1

1. Gribard owns an apartment building. Four months ago, he made an oral lease of an apartment to Howards, for an agreed term of 9 months, reserving a rent of $1200 per month. Howards moved in, and continues to occupy the apartment, duly paying the rent each month.

a. Howards has a term of years.

b. Howards has a monthly tenancy.

c. Howards is a tenant at will.

d. Howards is a licensee.

2. Reanswer the preceding question.

3. Suppose that Gribard orally leased to Howards creating a month-to-month tenancy that commenced August 15, 2003. Gribard wants to terminate the tenancy as soon as possible. Suppose that Gribard hand-delivers Howards a notice today (December 19, 2003) stating that the tenancy will terminate on January 14, 2004.

a. The notice should be effective according to its terms, and Howards would be a holdover tenant if he were still in occupancy on January 15.

b. The notice would not be effective according to its terms, but Howards would be a holdover tenant if he were still in occupancy on January 19.

c. The notice would not be effective according to its terms, but Howards would be a holdover tenant if he were still in occupancy on February 15.

d. The notice would not be effective to terminate Howards’ tenancy.

4. Reanswer the preceding question.

5. Assume now that Gribard made a written lease of an apartment “to Howards for two years reserving a rent of $1200 per month,” and that Howards entered into possession. Assume that the lease contained the usual covenants found in residential leases.

a. The result would be that Gribard and Howards would be in privity of estate and privity of contract.

b. Howards have a contractual obligation to pay rent by direct operation of the clause “reserving a rent of $1200 per month.”

c. Howards would have a right to possession and seisin of the premises.

d. All of the above.

6. Reanswer the preceding question.

7. Beckman occupies his apartment under a written two-year lease. After 7 months his employer is moving him to another city. Beckman finds a new person, Jones, to occupy the apartment. Beckman’s lease contains a clause stating that he is entitled to assign only with the landlord’s consent. The lease says nothing about subletting. The landlord has told Beckman that he will not consent to an assignment unless he receives an additional $100 per month rent.

a. As long as Beckman sublets rather than assigns, he would not need the landlord’s consent.

b. Some courts would hold that the landlord would be entitled to withhold consent for any reason (other than an “illegal” reason) or for no reason.

c. Some courts would hold that such a clause would not entitle the landlord to withhold consent to an assignment just because the tenant won’t agree to a higher rent.

d. All of the above.

8. Reanswer the preceding question.

9. In the preceding question,

a. If Beckman sublets to Jones, he would become the landlord of Jones.

b. If Beckman validly assigns to Jones, he would become the landlord of Jones.

c. If Beckman validly assigns to Jones, Beckman would no longer have any liability for the rent.

d. All of the above.

10. Reanswer the preceding question.

11. Six months ago, Fenway orally leased his house to Milford, for an agreed term of two years, reserving a rent of $1200 per month. Milford moved in, and continues to occupy the house, duly paying the rent each month.

a. Milford has a term of years.

b. Milford probably has a tenancy from month to month.

c. Milford probably has a tenancy from year to year.

d. There is no legal basis for assuming that Milford has anything but a tenancy at will.

12. Reanswer the preceding question.

13. Kresge occupies an apartment under a 3-year lease. Shortly after Kresge moved in, the landlord leased the apartment upstairs to a group of college students. They are noisy and sounds emanate from above Kresge’s apartment at all hours of the day and night (except mornings before 11:00 a.m. or so). Kresge wants to know whether, if he moves out before the end of his lease, he can continue to be held liable for rent.

a. Kresge should have no worries since tenants are not legally liable for rent once they have actually moved out, no matter what the agreed term of the lease.

b. In order to assert a constructive eviction, Kresge would have to show (among other things) that there was some breach of duty by the landlord that was creating the problem that is bothering him.

c. Whether or not the noise made Kresge’s apartment untenantable, he would still be able to assert a constructive eviction if he actually moved out.

d. Kresge ought to be able to assert that he was constructively evicted even if it was purely the acts of third parties, and not the landlord, that made his apartment untenantable.

14. Reanswer the preceding question.

15. In order to get around some of the limitations of the doctrine of constructive eviction, a number of courts have adopted the implied warranty of habitability and have said they would treat leases as contracts. The effect of these changes in the law is to:

a. Extend the doctrine of “independence of covenants” so that it applies to leases.

b. Give tenants a more-or-less effective “rent weapon” to motivate landlords to perform their obligations under leases.

c. Require landlords to expressly spell out in the lease the services to which tenants are entitled, and to deny tenants any right to services that are not clearly spelled out.

d. Treat leases strictly in accordance with ordinary contract law, just as though they were purely contractual arrangements without any “conveyance” aspects to them

16. Reanswer the preceding question.

17. After negotiating and agreeing to a 3-year lease, which neither party ever signed, Jackman entered into occupancy of premises owned by Thomas on August 15 of this year. The reserved rent was “$2000 per month,” and Jackman paid the rent for the first month in advance. He has continued paying the rent on the fifteenth day of each succeeding month. Now, however, Thomas has received an attractive offer for the purchase of the premises on the condition that they be delivered empty. The earliest day as of which Thomas can terminate the lease would be (assuming today is December 19, 2003):

a. December 31, 2003.

b. January 14, 2004.

c. January 19, 2004.

d. February 14, 2004.

e. August 14, 2007

18. Reanswer the preceding question.

19. If Coleman is a tenant under a lease and validly assigns the lease to Udall:

a. Coleman would continue to be liable for the rent essentially as a surety.

b. Udall would be liable for the rent during her occupancy irrespective of whether she assumes the lease.

c. Udall would be liable for the rent after re-assigning the lease only if she assumes the lease.

d. All of the above.

