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1. Borton is a retired biology professor who owns a farm. It has several large meadows with many wildflowers that attract butterflies. Borton has been particularly pleased that a certain very rare species of pink butterfly, the so-called “Hot Petunia,” has established itself on his land. One day, to his chagrin, Borton saw his former colleague, Klover, out in one of the meadows with a butterfly net. Borton had told Klover several times he was not allowed on Borton’s land. As Borton chased Klover away, he noticed that Klover had one of the prized Hot Petunias in a collection jar. On the lepidoptera market, a specimen of this rare butterfly is worth over $600. Under the usual common law rules:

a. Borton would have no serious claim to recover the Hot Petunia captured by Klover.

b. Borton should be entitled to the Hot Petunia under the principle of animus revertendi.

c. Borton should be entitled to the Hot Petunia under the principle of ratione soli.

d. Borton should be entitled to the Hot Petunia because he would be legally regarded as the first captor.

2. Reanswer the previous question.

3. While vacationing in the north woods, Borton decided to do some butterfly hunting on a large tract of open land owned by a timber company. He spotted a fairly rare Ugglod butterfly and, with a skilled sweep, got it securely in his net. However, he then fumbled and the Ugglod got loose again. As it flittered across a field with Borton watching in helpless resignation, Borton’s nemesis, Klover, leapt out of the tall weeds and netted the Ugglod. Now Klover refuses Borton’s demands for the Ugglod. Under the usual common law rules:

a. Borton should be entitled to the Ugglod as the first captor, and no serious argument to the contrary could be asserted by Klover.

b. Klover would have a strong claim to the Ugglod because he caught it after it had regained its natural liberty.

c. Borton should have a better claim to the butterfly than Klover under the principle of Keeble v. Hickeringill (the duck-decoy pond/gun-shooting case).

d. Borton should have no rights as against Klover if neither of them had any permission from the timber company to go on the timber company’s land or capture butterflies there.

4. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for George-Helene questions. George desires to obtain high-speed internet service for his home. This will require a new wire to be run from the street overhead utility lines to his house. Unfortunately, because of the way the utility-wire junctions are laid out, putting in the new wire will require a new, additional pole (installed at George’s considerable expense). The only inexpensive alternative is to pass the new wire across a corner of land belonging to Helene, who is George’s next-door neighbor. Even though the new wire would be 20’ above the ground, and not interfere with Helene’s buildings or trees, Helene objects.

5. If there is no applicable easement:

a. George would have no right to run the new wire over Helene’s land.

b. George would normally have a legal right to commit the minor technical “trespass” that would be involved in maintaining the new wire across Helene’s land if the only alternatives would require a major expense.

c. As long as the new wire does not actually touch the ground, buildings or trees, etc. on Helene’s land, it would not constitute a trespass to run it over her land.

d. As long as George offers to pay Helene a nominal amount for the nominal injury to her land, Helene has no legal objection that she can assert against the new wire.

6. Reanswer the previous question.

7. After being implored by George, Helene finally said: “Okay, go ahead and put the wire across my land.” Before George installed the new wire or otherwise relied, however, Helene changed her mind, and she told George not to install it:

a. George would still be entitled to install the new wire because Helene’s original statement granted him the right to do so.

b. George would still be entitled to install the new wire as long as it does not actually touch the ground (or buildings or trees, etc.) on Helene’s land.

c. Helene would not be entitled to have the wire removed, if George goes ahead and installs it, because an overhead wire does not constitute a trespass.

d. Helene can lawfully refuse to allow the wire because a license is revocable by the licensor.

8. Reanswer the previous question.

9. Suppose that George offered Helene $100, and Helene said: “Okay, go ahead and put in the wire across my land.” George did so, at substantial expense. A few months later, Helene wants George to remove the wire. Which of the following arguments or theories might be helpful to George?

a. Easement by estoppel.

b. Executed parole license.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. The statute of frauds requires a signed writing in order to create an interest in real property, and George is trying to assert an interest based on a purely oral agreement.

10. Reanswer the previous question.

11. Suppose that Helene, in exchange for $1000, delivered George a deed that was sufficient to create a valid express easement to install and maintain a new water line across Helene’s land. This easement would be presumptively:

a. Appurtenant.

b. Attendant.

c. In gross.

d. Personal and applicable only as long as George continues to own the property next door to Helene’s.

12. Reanswer the previous question.

13. Suppose again that Helene, in exchange for $1000, delivered George a deed that was sufficient to create a valid express easement to install and maintain a new water line across Helene’s land. If Helene later sold her property to Davis while the trench for the water line was still open and the pipe was visibly in place:

a. George would probably not be able to enforce the easement against Davis unless the deed creating it had been duly recorded.

b. George would probably be able to enforce the easement against Davis even if the deed creating it had not been duly recorded.

c. George would probably not be able to enforce the easement against Davis, recording or no recording, unless Davis expressly agreed to take subject to the easement.

d. None of the above.

14. Reanswer the previous question.

15. Telia discovered that her neighbor, Harold, made an arrangement with a local industrial concern, GlobeGas, to store natural gas underground beneath his property. Recently, it occurred to Telia that the gas being pumped into the ground on Harold’s property might be seeping into cavities under her property. She inquires about her rights:

a. Telia would have no complaint against Harold or GlobeGas for seepage because Telia does not own the inaccessible cavities deep beneath her land.

b. In some states, where courts analogize natural gas to ferae naturae, the gas pumped into the ground by GlobeGas would cease to be the property of GlobeGas.

c. Under the rule followed almost everywhere, Telia would be guilty of larceny if she “produced” (pumped out) gas injected into the ground by GlobeGas, knowing it to be such.

d. All of the above.

16. Reanswer the previous question.

17. Belfort Corp. has been taking percolating water from under its land to use in a cooling device for its office building, on the same land. As a result of the pumping, the wells go dry on neighboring land belonging to Salter when the weather is hot and dry in the summer..

a. If the local courts use the so-called English rule, Salter would have a legal remedy against Belfort, provided he could show that Belfort’s use of the water was not a reasonable use.

b. If the local courts use the so-called American rule, Salter would have no legal remedy against Belfort even if the cooling device made inefficient use of the water and would be considered wasteful.

c. Both of the above.

d. If the local courts use the so-called English rule, Salter would have no legal complaint since Belfort would be within its rights in taking as much water as it wanted.

18. Reanswer the previous question.

19. Gordon and Flowers were rafting down a navigable-in-fact stretch of the Jasper River. A landowner along the river, Corwell, sued the two for trespass. If Corwell owned the bed and banks of the stream:

a. Gordon and Flowers could be held liable for trespass even if they just floated through Corwell’s property, not touching either the bed or the banks.

b. Gordon and Flowers could be held liable for trespass if, for any reason, they touched either the bed or the banks as they floated through Corwell’s property.

c. Gordon and Flowers could not be held liable for trespass for touching the bed or banks of the stream as long as any such touching was absolutely necessary in connection with navigation.

d. None of the above. The only way Gordon and Flowers would not be guilty of trespass is if Corwell did not own either the bed or banks of the stream.

