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1. Gregory was a tenant in an apartment under a lease from Nunn. On most nights, loud noises, music, yelling, etc. came from taverns and clubs in the immediate area. As a result, Gregory was forced to move out, two years prior to the end of the agreed lease term.

a. If the noise came from premises also owned by Nunn, and the leases to those premises contained clauses requiring the tenants to avoid noisy disturbances, Gregory may be able to avoid any liability for rent following his abandonment.

b. Even if the noise did not come from premises also owned by Nunn, Gregory still may be able to avoid any liability for rent following his abandonment because, on these facts, it appears that Nunn probably violated the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. A landlord never has an obligation to mitigate when the tenant breaches and so, noise or no noise, Nunn will be entitled to the rent as it comes due for the rest of the agreed lease term.

2. Reanswer the previous question.

3. Suppose in the previous question that the problem with the premises was that heating system did not work, allowing the indoor temperature to go down into the 40s during the winter. The lease contained a covenant by the landlord, Nunn, to provide adequate heat for living purposes. If Nunn’s breach were persistent and rendered the premises untenantable), then Gregory would be legally permitted to abandon possession and would be relieved of his obligation to pay rent:

a. Only if the court were willing to treat the lease as an ordinary contract.

b. Only if the court were willing to treat the covenants in the lease as independent.

c. If the court treated the lease as a conveyance and treated the landlord’s failure to perform his duties as a basis for a constructive eviction.

d. Only if the lease were deemed to contain an implied warranty of habitability.

4. Reanswer the previous question.

5. Suppose in the preceding question that Gregory had no legitimate complaints with his apartment, but he just wanted to live closer to his girlfriend—so he abandoned possession when there were still two years to go in the agreed lease term.

a. Under the traditional common-law rule, the landlord could allow the apartment to remain empty and recover the full rent from Gregory as it accrued over the remaining time under the lease.

b. Under the traditional common-law rule, the landlord could retake possession of the apartment and relet it to somebody else and still also recover the full rent from Gregory as it accrued over the remaining time under the lease.

c. Both of the above.

d. In many states courts have decided to not follow the traditional common-law rule and, on the question of mitigation, they treat leases like any other contract.

e. All of the above.

6. Reanswer the previous question.

7. Ken and Marcia own a piece of land as tenants in common. Each owns an undivided 50% share. For the past several years, Ken has been in sole occupancy.

a. Based on her rights as a co-tenant, Marcia is entitled to recover an amount equal to the fair rental value of the land from Ken.

b. Based on her rights as a co-tenant, Marcia is entitled to recover an amount equal to one-half of the fair rental value of the land from Ken.

c. Under the so-called Statutes of Anne, Marcia is entitled to recover her “proportionate share” from Ken.

d. In the absence of an agreement or an ouster by Ken, Marcia would be entitled to no recovery based purely on the sole occupancy of Ken.

8. Reanswer the previous question.

9. Suppose that Ken committed an act of ouster against Marcia by, for example, notifying her that she was not welcome at the property, and that he was claiming it as his own. Select the best answer:

a. Marcia would have an ejectment action to recover possession of the land from Ken.

b. Marcia would have an ejectment action to recover undivided possession of the land from Ken.

c. Such an unlawful move by Ken would have no bearing on the question of when, if ever, Ken might acquire a sole ownership of the land by adverse possession.

d. Ken would, by such an act, forfeit his right to any possession of the land.

10. Reanswer the previous question.

11. Casper conveyed “to Helen and Harvey and their heirs, as joint tenants.” Later Helen and Harvey, acting together, leased the land for five years to Meyer. A year or so after that, Harvey needed some money, so he put up his interest in the land as collateral, giving a mortgage in order to get the loan.

a. In some states, the conveyance would not be construed as creating as a joint tenancy because the words of conveyance do not include a reference to survivorship.

b. If the conveyance were construed as creating a joint tenancy, in many states that joint tenancy would have been severed (converted into a tenancy in common) by the mortgage.

c. Both of the above.

d. If the conveyance were construed as creating a joint tenancy, in many states that joint tenancy would have been severed (converted into a tenancy in common) by the lease.

e. All of the above.