20. Reanswer the preceding question.

21. Ledbetter leased an apartment to Telford under a valid three-year lease. After seven months, Telford’s employer re-assigned him to a distant city, and he can no longer use the apartment. At common law:

a. Telford may sublease or assign his lease without Ledbetter’s consent, unless the lease contains a provision to the contrary.

b. Telford may surrender the premises back to Ledbetter, and thereby terminate his obligation to pay any future rent, even if Ledbetter is not willing to accept such a surrender.

c. Telford may declare a constructive eviction because, due to circumstances beyond his control, he can no longer make use of the premises.

d. All of the above.

22. Reanswer the preceding question.

23. The Marsh Creek Alliance owns a natural area that it keeps in preservation. Its neighbor, Balthus Corp., wanted to give the alliance the use of a building to use as its administrative headquarters. Balthus sold the building and surrounding lot to the Alliance for $1, retaining an option to repurchase (also for $1) at any time during the next 25 years. The building and surrounding land are worth approximately $1,000,000.

a. In some states the courts would be willing to make an effort to reform the terms of the option, for example by reading in a “savings clause.” in order to make it valid.

b. Using a rigorous application of the traditional rule again perpetuities, there is precedent for holding the repurchase option to be void.

c. There would be no problem under the rule against perpetuities if the option exercise period were 20 years rather than 25 years.

d. All of the above.

24. Reanswer the preceding question.

25. Ellen conveyed Blackacre to Harper, delivering a bargain and sale deed. Under the traditional interpretation of this transaction following the Statute of Uses:

a. Harper got full unqualified title directly and immediately from Ellen

b. Harper initially got an equitable title, which then instantly became a legal title when the Statute of Uses executed the trust.

c. Harper initially acquired a legal title to the land “in trust” for Ellen, but then he later received an unqualified legal title.

d. Ellen was considered owner of the land until she made a proper livery of seisin.

26. Reanswer the preceding question.

27. For the last 15 years of her life, Willa Mae Gormley lived in her house alone except for her longtime friend, Keera Hobbema, who acted informally as her housekeeper. In her will, Gormley wrote: “I devise and bequeath my house and furnishing to Keera Hobbema for as long as she shall wish to live there, then to the Friends of Homeless Cats, Inc.” (a charity).

a. The only likely interpretation of this language is that it allows Hobbema to continue to live there under her license that she received during Gormley’s lifetime.

b. By using the word “bequeath,” Gormley is indicating that she is leaving personal property to Hobbema.

c. Since Hobbema’s right to possession is at her “will,” the more modern interpretation would be to treat her estate in the property as a tenancy at will.

d. Most likely Hobbema has a fee simple determinable, which will end at or before her death

28. Reanswer the preceding question.

29. Jason owned Blackacre in fee simple absolute. He delivered a deed to Veronica Collins conveying the land “to Veronica Collins and her heirs, subject to a life estate to my nephew, Barney.”

a. The “subject to” clause is, if anything, an exception rather than a reservation.

b. Assuming that the “subject to” clause is a reservation, Veronica’s interest may be held invalid as running afoul of the common-law rule on reservations to strangers.

c. Assuming that the “subject to” clause is a reservation, Barney’s interest may be held invalid as running afoul of the common-law rule on reservations to strangers.

d. The traditional rule about reservations in strangers is so strong that no court would ever be likely to disregard it, even though the rule might defeat the grantor’s intention.

30. Reanswer the preceding question.

31. Donna Evans died owning Greenacre, a house and lot. In her will, she left a life estate to Limon, with the remainder to Renshaw. Later, during Limon’s lifetime, a fire broke out and caused several thousand dollars of damage to the house. A few weeks later, Limon died. Now there is a dispute over the insurance proceeds and over whose obligation it is to repair the house.

a. Limon’s estate is entitled to the insurance proceeds but Renshaw is responsible for repairing the damage to the house.

b. Renshaw is entitled to the insurance proceeds and Renshaw is responsible for repairing the damage to the house.

c. Renshaw is entitled to the insurance proceeds but Limon’s estate is responsible for repairing the damage to the house.

d. Limon’s estate is entitled to the insurance proceeds and is responsible for repairing the damage to the house.

32. Reanswer the preceding question.

33. Suppose that, before Limon’s death, he and Renshaw had an argument over who should pay the property taxes.

a. Renshaw should be liable for the property taxes because he had the permanent interest (that is, the most valuable interest) in the property.

b. Limon should be liable for the property taxes that accrue during his lifetime.

c. Renshaw and Limon are each required to pay their respective proportionate shares of the property taxes accruing during Limon’s lifetime.

d. Even if Limon does not pay the property taxes that accrue during his lifetime, no court would hold a mere failure to pay money to be “waste.”

34. Reanswer the preceding question.

35. Rachel conveyed Whiteacre “to Orville and Wilber and their heirs” in 1999. Since then Wilber has been in sole possession of the property.

a. If Wilber continues is sole possession for a total of 10 years, then he will almost surely acquire the sole title by adverse possession.

b. The sole possession of the premises by Wilber, without more, would normally be considered an ouster.

c. If Wilber’s conduct amounted to an ouster of Orville, then Orville’s remedy would be to maintain an action of ejectment against Wilber for the purpose of receiving shared possession of the premises.

d. If Wilber’s conduct amounted to an ouster of Orville, then Orville’s remedy would be to maintain an action of ejectment against Wilber for the purpose of receiving the sole possession of the premises.