20. Reanswer the previous question.

21. Riggert owns a piece of land about the size of our law school’s campus and located at the edge of his town. Recently the municipal council took several actions affecting Riggert’s land. Which of them would require that “just compensation” be paid?

a. Modified the zoning regulations to forbid the use of the land for commercial purposes, decreasing its overall value by 25%.

b. Widened a road and, in the process, permanently took possession of a strip approximately three feet wide along the entire front of the property, reducing the property’s overall value by about 2%.

c. Both of the above.

d. Adopted a wetland regulation that reduced the number of possible building lots that could be obtained from the land, diminishing the property’s overall value by 75%.

e. All of the above.

22. Reanswer the previous question.

23. Jill went to a dress shop and, while browsing through the merchandise, found a small purse with money, but no identification, on the floor next to one of the displays. Nobody has any idea who the true owner might be. As between Jill and the owner of the dress shop:

a. Jill would have the better claim under the so-called American rule.

b. Jill would have the better claim under the so-called English rule.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Since Jill found the purse on private property, she would have no right to the purse or money.

24. Reanswer the previous question.

25. Suppose in the previous question the local jurisdiction followed the so-called English rule. Support for the dress shop’s claim to the purse should be enhanced if:

a. Jill was the first customer to enter the shop that morning, after the shop had been locked up all night.

b. The local jurisdiction also applies the distinction between lost and mislaid property and, given the circumstances where the purse was found, it was probably lost rather than mislaid.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Under the English rule there would be an almost irrebuttable presumption in favor of letting Jill have the purse.

26. Reanswer the previous question.

27. Which of the following is not a bailment?

a. You leave your shoes at the shoe repair shop, to be picked it up later.

b. You deposit $300 to your bank account and plan to take it out again later.

c. You leave your car with the valet parking attendant at a hotel, to be picked up when you check out.

d. You rent a pair of skis, boots and poles from the ski shop at a mountain resort where you spend your winter vacation.

28. Reanswer the previous question.

29. While walking down the street to a restaurant, Ruth Anne became conscious of her diamond bracelet dangling all-too-temptingly from her wrist. She discreetly pulled the bracelet off and stuffed in a coat pocket. A short time later she entered a restaurant where the maitre d’ took her coat, adding it to several others he had over his arm. He left the coats at the checkroom. After the soup, Ruth Anne suddenly remembered the bracelet, and she went to the checkroom. The coat was there but the bracelet was not. Under the better analysis of this situation:

a. The restaurant did not become bailee of the bracelet because it was not aware of its value.

b. The restaurant did not become bailee of the bracelet because it was not aware of its existence.

c. The restaurant did not become bailee of the bracelet because it never agreed to become liable for so great a value.

d. The restaurant became bailee of the bracelet but it should not be held liable for the loss under the applicable “reasonable person” standard of care.

30. Reanswer the previous question.

31. Suppose in the preceding question that not merely the bracelet but also the coat itself was missing. Ruth Anne would like to recover at least for the coat.

a. The restaurant should not be liable because, unless Ruth Anne paid a charge to check her coat, any bailment would have been a gratuitous bailment.

b. There would be a rebuttable presumption that the restaurant was negligent once Ruth Anne proved there had been a bailment of the coat and the bailee was unable to return it.

c. There would be a conclusive presumption that the restaurant was negligent once Ruth Anne proved there had been a bailment of the coat and the bailee was unable to return it.

d. Ruth Anne could prevail only if she could affirmatively prove, as part of her prima facie case, that the restaurant was negligent.

32. Reanswer the previous question.

33. When Teller moved into a new house he had just bought, there was still some junk in the attic. On investigation, be found an oil painting, all covered with grime. He took it to an art dealer who identified the painting as a rare find, worth several hundred thousand dollars. The dealer agreed to have the painting cleaned up and then put it on sale. While the painting was at the dealer’s shop, however, there was a fire and the painting was badly damaged. Teller has sued. The art dealer is now trying to assert that Teller never owned the painting, arguing that, at most, Teller had a bare possession of it.

a. The art dealer has a very good point since, if he pays damages to Teller, he might end up later being held for damages a second time when the true owner of the painting shows up.

b. The art dealer’s assertion would be appropriate if Teller were suing in trover, but not in a case where he sues in replevin.

c. Teller is obviously the owner of the painting because the sale of a house normally includes everything in it.

d. Whether or not Teller is owner of the painting, the art dealer cannot defend by asserting a jus tertii under which he does not claim.

34. Reanswer the previous question.

35. When the English colonists came to North America and established their legal system here, the usual pattern was that they:

a. Generally just flat-out expropriated all of the lands previously belonging to the indigenous population already living here.

b. Were usually meticulous in respecting land titles claimed by persons of European origin who had received private conveyances from indigenous inhabitants.

c. Vested in the colonial government, as representative of the King, the sole power to make grants of lands occupied by the native inhabitants, but such conveyances were typically subject to the native right of occupancy.

d. Were obliged under the legal principles of “conquest” to recognize the property rights of the conquered peoples as those rights existed prior to the conquest.

36. Reanswer the previous question.

37. Thornton bought a vacation property in a distant state. At the time of purchase there was a cabin on the property, which Thornton left vacant and unoccupied. Thornton has just learned that an intruder has been going on the land and removing the slate roofing from the cabin, causing considerable damage. Under the modern American rule:

a. Thornton would not have standing to sue the intruder in trespass without actual or constructive possession of the land.

b. As owner of the land, Thornton would have constructive possession sufficient to sue the intruder in trespass as long as there is no adverse possessor on the land.

c. Both of the above.

d. As owner of the land, Thornton can recover from the intruder in trespass whether or not he has or ever had actual or constructive possession.

38. Reanswer the previous question.

39. Howland has occupied a piece of land near a river for the past 12 years. He has a cabin and a substantial garden plot there, and he has never left the land for more than a day. Except for an occasional guest, no one else has even been on the land during this time. Juston owned the land when Howland entered but he passed away 7 years ago, and his sole heir has not taken much interest in the land, except to pay the property taxes.

a. From these facts it looks like title has probably ripened in Howland.

b. Howland probably does not have a ripened title because he has not adversely possessed against any one owner for 10 or more years.

c. Howland probably does not have a ripened title because there is no evidence that he has ever paid the property taxes.

d. In most states, at least, Howland would not be recognized as having a ripened title because he did not personally communicate a “claim of right” to the owner of the land.

40. Reanswer the previous question.

41. Suppose in the preceding question Howland has sufficient facts at hand on which to establish a claim for ripened title, but for one major point of contention—that he has not, in fact, spent virtually his entire time on the land during the past 12 years. Suppose instead that he maintained only a non-“winterized” cabin there, which he occupied only during the warmer months of the year.

a. There is virtually no way this seasonal usage of the land could be deemed to be “continuous” as required by the doctrine of adverse possession.

b. A number of cases hold that such seasonal use can satisfy the requirement of “continuous” if the use is consistent with the nature and character of the property.

c. The requirement of “continuous” does not mean literally continuous; it only means “no tacking.”

d. None of the above.

