "to A and his heirs so long as the land is used for educational purposes," A would probably have a fee simple determinable.
88. O conveyed "to A and his heirs, but if A dies without any children surviving him, then to B and his heirs." B has a shifting interest.
89. O conveyed "to A for life, remainder to A's heirs." Under the Rule in Shelley's Case, this conveyance would create a fee simple in A.
90. If O conveyed a fee simple on condition subsequent to A, O would have a right of re-entry for condition broken.
91. O conveyed "to A and his heirs, but if A is more than 55 years old when he dies, then to B and his heirs." A has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation.
92. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and his heirs if B survives A." If B dies before A, the land will revert to O upon A's death.
93. If, during B's lifetime, O conveys "to A for life, then to B's heirs," the result would be a contingent remainder following A's life estate.
94. If O conveys "to A for life, remainder to my heirs," O's heirs would have a contingent remainder under the Doctrine of Worthier Title.
95. If O conveys "to A and her heirs beginning 7 years from today," A would have a shifting executory interest and O would have a term of years.
96. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and his heirs if B is still living in Springfield 5 years after the death of A." B would have a springing interest.
Facts for Jenna Rossatie questions
Jenna Rossatie, a wealthy widow, enjoyed making gifts to charity. She drew up a document that stated: "I hereby give my two Tang dynasty carved horses to the Asian Art Society. The Society's legal right in them shall commence immediately but its right to take possession is postponed until my death, when it shall assume possession." After signing the document, she delivered it (but not the carved horses) to the Society.
97. Of the following descriptions, the best description of this transaction in legal terms would be:
a. Jenna gave a remainder and retained a life estate.
b. Jenna made an equitable gift of the horses, in effect declaring herself to be the trustee for the donee.
c. Jenna gave the Society a future interest that is identical to the interest which, prior to a testator's death, is held by the beneficiaries named in a will.
d. Jenna has made a failed legal gift--failed because the delivery requirement has not been met.
98. Reanswer the previous question.
99. The delivery requirement for Jenna's gift to the Society was:
a. Met by the Society's taking possession, pursuant to Jenna's written instructions, after her death.
b. Met by Jenna's delivering the signed document to the Society.
c. Not met, but no delivery was needed since this gift should be properly construed as an equitable gift.
d. Not met, so the attempted gift failed.
100. Reanswer the previous question.
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examination.>