36. Reanswer the preceding question.

37. Rachel conveyed Whiteacre “to Orville and Wilber and their heirs” in 1999. Since then Wilber has been in sole possession of the property. Under the modern presumptions:

a. If Wilber predeceases Orville, then Orville would be the sole owner of the premises.

b. If Orville predeceases Wilber, then Wilber would be the sole owner of the premises.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

38. Reanswer the preceding question.

39. Rachel conveyed Whiteacre “to Orville and Wilber and their heirs” in 1999. Since then Wilber has been in sole possession of the 2/3 of the property and the southern third has been occupied by Green under a 5-year lease. The lease gives Green sole occupancy of the one-third that he occupies.

a. Under the majority rule, Orville would be entitled to recover rent or its equivalent from Wilber for the 2/3 that Wilber is in sole possession of.

b. If Wilber goes to collect the rent from Green, then Wilber would be entitled (under the Statute of Anne) to keep whatever rent he collects.

c. If Wilber goes to collect the rent from Green, then Wilber would be liable to Orville (under the Statute of Anne) for Orville’s proportionate share of the rent collected.

d. If Wilber goes to collect the rent from Green, Wilber would not be liable to Orville for any part of the rent collected unless Wilber has ousted Orville.

40. Reanswer the preceding question.

41. Donaldson conveyed Blueacre “to John Parker and Marcie Cole and their heirs, as joint tenants.”

a. In some states the result would be a tenancy in common, due to the absence of the language of survivorship.

b. Assuming that John and Marcie had a joint tenancy and John predeceased Marcie, then Marcie would become the sole owner of the land.

c. Assuming that John and Marcie received a joint tenancy and John then mortgaged his interest to Clark, and he later predeceased Marcie, then Marcie would not, in some states, become the sole owner of the land.

d. All of the above.

42. Reanswer the preceding question.

43. Ray, Randall and Rob owned Grayacre as joint tenants. Ray conveyed his interest to Wally. As a result:

a. Randall, Rob and Wally are now joint tenants.

b. Randall and Rob remain joint tenants as to an undivided 2/3, while Wally owns an undivided 1/3 as tenant in common with Randall and Rob.

c. Randall, Rob and Wally are now tenants in common.

d. The answer depends on Ray’s intention when he conveyed to Wally, i.e., whether he intended to make Wally a joint tenant or a tenant in common.

44. Reanswer the preceding question.

45. Ray, Randall and Rob owned Grayacre as joint tenants. Ray conveyed his interest to Rob. As a result:

a. If Randall then dies, Rob would own the whole, by himself.

b. If Rob then dies, Randall would own the whole, by himself.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

46. Reanswer the preceding question.

47. The primary effect of a severance of the joint tenancy (by destruction of one or more of the four unities) is to:

a. Destroy the right of survivorship in whole or, at least, in part.

b. Divide the premises into separate parcels, which are then separately occupied and possessed.

c. Divide the premises into separate parcels, which are then jointly occupied and possessed.

d. Make the former joint tenants into tenants in severalty.

48. Reanswer the preceding question.

49. Borrassa was involved in an automobile accident in which he was at fault. Borrassa’s principal asset is his interest in a house that he holds as tenant by the entirety with his wife. His liability insurance is inadequate to cover the amount of the tort judgment that has been rendered against him:

a. Under the majority rule, Borrassa’s judgment creditor would be unable to levy execution on Borrassa’s interest in the house to enforce the judgment.

b. Under the minority (and New York) rule, Borrassa’s judgment creditor would be able to levy execution on Borrassa’s interest in the house to enforce the judgment, with the result that the judgment creditor might become a tenant by the entirety with Borrassa’s wife.

c. Both of the above.

d. In all states that recognize the tenancy by the entirety, Borrassa’s judgment creditor would be able to levy execution on Borrassa’s interest in the house to enforce the judgment.

50. Reanswer the preceding question.

51. Hector and Yolanda, husband and wife, live in a community property state. In the last few days, Yolanda has received a paycheck from her employer, a gift of $10,000 of bonds from her father, and a dividend on stock that was purchased with money she earned from her job after she got married to Hector. She also owns a car, which she acquired (paid in full) with her own money shortly before the marriage.

a. Hector is a 50% owner of all of the above-mentioned items.

b. Hector is a 50% owner of everything but the car.

c. Hector is a 50% owner of everything but the car and the bonds.

d. Hector is a 50% owner only of the dividend.

52. Reanswer the preceding question.

53. The main purpose of the rule against perpetuities is:

a. To convert remainders into executory interests.

b. To make it possible to create legal springing and shifting interests.

c. To invalidate conveyances that are meant to deprive the grantor of title for a duration longer than a life in being plus 21 years.

d. To prevent damping effects on the use and transfer of land that result when contingent interests extend too far into the future.

54. Reanswer the preceding question.

55. Tremper was out hunting on land belonging to Ferroll. Tremper had a state hunting license. During his hunt he saw an animal (ferae naturae), shot it and took it home. This was the same animal which, the day before, had been caught in a trap laid by Morton on Morton’s own land. However, as Morton was taking the animal out of the trap, it bit him and got away.

a. If Tremper did not have a license from Ferroll to hunt on Ferroll’s land, then Ferroll would be entitled to the possession of the animal.

b. If Morton could prove that the animal was in fact the same one that he had in his trap the previous day, then Morton would be entitled to possession of the animal.

c. Both of the above.

d. If the animal was on Ferroll’s land, then it is the better (and more sensible) view to say that Ferroll owned it, in essentially the same way as he owns the bushes and trees growing on his land, or the rocks and soil lying under the surface.

56. Reanswer the preceding question.

57. Assume that Tremper had a license from Ferroll to “go hunting” on Ferroll’s land and, while hunting there, he discovered that trains passing on adjacent train tracks dropped considerable amounts of coal on Ferroll’s land—apparently because the tracks took a steep turn along the property line. Tremper collected as much coal as he could carry and, over the next several days, had managed to remove nearly $100 worth, which he intended to use to heat his home. Ferroll has found out about this and wants the value of the coal.

a. There is no way that Ferroll could get the value of the coal from Tremper because Ferroll didn’t own the coal any more than Tremper did.

b. Ferroll would have a strong argument for being entitled to the value of the coal even though Tremper had a license from Ferroll to “go hunting” on Ferroll’s land.

c. Ferroll would have a strong argument for being entitled to the value of the coal because, as owner of the land, Ferroll would normally be considered to be the owner of all that lies on it, such as the coal.

d. There is no way that Ferroll could get the value of the coal from Tremper because Tremper had a license from Ferroll allowing him to be on the land when he found and took the coal.