42. Reanswer the previous question.

43. Assume for this question only that the basic period of limitations on ejectment is 21 years and that there is a “disability” period of 10 years—just like that disability provision we studied in class. Suppose that, July 1, 1985 an adverse possessor entered against O who was, at the time, insane. O later died (without recovering) in the year 2000. H was his heir. Title would ripen:

a. in the year 2006.

b. in the year 2016.

c. in the year 2010.

d. ten years after H reaches majority if H was still a minor in the year 2000.

44. Reanswer the previous question.

45. Kedmore needed a tool shed for his garden implements and he constructed one at the rear of his property. In fact, the shed extended a full two feet over the property line onto the property of his neighbor, Yarm. It was not until Yarm had a survey done, some 15 years later, that the encroachment was discovered. Both Kedmore and Yarm were surprised, both having honestly believed that the shed was entirely within Kedmore’s property lines. Kedmore apologized profusely and promised to move the shed back, but still has not done so. In fact, a lawyer friend with whom Kedmore plays golf has told him he’d “be a fool to move that shed without getting paid to do it.”

a. There is no accepted line of authorities under which Kedmore could, in light of his honest mistake, claim to have acquired a ripened title to any of Yarm’s land.

b. Virtually all of the precedents would consider Kedmore, despite his honest mistake, to have acquired a ripened title to a portion of Yarm’s land.

c. According to at least some authority, the main obstacle to Kedmore’s claim to a ripened title would be that his encroachment was not, under the circumstances, “open and notorious.”

d. Kedmore would probably lose if he tries to assert a ripened title to some of Yarm’s land because courts usually do not recognize title by adverse possession in boundary situations.

46. Reanswer the previous question.

47. The Ferrols bought a home on a four-acre parcel of property. The land described in the Ferrols’ deed has been only partly converted to house and lawn. The rest, about 2½ acres, remains in its natural wooded state, and it has been little used by the Ferrols. Unfortunately, the person who sold the property to the Ferrols had a defective title, and the land was actually owned by Olander. Nevertheless, the Ferrols have paid the property taxes and occupied the house and immediately surrounding land as a true owner would, both continuously and exclusively, for more than 10 years. Their problem is that Olander now claims that he still owns the 2½ acres or so of the property that is heavily wooded.

a. By leaving part of the property unused (not “possessed”) the Ferrols were taking a chance that their title might be defective, and now they must pay the price; the defect in their title to the 2½ acres has not been cured by adverse possession.

b. In general, a title by adverse possession ripens only with respect to the area that is actually “openly and notoriously” possessed; there is nothing in the facts of this case to justify an exception to this general rule.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Under the doctrine of constructive adverse possession, the Ferrols should be considered to have been in adverse possession of the entire area described in their deed, provided they had adverse possession of a part.

48. Reanswer the previous question.

49. Suppose again that the Ferrols bought a home from a seller whose title was defective, but that the true owner has not (yet) shown up. A drunk driver lost control of his car and smashed into the garage on the Ferrols’ (supposed) property, practically destroying it. The Ferrols have sued the driver for damages.

a. The driver could defend by pointing out that the Ferrols had a defective title and were, in effect, merely adverse possessors, thus escaping liability entirely.

b. The driver could defend by pointing out the Ferrols’ defective title, and thus would be able to escape liability for permanent damages in some jurisdictions, but he would still be liable for injury to the Ferrols’ possession.

c. Under the Winkfield principle, the driver could defend by pointing out the Ferrols’ defective title, thus escaping all liability for damages.

d. Under the Winkfield principle, the Ferrols would be prevented from suing based on a jus tertii under which they could not claim.

50. Reanswer the previous question.

51. Nombrill frequently used land adjacent to his own as a shortcut for his ATV (all terrain vehicle). This use continued for over 10 years. During most of this time the adjacent land was owned by the state, but two years ago the state deeded it to a private developer. Now the developer wants to stop Nombrill from using the shortcut, and Nombrill wonders if he has acquired an easement by prescription. Nombrill may have a difficult time establishing that he has such an easement because:

a. The servient land was owned by the state during most of his adverse use, and it is widely held that title by adverse possession and prescription cannot be acquired by possessing against the state.

b. The servient land changed ownership during the prescriptive period, and tacking is not allowed when the actual true owner changes.

c. The servient land changed ownership during the prescriptive period, and there is no evidence here of the “privity of estate” that is required for tacking.

d. The servient land changed ownership from state to private hands during the prescriptive period, and prescription is not allowed on lands that have been previously owned by a state.

52. Reanswer the previous question.

53. Bushel owned a wooded parcel in fee simple. He leased it to Peck under a 15 year lease. Shortly after the lease term commenced, Nombrill made a path across the parcel and started using it as another one of his shortcuts. He’s made continuous use of this path for the past nine years. If Nombrill keeps up the use for another year, and he otherwise meets the requirements for acquiring an easement by prescription:

a. He will acquire an easement enforceable indefinitely against both Peck and Bushel.

b. He will acquire an easement enforceable against Peck, but the easement rights will cease when the land reverts to Bushel.

c. He will acquire an easement that will be enforceable against Bushel, but it will not be enforceable against Peck, who is a mere tenant.

d. He will not acquire an easement on these facts because, for policy reasons, a prescriptive easement cannot be acquired over land that is held under a lease.

54. Reanswer the previous question.

55. Gilbert decided to give some of the rare coins in his collection to his nieces and nephews. He put the coins into several packages and wrote the name of an intended donee on each of the packages. He then handed the packages to his brother and asked him to see that the packages got to the persons named on them, saying “Now these coins are theirs.”

a. There cannot yet be a completed gift because the delivery to the brother could not possibly be construed as meeting the delivery requirement.

b. There cannot yet be a completed gift because the donative intent in this case is apparently not an in praesenti donative intent.

c. There would be a completed gift in this case because the donative intent is clearly expressed.

d. There would be a completed gift in this case if the brother were construed as acting as agent for the donees.

56. Reanswer the previous question.

57. Anton Jervis was seriously ill and believed he was soon going to succumb. He handed a rare woodcarving to his friend Harper and said: “I’ve always wanted you to have this after my death. It’s yours.” Under the usual presumption:

a. The gift would be revocable if Jervis changed his mind.

b. Most would say the gift would be automatically revoked if Jervis did not die of the illness but instead fully recovered from it.

c. The gift would be a gift causa mortis.

d. All of the above.

58. Reanswer the previous question.

59. Claudia lent a DVD to her friend, Angela, so she could take it home and watch it. Later, Claudia told Angela over the telephone that she could just keep the DVD.

a. There has there been a valid gift of the DVD under these facts.

b. The delivery requirement was met by virtue of the fact that the DVD was already in the possession of the donee when Claudia decided to make a gift of it..

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. There is not (yet) a completed gift in this case.

60. Reanswer the previous question.

61. The major difference between gifts inter vivos and gifts cause mortis is:

a. Gifts causa mortis are in their nature revocable.

b. People on their deathbeds can make only gifts causa mortis, not inter vivos.

c. Gifts inter vivos are an effective will substitute, allowing persons to make a provisional dispositions of their affairs in anticipation of death.

d. All of the above.