12. Reanswer the previous question.

13. Martin, Tyler and Fredds became joint tenants in Blackacre. Martin conveyed his interest to Tyler. Later, Tyler died intestate. Blackacre would now belong to:

a. Martin and Fredds, each owning an undivided 1/2.

b. Fredds as to an undivided 1/2, and Tyler’s heirs as to an undivided 1/2.

c. Fredds as to an undivided 2/3, and Tyler’s heirs as to an undivided 1/3.

d. Fredds would be the sole owner.

14. Reanswer the previous question.

15. Portia and Anthony, husband and wife, owned Greenacre as tenants by the entirety. Anthony’s business has gone on hard times and his creditors would like to get at Greenacre in order to satisfy their debts.

a. In some but not all states that recognize the tenancy by the entirety, Anthony’s creditors would be able to satisfy a judgment against him by executing on his interest in the tenancy by the entirety.

b. In all states that recognize the tenancy by the entirety, Anthony’s creditors would be able to satisfy a judgment against him by executing on his interest in the tenancy by the entirety.

c. In some states that recognize the tenancy by the entirety, Anthony’s creditors would be able to take his place in the tenancy by the entirety, so the creditors and Portia would become tenants by the entirety with each other.

d. None of the above. One of the sacrosanct essential features of tenancy by the entirety is that it is not available to satisfy the separate debts of either husband or wife.

16. Reanswer the previous question.

17. Corwin and Cora, husband and wife, reside in a community property state. Which of the following would belong to Cora exclusively, as her separate property?

a. The salary she earns at her job while Corwin stays home and watch Judge Judy on TV.

b. Interest on the savings account that she has secretly opened and in which she deposits $50 per week out of paycheck from her employer.

c. The certificate of deposit (CD) that Cora bought shortly before the marriage with savings from her job.

d. All of the above.

18. Reanswer the previous question.

19. The Garners own a piece of property with a railroad line running along the back. Recently they have learned that the railroad company plans to abandon this particular stretch of track. The railroad holds under a deed that grants it the “right” to use the strip of land “for railroad purposes,” but does not expressly specify whether the interest conveyed is a fee or and easement.

a. If the interest is an easement, and the railroad takes actions such that it can no longer make use of the easement, then the easement will be extinguished.

b. In many states, the preferred construction of grants with respect to very long thin strips of land is that they create easements rather than fee interests.

c. Both of the above.

d. Whether the interest held by the railroad is a fee interest or an easement, the railroad should still be presumptively entitled to it in perpetuity, whether it needs it for railroad purposes or not.

20. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Taylor-Longman questions. Taylor owned a piece of rural land on which he had a small cabin. In 1992 he dug a well about 100’ from the cabin, and ran a pipe underground to deliver the water. Later, in 2002, he sold and conveyed a portion of his land to Longman. The portion conveyed contained a segment of the underground pipe that Taylor had run from the well to his house. It would be possible to re-route the pipe, so it would be entirely on Taylor’s retained land, but that would cost several hundred dollars.

21. If Taylor’s deed to Longman stated that the grant was ”subject to an easement for an existing pipe supplying [the house] from a well on the land retained,” an easement created by such language would:

a. Probably last only as long as Taylor remained the owner of the land he retained.

b. Be an easement by reservation rather than by grant.

c. Be presumptively revocable.

d. Be presumptively in gross.

22. Reanswer the previous question.

23. If Taylor’s deed to Longman did not mention any easements:

a. There would be no plausible way for Taylor to claim an easement for the existing pipe.

b. Taylor might be able to make a plausible claim for an easement by implication from prior use, and the fact that the easement was by reservation rather than grant would lead most courts look on the claim more favorably.

c. Taylor might be able to make a plausible claim for an easement by implication from prior use, but the fact that the use was not visible would mean he’d have to show that it was otherwise apparent to the Longman.

d. Taylor might be able to make a plausible claim for an easement by prescription since he has been using the pipe for over 10 years