58. Reanswer the preceding question.

59. Wilson is constructing a patio in his back yard. This project will require a fairly large quantity of concrete. Because of the steepness of the terrain, there is no way for a concrete delivery truck to obtain access to Wilson’s back yard from the street in front of his house. This means that the concrete would have to be carried up in buckets, or the like—requiring many separate trips with a heavy load, and requiring the efforts of 5-8 men for a full day (at great expense). Wilson’s neighbor in back, however, has an existing driveway that would be very convenient for the purpose, allowing access to Wilson’s back yard with no harm or inconvenience to the neighbor. Unfortunately, the neighbor refuses to allow Wilson to bring in the concrete over his driveway. If Wilson goes ahead and uses the neighbor’s driveway anyway:

a. It would not be a trespass because courts will balance the hardships and refuse to enjoin a harmless use by one person of the other person’s land.

b. It would not be a trespass because Wilson’s neighbor is being unreasonable, and courts will not allow a person to be unreasonable when the result is great expense to others.

c. It would be a technical trespass but no court is likely to award more than nominal damages unless the neighbor can show he has sustained serious actual harm.

d. It would be a trespass and some courts might even require Wilson to pay major punitive damages.

60. Reanswer the preceding question.

61. Jenkins has a house in a semi-rural area near a truck depot. Jenkins gets his domestic water from a well. Recently the truck depot put in an extensive truck-washing facility that also uses well water. The needs of the truck depot are sufficiently great that it has lowered the water table in the immediate vicinity. As a result, Jenkins’ well has gone dry. In order get water on his own land, Jenkins will have to extend the depth of his well considerably—at a cost of several thousand dollars.

a. If the state follows the so-called English rule, the truck depot would not be liable to Jenkins.

b. If the state follows the so-called American rule, the truck depot would not be liable to Jenkins (you may assume that its use of the water was not a “commercial” use).

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. In most or all states the truck depot would be liable to Jenkins.

62. Reanswer the preceding question.

63. Norvin and Yelborg decided to take a small boat down the Golfent River, a small but navigable-in-fact stream. They prepared to put their boat in at the public highway and traverse, among other private lands, a parcel called Greenacre, owned by a Mr. Green. As they were putting their boat in the water, Mr. Green approached them and ordered them not to use the stretch of river crossing his land. Norvin and Yelborg ignored him and went on their way. A short distance downstream, in the midst of Greenacre, they were photographed as they dragged their boat on the riverbank to get around a rocky obstacle at a shallow point in the stream.

a. Norvin and Yelborg should be liable as trespassers because they had no permission to go down the stream through Greenacre.

b. Norvin and Yelborg should be liable as trespassers because, though they were entitled to float down the stream, they had no right to go ashore.

c. Norvin and Yelborg should not be liable as trespassers because the law implies a license for members of the public to use rural lakes and streams.

d. Norvin and Yelborg should not be liable as trespassers because there is a public navigation easement (including a right to make necessary uses of the shore) over streams that are navigable in fact.

64. Reanswer the preceding question.

65. Sillman found a valuable bracelet while walking through a public park on his way to work. He showed it to his boss, who told him he should turn it over to the police. In fact, his boss even offered to do it for him. A couple of weeks later, Sillman was in a supermarket and saw his boss’ wife wearing the bracelet.

a. Sillman has an action in trover to recover the value of the bracelet from his boss.

b. Sillman has an action in replevin to recover the value of the bracelet from his boss.

c. Both of the above.

d. Sillman has no action because he is not the true owner of the bracelet.

66. Reanswer the preceding question.

67. Suppose in the preceding question Sillman had found the bracelet in a supermarket, in among the lettuce heads in the produce display. As between Sillman and the owner of the supermarket:

a. Sillman would probably have the better claim under the so-called American rule.

b. The supermarket owner would probably have the better claim under the so-called English rule, assuming the place where bracelet was found would be considered a public or semi-public place.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Sillman would have no lawful claim to the bracelet because he is not the true owner of the bracelet.

68. Reanswer the preceding question.

69. Suppose again that Sillman found the bracelet in a supermarket, in amongst the lettuce heads in the produce display. In a state that makes the distinction between lost and mislaid property:

a. The supermarket’s claim to the bracelet would be strengthened if it could establish that the bracelet had been lost.

b. The supermarket’s claim to the bracelet would be strengthened if it could establish that the bracelet had been mislaid.

c. In a case like this one, it would not make any difference whether the bracelet was mislaid or lost.

d. The true owner would have a better legal claim to the bracelet if it had been mislaid rather than lost.

70. Reanswer the preceding question.

71. Apenta needed a cup of sugar to use in baking a cake. She went next door and “borrowed” a cup of sugar from her neighbor. The neighbor said: “I hope it makes a nice cake, but be sure and give it back.” On her way home, Apenta thought (for the first time): “That fool! I’m never going to give her back any sugar.”

a. Arpenta is guilty of common law larceny, because she has unlawfully taken somebody else’s sugar with felonious intent.

b. Arpenta is guilty of common law larceny, because she has decided to unlawfully retain the sugar with felonious intent.

c. Arpenta is not guilty of common law larceny because it is not clear from these facts that the sugar in fact belonged to the neighbor.

d. Arpenta is not guilty of common law larceny because, at the time she formed a felonious intent (if any) with respect to the “borrowed” sugar, it was already in her possession.