62. Reanswer the previous question.

63. Aunt Olivia was on her deathbed when she handed a safe deposit box key to her nephew, Trent, saying: “There are some stocks and bonds in this box and I want you to have them. They are yours. Go get them as soon as possible.”

a. If the delivery of the key constituted a constructive delivery of the contents of the box, then Trent would be entitled to the stocks and bonds even if he does not retrieve them until after Olivia’s death.

b. If Olivia retained possession of other keys to the safe deposit box, Trent would probably not be deemed entitled to the stocks and bonds unless he retrieved them before Olivia’s death.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. The gift could not be complete until Olivia actually hands the stocks and bonds themselves to Trent.

64. Reanswer the previous question.

65. The effect of the Statute Quia Emptores was to make it no longer possible to convey fee simple interests in land by:

a. disseisin.

b. subinfeudation.

c. substitution.

d. bargain and sale deed.

66. Reanswer the previous question.

67. During the past year, Compton conveyed some land to “Fausto for life, then to his heirs.” Fausto currently lives on the land. (The Rule in Shelley’s Case does not apply.)

a. Fausto has received a hereditament.

b. As a practical matter, the effect of the conveyance is the same as though it had been “to Fausto and his heirs.”

c. Fausto’s heirs have a vested remainder.

d. None of the above.

68. Reanswer the previous question.

69. Assume that Compton conveyed “to Fausto and his heirs as long as the property is open to the public for use as a ballpark.” If the court recognizes the defeasible estate that is normally intended by these words of conveyance:

a. Fausto would probably be deemed to have a fee simple determinable.

b. Compton would probably have a right of entry.

c. Fausto would probably have a possibility of reverter.

d. All of the above.

70. Reanswer the previous question.

71. Assume that Compton conveyed “to Fausto and his heirs, but if the property ceases to be made available to the public for use as a ballpark, then the grantor may re-enter and resume possession.” If the court recognizes the defeasible estate normally intended by these words of conveyance:

a. Fausto would probably have a fee simple determinable.

b. Compton would probably have a right of entry.

c. The land would automatically revert to Compton if the land ceases to be made available to the public for use as a ballpark

d. None of the above.

72. Reanswer the previous question.

73. Assume that Compton conveyed “to the City of Yarrow and its successors and assigns, but if the property ceases to be made available to the public for use as a ballpark, then the grantor may re-enter and resume possession.” Assume that the court recognizes the defeasible estate normally intended by these words of conveyance, but the City decides to take Compton’s rights by eminent domain and then use the land for a sewage treatment plant.

a. The City probably would not have to pay any significant amount of “just compensation” in eminent domain since, technically, no “violation” of the use restriction would ever occur; the use restriction would be extinguished before any change in use occurs.

b. The City probably would not be permitted to condemn Compton’s rights in a case like this, no matter what it was willing to pay

c. The City could condemn Compton’s rights, as described, but in these circumstances it probably would be required to pay very substantial “just compensation,” given its intention to change in use of the property.

d. The City need not condemn Compton’s rights because it could make the desired change in use without triggering any of the rights held by Compton.

74. Reanswer the previous question.

75. Pemberton leased a storefront to Howard for 10 years. The lease contained a clause saying that, in case of a breach by Howard, Pemberton could trigger a termination by giving Howard five days’ notice, whereupon the lease would expire at the end of the five days.

a. The clause makes the lease into a lease on conditional limitation.

b. In New York, the so-called “holdover” proceeding would be available to Pemberton in order to dispossess Howard in the event of a breach by the latter; Pemberton would not have to resort to ejectment.

c. The estate created by this lease is analogous to the fee simple determinable.

d. All of the above.

76. Reanswer the previous question.

77. Lennon conveyed Blackacre “to Ellen and her heirs, but reserving a life estate to Jenna.” Jenna then took possession until her death. While Jenna was in possession, a wheel detached from a passing car and crashed into the side of the house, causing moderate damage. It was not until after Jenna’s death that the insurance proceeds were received on the homeowner’s policy. Ellen is now in a tussle with Jenna’s estate over who gets the insurance proceeds, and who has to pay the bills to fix the side of the house.

a. In some states Jenna technically may have had no right to possess as a life tenant at all since, at common law, a reservation cannot be created in a stranger.

b. If Jenna had been a life tenant under the conveyance, then she (or her estate after her death) should have been entitled to receive the insurance proceeds.

c. If Jenna had been a life tenant under the conveyance, then she (or her estate after her death) was properly responsible for paying the cost of making the repairs.

d. All of the above.

78. Reanswer the previous question.

79. In the preceding question, if Jenna did receive a life estate under Lennon’s conveyance:

a. Her interest would have been a legally non-salable one.

b. She would have had an interest that is technically salable but that most land buyers would not likely be interested in purchasing.

c. Her estate would be considered a non-freehold.

d. Ellen would be considered Jenna’s heir under the terms of Lennon’s conveyance.

80. Reanswer the previous question.

81. Assume now that Lennon conveyed Blackacre “to Ellen and her heirs in trust for Jenna for life, then for Caroline and her heirs.” (Assume that the trust is “active” so the Statute of Uses does not execute it.)

a. Ellen would have a bare legal title.

b. Jenna would have an equitable life estate.

c. Caroline would be a beneficial owner of the property.

d. All of the above.

82. Reanswer the previous question.

83. After the Statute of Uses O “bargains and sells Blackacre to L for life and one day after L’s death to R and her heirs.” The consideration for the conveyance is immediately received by O.

a. The immediate initial effect would be to give L and R equitable interests in the land.

b. The end result would be, among other things, to create an executory interest held by R.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. The Statute of Uses abolished the “bargain and sale.”

84. Reanswer the previous question.

85. Which of the following conveyances would be invalid, in whole or part, under the traditional rule against perpetuities? (At the time of the conveyance, L has one child, age 2.)

a. To L for life and then one day after L’s death to R and his heirs.

b. To L for life, then to L’s first grandchild and his heirs.

c. To L for life, then to L’s first child to reach age 18, and his heirs.

d. All of the above would be invalid in whole or in part.

e. None of the above would be invalid in whole or in part.

86. Reanswer the previous question.

87. Joanne and Paula negotiated and agreed to a detailed written 10 year lease—with Joanne as landlord and Paula as tenant. However, before the final document was ever signed by either party, Paula moved in (with Joanne’s permission). The local statute of frauds makes an exception for leases of one year or less.

a. Paula occupies with no estate in the land at all.

b. Paula initially had at very least a tenancy at will, since there was a demise of possession.

c. Paula has received a term of years for ten years.

d. Paula has received a term of years for one year.

88. Reanswer the previous question.

89. Suppose that Joanne and Paula had entered into an arrangement under which Paula became Joanne’s tenant from month to month, the monthly period running from the 15th to the 14th of each month. If Joanne wants to remove Paula from possession:

a. She can do so at any time by simply giving reasonable notice.

b. She can do so at any time by simply giving one month’s notice.

c. She can do so as of the end of any period (the 14th of any month) by simply giving one month’s notice to terminate as of the end of a period.

d. She can do so at the end of any calendar month, with a month’s notice.

90. Reanswer the previous question.

91. Suppose that Joanne and Paula had entered into a duly executed written agreement under which Joanne leased premises to Paula for a period of 5 years, reserving a rent of $2000 per month, which Paula promised to pay. Ordinarily under such an arrangement:

a. Joanne would be entitled to receive rent based on privity of contract.

b. Joanne would be entitled to receive rent based on privity of estate.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

92. Reanswer the previous question.

93. Suppose in the preceding question that, after only three years, Joanne had physically evicted Paula when Paula failed to pay the rent on a timely basis. There was no lease provision or statute that modified the common law rule on eviction for non-payment of rent:

a. Joanne would have violated Paula’s rights in evicting her.

b. Paula, as leasehold tenant, should be able to maintain an ejectment action against Joanne.

c. Paula’s obligation to pay rent would be suspended or extinguished for as long as the eviction continued.

d. All of the above.

94. Reanswer the previous question.

95. Suppose again that Joanne and Paula entered into a duly executed written agreement under which Joanne leased premises to Paula for a period of 5 years reserving a rent of $2000 per month, which Paula promised to pay. Suppose that after 2 years Paula assigned her lease to Daly, who is now in possession. Ordinarily in such arrangements:

a. Paula would have no further obligation to pay rent to Joanne.

b. Joanne would be able to look either to Paula or to Daly for payment of rent.

c. If Joanne made Daly pay the rent, it would be as a “surety,” and Daly could then turn around and recover the amounts paid from Paula, in “subrogation.”

d. Daly would be liable to pay rent only if he assumed the lease.

96. Reanswer the previous question.

97. Suppose in the preceding question that Paula had decided to sublet to Daly instead of assigning her lease to him.

a. Joanne and Paula would continue to be in privity of contract and privity of estate under their original landlord-tenant relationship.

b. If Joanne did not receive the rent when due, she could recover it in an action directly against Daly.

c. Paula’s rights would be no different than if she has assigned the lease.

d. All of the above.

98. Reanswer the previous question.

99. Suppose that when Paula first suggested subletting to Daly, Joanne objected, and did not want her to do so.

a. If the lease was silent on the subject, the presumption would be that Paula could not assign or sublet without Joanne’s consent.

b. The presumption is in favor of free alienability of land, so courts generally allow assignment and subletting unless the lease expressly provides to the contrary.

c. If a lease says “no subletting without the landlord’s consent,” the courts are all in agreement that this means the landlord cannot withhold consent unreasonably.

d. Most courts permit assignment only when the lease expressly allows it, but they freely permit subletting.

100. Reanswer the previous question.

101. Suppose again that Joanne and Paula entered into a duly executed written agreement under which Joanne leased premises to Paula for a period of 5 years reserving a rent of $2000 per month. Suppose Paula then abandons possession and ceases to pay rent, without justification:

a. Under the traditional common law rule, Joanne would not be expected to “mitigate damages” by finding a substitute tenant.

b. Under many modern cases, the traditional rule has been changed so, today, Joanne would not be expected to “mitigate damages” by finding a substitute tenant.

c. Under both the traditional rule and virtually all of the modern cases, Joanne would be expected to “mitigate damages” by finding a substitute tenant.

d. Under neither the traditional rule nor under any of the modern cases would Joanne be expected to “mitigate damages” by finding a substitute tenant.

102. Reanswer the previous question.

103. Roscoe Corp. leased office space from Tergament Company. Right next door, there is an open lot also owned by Tergament. After Roscoe moved in, Tergament leased this lot to an excavating and scaffolding contractor, which uses the space to store equipment and materials. Because of the nature of this use, there is constant noise and dust emanating from the lot, making it extremely difficult to use Roscoe’s space for office purposes. After numerous complaints, Roscoe wants to know if it has to continue paying rent for space that it essentially cannot use.

a. Roscoe would be justified in abandoning and ceasing to pay rent only if Tergament was somehow responsible for or able to control and prevent the noise and dust coming from the lot.

b. If Roscoe desires to be relieved of its obligation to pay rent, it would have to actually vacate its premises at least partially, in addition to showing some sort of breach of duty by Tergament.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Roscoe is responsible for its own leased premises, and it cannot look to the landlord to make the premises useful to Roscoe.

104. Reanswer the previous question.

105. A reason that many modern courts have moved to recognize the implied warranty of habitability is that:

a. The implied warranty corresponds more closely to the expectations of both landlords and tenants than did the prior rule that places virtually all responsibility to maintain the premises on the tenant.

b. Leases have traditionally been considered to be more or less ordinary contracts anyway, and it would be normal to imply such a warranty in a contract.

c. The courts wanted to get away from the harsh doctrine of constructive eviction and its effect of depriving landlords of the rents that are due them.

d. All of the above.

106. Reanswer the previous question.

107. Fellows leased an apartment under a 2 year lease. After a few months, the landlord experienced financial difficulties and allowed the building to go into disrepair, resulting in numerous serious housing code violations and bad living conditions. Fellows and the other tenants have “had it.” They would be entitled to a reduction in their liability for the agreed rent:

a. Under the doctrine of “independence of covenants.”

b. Under the cases that say they are treating leases as ordinary contracts rather than as conveyances.

c. Only if they do what it takes so the situation would qualify as a constructive eviction.

d. None of the above. They would not be allowed a reduction in their liability for the agreed rent under any recognized body of authorities.

108. Reanswer the previous question.

109. Ever since Maria and Morris inherited Blackacre from their mother, Maria has been in sole occupancy. Morris inquires about his rights.

a. Under the rule recognized by most courts, Morris would be permitted to recover rent from Maria purely by virtue of her being in sole occupancy.

b. If Maria refused to permit Morris to share occupancy with her, he could bring an ejectment action and have her removed from the premises.

c. If Maria refused to permit Morris to share occupancy with her, he would have no remedy except to sue for partition.

d. If Maria refused to permit Morris to share occupancy with her, she would be liable to him for damages corresponding his share of the fair rental value of the premises.

110. Reanswer the previous question.

111. In the preceding question, if Maria has remained in sole occupancy for slightly more than the normal period of limitations on ejectment:

a. By now she would probably have become the sole owner of Blackacre, since her period of sole occupancy would be treated as adverse possession against Morris.

b. By now she would probably have accumulated a very large rent liability to Morris under the rule applied in most courts.

c. Her sole occupancy would be treated, at least initially, as occupancy on behalf of both herself and Morris, unless she were to commit an ouster of Morris.

d. None of the above.

112. Reanswer the previous question.

113. Glover delivered a deed conveying Greenacre “to Bea, ‘Ciel and Dee and their heirs.” Under the modern interpretive presumptions:

a. Bea, ‘Ciel and Dee would have a tenancy in common

b. Bea, ‘Ciel and Dee and their respective heirs would have a tenancy in common.

c. Bea, ‘Ciel and Dee would be joint tenants.

d. Bea, ‘Ciel and Dee along with their respective heirs would be joint tenants.