72. Reanswer the preceding question.

73. Foster checked out of her hotel one morning but was not leaving town until evening. She left her bags with the hotel bellhop, including her violin in an ordinary violin case. The violin was a particularly valuable one, worth over $200,000, but Foster did not tell that to the hotel personnel. When she returned later to pick up her bags, the violin case and violin were missing. There is no evidence of misdelivery or other conversion. Under the better reasoning:

a. The hotel should not be held liable as bailee for the loss of the violin as long as it used the care that an ordinarily prudent person would use to protect it.

b. There was no bailment of the violin because the hotel did not know that the violin case contained a violin.

c. There was no bailment of the violin because the hotel did not know the value of the violin.

d. The hotel should not be liable for more than the apparent value of the violin, i.e., the value that it would appear to have to an ordinarily prudent person, assuming that the hotel can be held liable at all.

74. Reanswer the preceding question.

75. Robbins delivered some family photo negatives to FasProcessing to have prints made. When Robbins came back to retrieve the pictures, the negatives had disappeared.

a. In order to make a prima facie case to hold FasProcessing liable, Robbins would have to provide proof as to all the elements of his cause of action, including proof that FasProcessing failed to use reasonable care.

b. If it turned out that FasProcessing had inadvertently misdelivered the negatives to somebody other than Robbins, FasProcessing would be liable for such misdelivery only if negligent,

c. In order to hold FasProcessing liable for the value of the negatives, Robbins would have the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that FasProcessing failed to use reasonable care, provided he showed that there was a bailment and a loss.

d. FasProcessing could not be held liable as a bailee because this sort of transaction does not involve a bailment.

76. Reanswer the preceding question.

77. While driving a car that she borrowed from Kline, Mindy was involved in an accident caused by the sole negligence of the other driver, Burvis.

a. Mindy can recover for the damage done to Kline’s car.

b. If Burvis pays full damages to Mindy for the damage to the car, and Kline later sues Burvis for that same damage, Kline will be unable to recover from Burvis for the damage done to Kline’s car.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Mindy cannot recover for the damage done to Kline’s car.

78. Reanswer the preceding question.

79. In 2001, Larkin inherited some farmland about 200 miles from his home. He has not even visited the land in the meantime. Recently, however, he has learned that a neighboring owner, Corliss, has taken over possession of the land without permission. This discovery occurred after a trespasser, Norwood, was caught on the property removing boards from an old barn. As things now stand:

a. Corliss is now apparently in a legal position (without more) to recover trespass damages from Norwood.

b. Larkin would be considered to be in constructive possession of the land.

c. Larkin is now apparently in a legal position (without more) to recover trespass damages from both Corliss and Norwood.

d. All of the above.

80. Reanswer the preceding question.

81. Suppose that Corliss has been in adverse possession of Larkin’s land for the past two years.

a. By taking the proper steps, Larkin should be entitled to recover mesne profits from Corliss

b. By taking the proper steps, Larkin should be able to recover for damage done to the land by Corliss

c. Larkin would not be entitled to recover in trespass from Corliss without recovering possession—for example by bringing a successful ejectment action first (or, in some states, simultaneously).

d. All of the above.

82. Reanswer the preceding question.

83. In order for Corliss to acquire a title to Larkin’s land by adverse possession, Corliss must (for the requisite period of time):

a. Act essentially as an ordinary owner would act with respect to land having the same general situation and character.

b. Give actual notice of his possession to Larkin, the true owner, so he would know that his land is being adverse possessed.

c. Pay the property taxes on the land.

d. All of the above.

84. Reanswer the preceding question.

85. Suppose that Corliss commenced his adverse possession of Larkin’s land in 1992 (when it was still owned by Larkin’s ancestor) and that he has been in continuous exclusive possession of it ever since. Larkin inherited the land in 2001. If the requirements for ripened title by adverse possession are otherwise met:

a. Corliss could, in some states, have acquired a ripened title even if he possessed under an honest but mistaken belief that the Larkin land was his.

b. Corliss could, in some states, be denied a ripened title if he possessed under an honest but mistaken belief that the Larkin land was his.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Larkin did not receive his cause of action until he inherited the land in 2001, and he therefore still has a number of years before the period of limitations on ejectment will run out.

86. Reanswer the preceding question.

87. In 1984, an adverse possessor went into possession of Blackacre. The true owner was under a legal disability (mental infirmity) at the time. The true owner died in 1998, without having previously recovered from her legal disability. Howard is her heir. Assuming the state has a disability provision like the one we studied in class (with a basic 21 year period and a 10-year disability period), then the earliest the adverse possessor could get a ripened title would be:

a. 1994

b. 2005

c. 2008

d. 2015

88. Reanswer the preceding question.

89. Due to a surveying error, Elwes went into adverse possession of some neighboring land—part of a mountainous rural tract. This occurred in 1991. In 2002, the owner of the tract sold it to Holborn Development Co. In connection with this sale, Elwes’ error was pointed out to him and he retreated, apologetically. Now Holborn is seeking approvals to build pursuant to a development plan that Elwes regards as ecologically unsound. Elwes has now asserted a claim to the area that he previously had possessed wrongfully. If Elwes otherwise has met the requirements for acquiring title by adverse possession:

a. In some states he would be considered to have effectively “given back” any title acquired by adverse possession when he retreated after being told the actual location of the boundary.

b. In some states he could be held to have never acquired a ripened title by adverse possession if his apologetic attitude (shown when the boundary facts were pointed out) were taken as proof that he did not possess under a “hostile…claim of right.”

c. If the owner who sold to Holborn happened to be the state, that fact would not likely make any legal difference anywhere.

d. All of the above.

90. Reanswer the preceding question.

91. Diggman went into adverse possession of a tract of land in 1991. At the time, the fee simple in the land was owned by Marshall but possession was held by Grant under a 20-year lease. If Diggman has otherwise met the requirements for acquiring title by adverse possession:

a. He would have a ripened title that is good against Grant (for the remainder of the lease term) but not against Marshall.

b. He would have a ripened title that is good against Marshall but not against Grant (for the remainder of the lease term).

c. He would have a ripened title that is good against both Marshall and Grant (for the remainder of the lease term).

d. He would have a ripened title that is good against neither Marshall nor Grant.

92. Reanswer the preceding question.

93. Last October an automobile operated by a drunk driver went off the road and crashed into the garage at Pickett’s home, leading to a fire that completely consumed the garage. When Pickett sued, the driver’s defense asserted that there was a defective deed in Pickett’s chain of title—with the effect that Pickett could not prove his ownership in court. Although nobody (except the drunk driver) is contesting Pickett’s legal ownership:

a. Unless Pickett figures out a way to prove his legal ownership in court, be may be precluded from recovering any damages at all.

b. Under the better-reasoned rule (and consistently with the Winkfield case), Pickett should be allowed to recover full damages for the harm caused, just as any ordinary owner would get.

c. The fact that Pickett cannot prove his ownership in court means that, almost certainly, the rightful ownership is held by some other person, somewhere.

d. Under the better-reasoned rule (and consistently with the Winkfield case), the damages recoverable by Pickett should be limited to the injury that has already accrued to his possessory interest.

94. Reanswer the preceding question.

95. Becky and Lucinda were playing CDs over at Becky’s house when Lucinda commented that she liked one of Becky’s CDs very much. Becky said: “Here, I’ll give it to you,” and she handed the CD to Lucinda, who said “thanks.” Then Becky said: “Wait. I wanted to play that CD at my party on Saturday. Let me use it till then, but it’s yours.” Lucinda said “Fine,” and later left without the CD.

a. A court should hold that this gift failed for lack of in praesenti donative intent.

b. A court should hold that this gift failed for lack of delivery.

c. A court should hold that this gift failed for lack of acceptance.

d. None of the above.

96. Reanswer the preceding question.

97. The basic meaning of the delivery requirement for gifts is:

a. The donor must clearly express donative intent.

b. Possession must be transferred in point of fact.

c. The donor must actually hand the object (or a deed a gift) directly to the donee.

d. The donor must use FedEx or some other recognized delivery service to effectuate the gift.

98. Reanswer the preceding question.

99. While still in good health and expecting many more years of life, a woman delivered a deed in which she transferred a future interest in her home to her son, retaining a life estate in herself. Orally she told her son, in the presence of many disinterested witnesses: “I also want you to have all my furniture in the house.” The son lived in a nearby town. The woman died eight years land. still in possession of the house and furniture.

a. The gift of the furniture would not work as a testamentary gift because there is no writing that meets the legal requirements for such a gift.

b. The gift of the furniture did not work as an inter vivos gift because the son did not get possession of the house (and, hence, the furniture) until at or after his mother’s death.

c. The gift of the furniture did not work as a gift causa mortis because, among other things, the donor was not in a position to make a gift cause mortis at the time.

d. All of the above.

100. Reanswer the preceding question.

101. Talbot, believing himself to be on his deathbed, made a gift of his pocket wristwatch to his favorite nephew, Billy.

a. The gift is presumptively revocable.

b. If Talbot recovers, Billy must return the watch—unless Talbot doesn’t want it.

c. Both of the above.

d. Since a gift under these circumstances is effectively a will, the delivery requirement would be waived.

e. All of the above

102. Reanswer the preceding question.

103. Talbot, believing himself to be on his deathbed, wanted to give $10,000 cash to his favorite nephew, Billy. The money was not, however, nearby or handily available for making an immediate hand-to-hand delivery.

a. If the money was in a safe deposit box, and Talbot delivered to Billy the sole key to the box, then Billy (as opposed to Talbot’s estate) should be entitled to the money even if he doesn’t retrieve the money till after Talbot’s death..

b. If the money was concealed in a secret place out in a woods, and Talbot told to Billy where to find it, this information should logically be treated as equivalent to the “sole key” to a safe deposit box. So the money should be Billy’s (as opposed to the estate’s) even if Billy doesn’t go retrieve the money till after Talbot’s death..

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

104. Reanswer the preceding question.

105. Fordman was a collector of antique vases. He wrote and signed a letter to his daughter, Jill, in which he said: “I want you to have the large Ming vase in the entrance hallway after I’m gone. I’ll keep it while I’m still kicking, but if anything happens to me, the vase yours.” The letter was delivered to Jill, but the vase stayed exactly where it was.

a. If Fordman later donates the vase to a museum , he should get a charitable tax deduction equal to the full fair market value of the vase.

b. If Fordman later donates the vase to a museum , he is in effect committing larceny, since the gift to his daughter means he has no legal interest left to “donate.”

c. Fordman tried to make what was, in effect, a testamentary gift to his daughter without complying with the statute of wills; the attempt would probably be held to fail.

d. By delivery of the letter, Fordman should be regarded as having given a future interest to Jill by deed of gift.

106. Reanswer the preceding question.

107. Ulster owned a parcel of land on which he maintained his residence. In order to raise money to send his daughter to college, Ulster sold a portion of the land to Rhodes. Due to county frontage requirements, the portion sold (“Rhodesacre”) had to include a portion of the driveway from Ulster’s house to the highway. Ulster knew he could not easily sell his retained land with such an arrangement, but he wanted to put off the expense of a new driveway as long as possible—ideally till it came time to sell. The deed to the purchaser of Rhodesacre stated “reserving to the grantor personally a right of way over the existing driveway for as long as he continues to own [the retained land].” Under the interpretation that would probably best carry out the parties’ intent, this language would create:

a. An easement appurtenant

b. An easement in gross.

c. A license.

d. A fee simple determinable in the strip covered by the driveway.