114. Reanswer the previous question.

115. Suppose that Bea, ‘Ciel and Dee were joint tenants.

a. If Bea dies, then ‘Ciel and Dee would be co-owners as joint tenants.

b. If Bea conveys her interest to Fred and then Bea dies, ‘Ciel and Dee would be joint tenants as to an undivided 2/3, and the two of them would be tenants in common with Fred as to an undivided one-third.

c. If Bea conveys her interest to ‘Ciel and then dies, ‘Ciel and Dee would be joint tenants as to an undivided 2/3, and the two of them would be tenants in common with ‘Ciel as to an undivided one-third.

d. All of the above.

116. Reanswer the previous question.

117. Suppose Bea and Dee were co-tenants.

a. If they were tenants in common and Bea died, then Dee would be the sole owner.

b. If they were joint tenants and Bea died, then Dee would be the sole owner.

c. If they were joint tenants and Bea conveyed her interest to Jake, then Dee and Jake would joint tenants.

d. If they were joint tenants and Bea tried to convey her interest to Jake, then Dee would be the sole owner.

118. Reanswer the previous question.

119. Henry and Harriet are tenants by the entirety in Blueacre. The creditors of Henry are trying to get at his property in order to satisfy judgments they hold against him.

a. Under the general rule the creditors of either tenant by the entirety can levy execution on both co-tenants’ interests in the property.

b. Under the general rule the creditors of neither tenant by the entirety can levy execution on either co-tenants’ interests in the property.

c. In some of the states that recognize the tenancy by the entirety, but not all, Henry’s creditors would have no recourse to Blueacre to satisfy judgments against Henry alone.

d. In most states that recognize the tenancy by the entirety, a deed by either Henry or Harriet alone would suffice to sever the tenancy and extinguish the right of survivorship.

120. Reanswer the previous question.

121. Eileen and Elmore are married. Since Elmore was laid off several months ago, only Eileen has been working and bringing in a paycheck. Elmore has stayed at home and taken care of the couple’s child and managed the household. They have, during this time, managed to save over $2000.

a. In community property states, the $2000 would presumptively belong to both Eileen and Elmore.

b. In common-law property states, the $2000 would presumptively belong to both Eileen and Elmore.

c. Both of the above.

d. There is no way to determine, from the facts given, who the $2000 would presumptively belong to.

122. Reanswer the previous question.

123. In 1960, a purchaser buys a painting from a New York gallery. The painting had been stolen in 1950 from Xerxes, in New York. The purchaser displays the painting at shows and galleries frequently until 1975, the painting remaining in New York all this time. In 1975 Xerxes demands its return and the purchaser refuses. Assuming the purchaser has no evidence to assert a claim to ripened title based on events prior to 1960, in what year can the purchaser claim the painting under the doctrine of adverse possession?

a. 1963

b. 1970

c. 1975

d. 1978

124. Reanswer the previous question.

125. RunJimmiPop (RJP), a rap group, got possession of the master recording of ten songs performed by The Delbert Rhythm Boys which was produced in a studio in 1990. In 1992, RJP used three of the Boys songs in an album which still hasn’t been released. In 1995, RJP licensed the Boys recording to Eclectic Productions which released an album of the Boys songs and these songs began to be played on various radio stations. The statute of limitations on the Boys’ cause of action against RJP for the master recording begins to run:

a. When RJP took possession of the master recording.

b. When RJP first used three of the Boys’ songs.

c. When RJP licensed the Boys’ recording to Eclectic Productions.

d. It has not yet begun to run.

126. Reanswer the previous question.

127. The essential characteristic of a work that qualifies it for copyright protection is:

a. Originality

b. Distinctiveness

c. Novelty

d. Utility

e. Non-obviousness

128. Reanswer the previous question.

129. Gilda Porreca develops an act that makes fun of a well-dressed slim blond pointing to answers in front of a game board instantly recognizable as the Wheel of Fortune set. The act is hilarious and devastating. It airs several times and Vanna White’s reputation plummets and her endorsements dry up. Vanna has a good chance of securing damages against Gilda because:

a. Gilda has converted Vanna’s intellectual property

b. Gilda has appropriated Vanna’s persona.

c. Gilda has taken Vanna’s right to publicity.

d. None of the above.

130. Reanswer the previous question.

131. Penniworth owned a piece of land and sold part of it to Arazone. Although the part acquired by Arazone borders on a public road, the terrain is very steep along the road and it would be very costly to build an entranceway there. Prior to the sale, Penniworth gained access to the area bought by Arazone by means of an established dirt lane running across the land retained by Penniworth. If the deed from Penniworth to Arazone did not make mention of any easements:

a. It is highly unlikely that Arazone could claim any easement to use the lane.

b. Arazone would probably have a sound basis for claiming an easement by implied reservation.

c. Arazone would probably have a sound basis for claiming an easement by implied grant.

d. Arazone would probably have a sound basis for claiming an easement by express grant.

132. Reanswer the previous question.

133. Pepke owned a piece of land adjacent to a large public lake and he had a house near the lakeshore, a couple of hundred feet from the public highway. Pepke conveyed a portion of his land to his brother in law, Carlin, including all of the highway frontage. However, Pepke needed to cross this frontage in order to get access to his house from the public highway. Therefore, after the conveyance Pepke owned no land access to the house and land that he retained by the lake.

a. According to modern cases, Pepke probably could not successfully claim an easement by necessity over the land of Carlin because he has access to his land by boat, from the lake.

b. If Pepke had acquired an easement by necessity over the land of Carlin, the easement would still be in effect even if, for a time, the necessity had ceased to exist because Pepke temporarily owned some adjacent land on the other side of his property.

c. Pepke likely acquired an easement by implied grant over the land conveyed to Carlin, and for this purpose it would not matter at all whether there existed, at the time of the conveyance, a visible lane used by Pepke for access.

d. Pepke likely acquired an easement by implied reservation over the land conveyed to Carlin, and his case for such an easement would be even stronger if there existed, at the time of conveyance, a visible lane that Pepke had previously used for access from the highway.

134. Reanswer the previous question.

135. Suppose that Pepke owned lakeside land, as in the preceding question, and sold a portion of it to Carlin. Suppose also that (with whatever additional facts might be necessary) a court would hold that Pepke acquired an easement by implication for ingress and egress over the land conveyed to Carlin. Suppose that Carlin later sold his land to Gregg, while Pepke was still using the easement for ingress and egress. The original deed to Carlin was recorded but it did not, of course, mention the easement.

a. The parcel acquired by Gregg would remain legally subject to the easement, and Pepke would remain entitled to use it.

b. The parcel acquired by Gregg would remain legally subject to the easement, but on these facts Pepke may not be entitled to use it.

c. The parcel acquired by Gregg would probably not be legally subject to the easement because the easement is not mentioned in a recorded instrument in his chain of title.

d. The parcel acquired by Gregg is probably not legally subject to the easement because the instrument that created it is not recorded in Gregg’s direct chain of title.