108. Reanswer the preceding question.

109. Harvey and Dobbins were neighboring landowners. Harvey wanted to build an irrigation canal that would pass partly across land belonging to Dobbins. Harvey offered to let Dobbins use the water from the canal if Dobbins would let Harvey build the canal across Dobbins’ land. In reliance on Dobbins’ expression of assent, Harvey built the canal at his own (considerable) expense. Later, Dobbins decided he had no further use for the water and he wanted to fill in the portion of the canal on his land. Harvey objects. Based on these facts, there appears to be a good chance that a court would recognize that Harvey has:

a. An executed parol license.

b. An easement by estoppel.

c. What some refer to as an “irrevocable license.”

d. All of the above.

110. Reanswer the preceding question.

111. Irwin owned a long narrow lot, with his house at one end. Many years ago he installed a lateral underground sewer pipe from his house to the sewer main in the street. This pipe ran nearly the entire length of Irwin’s lot, and it was the only connection between the house and the sewer main. Later Irwin sold a part of his lot, including a portion with the sewer pipe, to Baker. No mention was made of the sewer pipe.

a. Baker probably took subject to an easement by implied grant.

b. One problem with finding an easement by implication in this case is that there was no quasi-easement.

c. One problem with finding an easement by implication in this case is that the pipe was underground and not apparent.

d. One problem with finding an easement by implication in this case is that most courts recognize such easements only for purposes of rights of way.

112. Reanswer the preceding question.

113. Suppose that, after negotiations, Baker agreed to deliver a deed to Irwin confirming the existence of an easement allowing Irwin to have an underground pipe running across Baker’s land. The deed described a 5-foot wide strip as the location for that pipe.

a. Baker may make any use of the 5-foot strip that does not unreasonably interfere with Irwin’s use of the easement.

b. Irwin may make any use of the 5-foot strip (including cable TV wires) that does not unreasonably interfere with Baker’s use of his land as a whole.

c. Either Baker or Irwin can unilaterally relocate 5-strip to any convenient location across Baker’s property whenever either wants to do so.

d. Baker may not use or conduct any but most fleeting activities in the described 5-foot strip.

114. Reanswer the preceding question.

115. In 1990, Fran sold a part her pasture to George, a neighbor. Due to a drafting error, the deed contained no mention of an access easement, even though the portion conveyed to George has no public road access. It wasn’t a problem because George bought an adjacent parcel (“Parcel B”) a few days later, and he could get to the pasture from the public road over that. However, several years later, Parcel B was taken by eminent domain, in order to build a freeway. At this point George no longer had access to the pasture parcel he bought from Fran. He brought an action again Fran claiming that he had an easement by necessity over the land retained by Fran at the time of the original 1990 sale.

a. George’s action will fail because he never could have had an easement by necessity in the first place.

b. George’s action will fail because, even if he had an easement by necessity in the first place, the easement would have been extinguished when he bought Parcel B.

c. George’s action will succeed because, even if his easement by necessity was extinguished by his purchase of Parcel B, the easement would have been revived when Parcel B was taken by eminent domain.

d. George’s action will succeed because courts disfavor judgments that leave parcels of land with little or no value or use, and so they will imply an easement by necessity whenever such easement is reasonably necessary.

116. Reanswer the preceding question.

Facts for Gibson-Kelly questions. Gibson and his neighbor, Kelly, own adjoining rural lots. They went together and paid to have a well dug, to be shared by the two of them. The actual well is on Kelly’s lot, but Kelly granted “to Gibson a permanent easement to use water from the well and maintain connecting pipes to carry the water” across the property line.

117. Recently Gibson received an offer to buy his lot, and he is seriously considering the offer. One thing the prospective buy wants to know, however, is whether there is a water supply for the lot. Gibson mentions the easement, but the buyer’s lawyer is not so sure.

a. This easement granted to Gibson is presumptively in gross.

b. This easement granted to Gibson will presumptively terminate when Gibson sells his lot.

c. The easement to Gibson will presumptively become the property of whoever buys Gibson’s lot.

d. The easement to Gibson will be Gibson’s property until he transfers the easement (with or without his lot), and then it will belong to whomever he transfers the easement to.

118. Reanswer the preceding question.

119. Assume Gibson didn’t sell his lot, but now Gibson’s brother has purchased the lot on other side of Gibson’s (so Gibson’s lot is now between his brother’s and Kelly’s). Gibson tells his brother that he needn’t worry about the expense of digging a well since Gibson gets far more water than he needs from the well that he dug with Kelly. However, Kelly objects to Gibson’s proposal to hook up the brother’s house to the water pipes that carry water to Gibson’s house. Under the usual presumptions:

a. It would be an unlawful overuse of the easement if Gibson were to try to add his brother’s parcel onto the dominant tenement that enjoys the benefit of the easement.

b. Gibson would be entitled to transfer a shared ownership of his rights under the easement to whomever he pleases (and with or without his lot), including to his brother.

c. Gibson would be entitled to transfer his rights under the easement to whomever he pleases (and with or without his lot), but if he makes such a transfer, Gibson would no longer be entitled to use the easement himself.

d. Gibson couldn’t lawfully allow use of the well water in connection with his brother’s lot, but if Gibson and his brother put the brother’s lot in Gibson’s own name then it would be lawful for Gibson to use the water in connection with that lot as well as his own original lot.

120. Reanswer the preceding question.

121. Jason and June were neighbors. June wanted to enclose the porch on the front of her house. Jason objects, and his lawyer found an old deed from 1903 that prohibits such enclosures. June traces her title back to this deed—from the original developer of the tract. Jason also traces his title back to a deed from that same developer. Using the New York (or minority rule):

a. This covenant should not be enforceable by Jason against June because June never promised or agreed to be bound to it.

b. This covenant should not be enforceable by Jason against June because nobody ever promised Jason not to enclose the porch on what is now June’s house.

c. Prima facie, this covenant should be enforceable by Jason against June on these facts if the court is able to find that it was intended to run with the land.

d. This covenant should be enforceable by Jason against June on these facts even if many other houses in the tract, though supposedly subject to the same deed restrictions, have enclosed porches.