136. Reanswer the previous question.

137. Suppose that, to clear things up, Pepke and his neighbor, Gregg, entered into an arrangement by which Gregg conveyed to Pepke “an easement of ingress and egress” over Gregg’s land between the highway and Pepke’s land.

a. If Pepke later bought some additional land behind his originally retained parcel and he used the new land as part of his yard, he would presumptively be entitled to use the easement in connection with that new land, too.

b. If Pepke later divided his originally retained parcel into five lots, which he sold to five different purchasers each of whom intended to build homes of their own, all five of the purchasers would be presumptively be entitled to use the easement in connection with their respective lots.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. The easement would be presumptively extinguished if Pepke either bought additional land or subdivided and sold his existing land.

138. Reanswer the previous question.

139. Suppose that Pepke and his neighbor, Gregg, also entered into an arrangement by which Pepke conveyed to Gregg “an easement to draw water from the lake and maintain pipes” on land belonging to Pepke. Several years later, however, the county put in a water line and Gregg now gets his water from the county—having ceased to use the intake and pipes for which the easement was created.

a. The mere non-use of the easement by Gregg would cause it to be extinguished.

b. The easement would be extinguished by abandonment if Gregg, in addition to not using it, made some permanent change indicating an intention to make no use of it in the future (for example, by digging up the pipe connections on his own land).

c. The easement could not be extinguished unless Gregg made no use of it for the prescription period.

d. The easement could not be extinguished unless Pepke acted in a way that interfered with the easement and Gregg did nothing about the interference for the prescription period.

140. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Kaystar-Isidore questions. Kaystar lives in a residential area that had been developed Holmehall Development Co. with restrictive covenants limiting the use of the land to residential purposes, specifically, single-family houses. Kaystar’s neighbor, Isidore, is planning to create a “mother-in-law” apartment in a portion of his home, which will make it effectively a two-family house. There is a restrictive covenant in a duly recorded deed from Holmehall to Jergon, the original owner of Isidore’s lot, and it purports to prohibit such a modification by Isidore.

141. In order to enforce the restrictive covenant against Isidore as a real covenant, Kaystar would have to be able to show that:

a. Isidore actually knew about the presence and contents of the restrictive covenant in the deed to Jergon when Isidore bought his land.

b. There is privity of contract and estate between Kaystar and Isidore.

c. The restrictive covenant in the deed to Jergon touches and concerns the land.

d. All of the above.

142. Reanswer the previous question.

143. In the dispute between Kaystar and Isidore, the presence of the restrictive covenant in the duly recorded deed from Holmehall to Jergon means:

a. Isidore has record notice of the covenant.

b. The covenant can be enforced against Isidore as long as he bought with actual knowledge of it.

c. The covenant can be enforced against Isidore as long as he had actual knowledge of it before he decided to create a “mother-in-law” apartment in his home.

d. Little, since it is not his Isidore’s direct chain of title.

144. Reanswer the previous question.

145. Assume now that the “single-family” restrictive covenant had been omitted from the recorded deed from Holmehall to Jergon, but that it had been inserted in most of the (recorded) deeds from Holmehall to the original buyers in the development, as part of a common plan or scheme:

a. Isidore’s land might still be subject to the restriction on a theory of “implied reciprocal negative easements.”

b. Isidore would not be deemed to have record notice of the covenants in the other deeds from Holmehall under the “direct chain of title rule.”

c. Isidore might still be deemed to have purchased with notice of the covenants, namely, inquiry notice, if all the lots in the neighborhood had been uniformly developed with one-family homes.

d. All of the above.

146. Reanswer the previous question.

147. Assume that sufficient facts exist to convince a court that Isidore’s lot originally became subject to the “single-family” house restriction, but many of the homes in the restricted area have now been already converted to multifamily use:

a. Isidore might still be able to create the “mother-in-law apartment” despite the common plan or scheme of development that the developer had originally imposed..

b. Isidore would probably still be subject to the restrictive covenant because you cannot violate the law just because a lot of other people do.

c. That would prove the restrictive covenant never actually touched and concerned the land in the first place.

d. All of the above.

148. Reanswer the previous question.

149. Bellow decided to sell his house and wanted at least $600,000 for it. He contacted Turner, a real estate broker, who agreed to try to find Bellow a buyer. After several weeks of effort and considerable expense, Turner introduced Bellow to Griggs, who made an offer of $601,000. Under the traditional rule for interpreting brokerage contracts:

a. There is no contract for a commission here, since Turner did not promise to find a buyer nor did Bellow promise to pay a commission.

b. Turner has earned his commission and Bellow can be held liable for it on these facts alone, without more.

c. Turner has earned his commission and Bellow can be held liable for it if Griggs is ready, willing and able to buy on the essential terms specified by Bellow.

d. Turner has not yet earned his commission and he will not until the sale actually closes and Bellow receives the purchase price for the house.

150. Reanswer the previous question.

151. Suppose in the preceding question Bellow and Griggs commenced negotiations leading to a contract for purchase and sale of Bellow’s house. The two of them entered into a contract providing that Griggs’s obligation to buy was subject to his receiving a commitment for the mortgage financing that he needed to go through with the deal. Again using the traditional rule for interpreting brokerage contracts:

a. Turner would have earned his commission as of the time that such a contract was signed, if not before.

b. Turner would have earned his commission as of the time that Griggs received a financing commitment, as called for by the contract.

c. Griggs should be able to get out this deal, if he changes his mind, by simply not even applying for mortgage financing, thereby preventing the financing condition from ever occurring.

d. Bellow has made a bad deal because he is not only now liable for the brokerage commission, but his buyer has, in effect, an “option” to either take the property or leave, with no liability if chooses the latter.

152. Reanswer the previous question.

153. The main point to remember about the “binder” in a real estate deal is:

a. To make sure it is legally binding on the parties.

b. To make sure that it contains all of the detailed terms that the parties want to have in their contract of sale.

c. To make sure the buyer cannot receive back the deposit check under any circumstances.

d. To make sure that, if a formal and detailed contract is intended, that the binder does not itself become the contract of sale, prematurely fixing the rights of the parties in a way they may not have actually wanted.

154. Reanswer the previous question.

155. Deakin owned a piece of vacant land that he wanted to sell. Hearing about this property, Wilson sent Deakin a (signed) letter offering to buy the land for $15,000. Deakin telephoned Wilson and said: “Your offer sounds fine. It’s a deal.” Wilson now no longer wants the land because, since the telephone call from Deakin, he has learned that there is an easement across the property and several restrictive covenants applicable to it.

a. Wilson should not worry about being contractually bound to buy from Deakin because the “contract” does not comply with the statute of frauds.

b. Wilson should not worry about being contractually bound to buy from Deakin because it appears from these facts that Deakin does not have a marketable title.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

156. Reanswer the previous question.

157. Assume that Wilson in the previous question has disappeared and Deakin is now looking for another purchaser for his land. He has become extremely concerned, however, about the easement and restrictive covenants on his property. They do not have much effect on the current or likely uses, but Wilson was quite firm in saying they were objections to title. The easement crosses a corner of Deakin’s land, and it gives Deakin’s neighbor his sole ingress and egress, and the restrictive covenants (which limit the use to residential purposes) are part of a “common plan or scheme” for the neighborhood. Probably the most efficient course of action for Deakin to take would be to:

a. Go to the owner of the easement and to the beneficiaries of the restrictive covenants and seek to have these encumbrances removed from his property so he will be able to sell it free and clear.

b. Just chill out a little, since virtually all properties are burdened by easements, restrictive covenants and the like, and such provisions are generally not considered to be valid objections to marketability.

c. Make sure that, in any future contracts with prospective buyers, the terms specify that the buyer will take title “subject to” the existing easement and restrictive covenants.

d. Bring an action to quiet title to have the easement and restrictive covenants removed.