122. Reanswer the preceding question.

123. Suppose in the preceding question the developer had created a community association and designated it as the one to bring suit to enforce covenants such as the one relating to porch enclosures.

a. Under the traditional rules such a community association may have trouble being recognized as having standing to sue because the requirement of privity of estate is technically not met.

b. Under the traditional rules such a community association may have trouble being recognized as having standing to sue because its existence does not “touch or concern” any of the restricted land.

c. Modern courts will recognize enforcement power in whomever the person creating the covenants designates—it is purely a matter of intent.

d. The community association would not be able to sue to stop the enclosure in any event if such enclosures were now permitted under the local zoning law.

124. Reanswer the preceding question.

125. Bellamy constructed an old-style large dish antenna that was a real eyesore. When he tried to sell a part of his land, the buyer insisted that he take the antenna down as part of the deal. Bellamy agreed, provided the buyer agree never to use the acquired land for any but residential purposes. Having made these mutual agreements, Bellamy and the buyer signed up the deal and closed. Later, the buyer sold the land he’d acquired to Lembro, who intended to convert the dwelling into a convenience store.

a. There is no way that Lembro could be bound to comply with the restriction to residential use.

b. Lembro could be required to comply with this restriction to residential use if he bought with notice of it.

c. In order for Lembro to be bound by “notice,” there would have to be record notice from a deed recorded at the county recorder’s office.

d. In order for Lembro to be bound by “notice,” there would have to be actual notice from observable facts, and it would not be sufficient that there was record notice contained in a deed recorded at the county recorder’s office.

126. Reanswer the preceding question.

127. Suppose in the preceding question that, as part of the deal, Bellamy promised that no external antennas of any kind would be constructed on the land that he retained. If this covenant were placed in the deed that conveyed a part of Bellamy’s land to Lembro, and Lembro duly recorded that deed:

a. A subsequent buyer of Bellamy’s land would be on record notice of the covenant against external antennas, in any state.

b. A subsequent buyer of Bellamy’s land could be considered to be on record notice of the covenant against external antennas in states that follow the “direct chain of title rule.”

c. A subsequent buyer of Bellamy’s land could not be considered to be on record notice of the covenant against external antennas in some states that follow the “direct chain of title rule.”

d. None the above. The “direct chain of title rule” has no bearing on whether a subsequent buyer of Bellamy’s land would be on record notice—and none would be.

128. Reanswer the preceding question.

In answering the following TRUE/FALSE questions, assume (unless otherwise specified) that, at the times of conveyance, O is an owner in fee simple absolute, and that every named party is alive and unmarried. Remember that the conveyances are to be interpreted as set forth in the last two paragraphs on the instruction page. Assume that all life estates end at the death of the named life tenant. When you see words appropriate for a defeasible fee simple, assume that the words of conveyance also include whatever additional words (such as words of reverter or re-entry) that may be required by law in order to create the defeasible estate.

129. O conveyed “to A and his heirs.” The heirs of A receive a vested remainder under this conveyance.

130. O conveyed “to A and his heirs.” The heirs of A receive a contingent remainder under this conveyance.

131. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs.” B has a remainder.

132. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs.” B’s heirs have a remainder.

133. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B becomes a probate lawyer.” O has no future interest.

134. O conveyed “to A for life and then, one month after A’s death, to B and her heirs.” B has an executory interest.

135. O conveyed “to A and her heirs so long as the land is used as a farm, then to B and her heirs.” O has a reversion.

136. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs.” O has an executory interest.

137. O conveyed “to A for two years, then to B and her heirs.” B may be properly said to have a remainder.

138. O conveyed “to A for two years, then to B and her heirs if B becomes a probate lawyer.” B may be properly said to have a remainder.

139. O conveyed “to A for life.” O is much older then A. The conveyance results in a possibility of reverter.

140. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” B has a contingent remainder (at least).

141. O conveyed “to A and his heirs beginning after the time of my death.” The conveyance creates an remainder.

142. O conveyed “to A for life and then, six days after A’s death, to B and her heirs.” B has a remainder.

143. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A by at least one year.” B has an executory interest.

144. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if C survives A, then to C and her heirs.” B has a future interest that is vested subject to divestment.

145. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B does not survive A.” B has a contingent remainder.

146. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B attends A’s funeral.” B has a contingent remainder.

147. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” O has a reversion.

148. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A by at least one year.” O has a reversion.

149. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C after the death of A.” B has an executory interest.

150. O conveyed “to A for life, remainder to the children of B.” B is living but childless. This conveyance creates a vested remainder.

151. O conveyed “to A for life, remainder to the heirs of B” (a person recently deceased). This conveyance creates a vested remainder.

152. O conveyed “to A for 5 years, then to the heirs of B” (a living person). This conveyance creates a contingent remainder.

153. O conveyed “to A for 5 years, then to the heirs of B” (a living person). This conveyance creates an executory interest.

154. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if C survives A by at least one year, then to C and her heirs.” C has a future interest that is vested subject to divestment.

155. O conveyed “to A and his heirs until the District of Columbia becomes a state.” This conveyance creates a fee simple on special limitation.

156. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as swans nest on Belle Isle.” O has a right of re-entry.

157. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as swans nest on Belle Isle.” O has a future interest that is properly called a reverter.

158. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as swans nest on Belle Isle.” O has a future interest that is properly called a reversion.

159. O conveyed “to A and the heirs of his body.” In states that still recognize the fee tail, this estate would not be inherited if, at A’s death, his sole heirs were one brother and one sister

160. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as the house be kept painted white with green shutters.” The premises will automatically revert back to the grantor if the house is painted green with white shutters.

161. O conveyed “to A and his heirs on the condition that the premises be kept as a nature preserve and open to the public.” O has a right of re-entry.

162. O conveyed “to A as long as he desires to remain living on the land.” The more modern tendency is to interpret this conveyance as creating a determinable life estate, rather than a tenancy at will..