158. Reanswer the previous question.

159. Suppose that Deakin makes a contract to sell his land to Underwood, and the contract does not mention the easement. Nevertheless, Underwood accepts the deed and pays the full purchase price for the land. Now Underwood wants a partial refund from Deakin, having discovered that the neighbor’s driveway lies on an easement crossing a corner of the land that Underwood has bought.

a. Underwood should be entitled to the refund because, manifestly, Deakin has breached his duty to supply a marketable title.

b. Underwood would be entitled to a recovery only if Deakin had conveyed by a quitclaim deed.

c. Deakin’s implied warranty of marketability is exactly the sort of contract provision that normally survives delivery of the deed, but an easement would normally not consitute a breach of that implied warranty.

d. The implied warranty of marketability would be considered “merged” into the deed (and therefore not actionable as such after the deed was accepted), but Underwood could recover if Deakin conveyed by a general warranty deed.

160. Reanswer the previous question.

161. Penfold contracted to sell a parcel of land to Comstock and his lawyer prepared the papers, including the deed. At the closing, Penfold signed the deed, handed it over to Comstock’s lawyer for review, then took it back and briefly handed it to Comstock for a look. Finally Penfold said: “I guess everything’s in order here. We’re closed.” At the time he said these words, the deed was in the pile of papers in front of Comstock’s lawyer. The deed became effective to convey title to Comstock:

a. When Penfold signed it.

b. When Penfold first handed it over to Comstock’s lawyer.

c. When Penfold first handed it over to Comstock.

d. When Penfold indicated his intention that the deed become absolutely and unconditionally delivered and effective as a conveyance.

162. Reanswer the previous question.

163. After closing in the purchase of land from Penfold, Comstock’s lawyer delayed for several days in submitting the deed for recording. In the meantime, Penfold delivered a second deed to the same land to Harlow, who did not know or have any reason to know of the previous conveyance to Comstock.

a. In a notice jurisdiction, Harlow would have a better title than Comstock.

b. In a race-notice jurisdiction, Comstock could still secure his title if his deed is recorded before Harlow’s.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. The purpose of the recording acts is to protect honest dealers in real estate and not persons who do the kinds of things that Penfold is described as doing here.

In answering the following TRUE/FALSE questions, assume (unless otherwise specified) that, at the times of conveyance, O is an owner in fee simple absolute, and that every named party is alive and unmarried. Remember that the conveyances are to be interpreted as set forth in the last two paragraphs on the instruction page. Assume that all life estates end at the death of the named life tenant. When you see words appropriate for a defeasible fee simple, assume that the words of conveyance also include whatever additional words (such as words of reverter or re-entry) may be required by law in order to create the defeasible estate.

164. O conveyed “to A and his heirs.” The heirs of A have no interest in the land.

165. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” O has no remaining interest in the land.

166. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” B has a contingent remainder.

167. O conveyed “to A and her heirs, then if A dies childless, to B and her heirs.” B has an executory interest.

168. O conveyed “to A for two years, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” B has a remainder.

169. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs.” If B dies before A, the land will revert to O.

170. O conveyed “to A for life.” The conveyance results in a reversion.

171. O conveyed “to A to take effect in possession beginning from and after my death.” The conveyance would create a life estate and remainder.

172. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A by at least one year.” B has an executory interest.

173. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A by at least one year.” O has a reversion.

174. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if C survives A by at least one year, then to C and her heirs.” B has an executory interest that is subject to divestment.

175. O conveyed “to A for two years, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” B has an executory interest.

176. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B’s first child to reach the age of 21 years.” B has three children, aged 15, 12, and 8. This conveyance creates a vested remainder, subject to divestment.

177. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B’s first child born before the death of A.” B is living but childless. This conveyance creates a contingent remainder

178. O conveyed “to A for life, remainder to B and the heirs of her body if B gives A a suitable burial.” In a state that still recognizes the fee tail, B would have a contingent remainder.

179. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” C then dies, never having married. B has no interest.

180. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C after the death of A.” B has an executory interest.

181. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C after the death of A.” B has a contingent remainder.

182. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if B dies childless then to C and his heirs.” B has a vested remainder subject to divestment.

183. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if B dies childless then to C and his heirs.” O has a reversion.

184. O conveyed “to A for life, remainder to the heirs of B” (a living person). This conveyance creates a contingent remainder.

185. O conveyed “to A for life, remainder to the heirs of B” (a person who had died just before the conveyance). This conveyance creates a vested remainder.

186. O conveyed ”to A for 5 years, then to the heirs of B” (a living person). This conveyance creates a contingent remainder.

187. O conveyed “to A and his heirs until the United States admits a 51st state to the Union.” The future interest in O would be a possibility of reverter.

188. O conveyed “to A and the heirs of his body” in a state that still recognizes the fee tail. If A dies without surviving issue (children, grandchildren, etc.), then the land could be inherited by A’s brother.

189. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as the house is kept painted white with green shutters.” If the house is painted the opposite, green with white shutters, the premises would go back to the grantor only if the grantor so elects.

190. O conveyed “to A and his heirs on the condition that the premises be kept as a nature preserve and open to the public.” O has a right of re-entry under which possession will automatically revert if the premises are converted to a golf course.

191. O conveyed “to A as long as he desires to remain living on the land.” The more modern tendency is to interpret this conveyance as creating a tenancy at will.

192. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as swans nest on Belle Isle.” A has a fee simple on executory limitation.

193. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as swans nest on Belle Isle, then to B and her heirs.” A has a fee simple on executory limitation.

194. O conveyed to “to A for life, then to A’s first child who reaches age 25, and his heirs.” The future interest to “A’s first child who reaches age 25” is valid under the rule against perpetuities.

195. O conveyed to “to A for life, then to A’s first child now alive who reaches age 50, and his heirs.” The future interest to “A’s first child now alive who reaches age 50” is valid under the rule against perpetuities.

196. O conveyed to “to A for life, then to A’s first child, but if A’s first child does not survive until age 25, then to B and his heirs.” The future interest to B is void under the rule against perpetuities.

197. O conveyed to “to T and his heirs for the benefit of A for life then for the benefit of B and his heirs.” T has a legal (not an equitable) fee simple absolute.

198. O conveyed to “to T and his heirs for the benefit of A for life then for the benefit of B and his heirs.” B has an equitable remainder in fee simple absolute.