24. Reanswer the previous question.

25. Assume again that Taylor’s deed to Longman did not mention any easements:

a. Taylor would probably have a pretty good case for asserting an easement by necessity to continue using the pipe.

b. If Taylor succeeded in claiming an easement by necessity for the segment of pipe on Longman’s land, the easement would probably continue in to exist even if alternative supplies of water became available.

c. If Taylor succeeded in claiming an easement by implication from prior use for the segment of pipe on Longman’s land, the easement would probably continue to exist even if alternative supplies of water became available.

d. None of the above. If the deed mentioned no easements, then Taylor could not have any plausible basis for claiming one except an executed parol license.

26. Reanswer the previous question.

27. Assume that Taylor has obtained from Longman a grant of an easement “for a water conduit at the location of the existing pipe from the well on the land that is being retained.”

a. Under the majority rule, Longman would probably not be permitted to unilaterally relocate the route of the pipe, even if he did so at his own expense.

b. Under the majority rule, Taylor would probably be permitted to unilaterally relocate the route of the pipe, provided that he did so at his own expense and with full compensation to Longman for any harm caused.

c. Under the majority rule, Longman would not be permitted to make any use of the portion of his property along the route of the pipe (for example, to plant flower beds) without the consent of Taylor.

d. All of the above.

28. Reanswer the previous question.

29. In the preceding question

a. It is probable that the easement would last only as long as the existing pipe continued to be serviceable, and he could not replace the pipe.

b. If Taylor sold another piece of his land, on the other side of his house, he probably could not provide the buyer with the right to use the pipe to supply water to the buyer’s parcel.

c. If Taylor bought another, additional parcel of land right adjacent to his house, he could not (under the traditional rule) use the pipe across Longman’s land to supply water to that newly acquired parcel.

d. All of the above.

30. Reanswer the previous question.

31. Urbanoff and Correlli were neighboring landowners. They orally agreed to build and share the use of a 14’ wide driveway between their homes. The driveway was constructed to run right up the property line between them, about 7’ on each side of the line. Both made use of the driveway until they sold their respective parcels, in 1992 and 1993, respectively, to plaintiff and defendant, who have shared the use of it ever since. No deed makes mention of any easement for the driveway. Defendant now wants to block off his side of the driveway and plaintiff sues for a declaration of his rights:

a. There should be no obstacle to defendant’s blocking off his side of the driveway since plaintiff does not appear to have any basis for asserting a legal interest in it.

b. Though Urbanoff and Correlli had an agreement for what were, in effect, mutual easements, the statute of frauds makes it impossible that mutual easements were ever created

c. There is no way to conclude that the plaintiff has acquired an easement by prescription because plaintiff’s use of the driveway over the years has been permissive.

d. In many states plaintiff’s use would be regarded as being with a sufficient claim of right to make possible the creation of an easement based on adverse use.

32. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Devlin-Cimmion questions. In the 1950s, Devlin acquired a tract of oceanfront land, which he divided into lots. As he sold the lots, he placed in each deed a covenant restricting the use to one- and two-family homes, creating a “restricted zone.” The purpose and effect of the covenants was to protect the value of the lots conveyed as well as the value of the portion of the tract retained by Devlin. Devlin has since died and his retained portion of the tract is held by his daughter, Cimmion. A developer has recently bought 6 of the lots, all in a row, and has proposed to tear down the existing houses and put up 10-attached unit garden apartments.

33. Cimmion wants to prevent the development of the garden apartments.

a. There is no way that Cimmion could enforce the restrictive covenants against the developer since neither she nor the developer is a party to the covenants.

b. If the developer traces his title to the lots back to the original buyers from Devlin, then there would be “horizontal privity,” which is necessary for Cimmion to be able to enforce the covenants at law against the developer.

c. In the majority of states, there would be no need for horizontal privity in order for Cimmion to be able to enforce the covenants at law against the developer; it would be enough if there were “vertical privity.”

d. There is no way these particular covenants would run with the land because there is no basis for saying that they touch or concern the land.

34. Reanswer the previous question.

35. Suppose that, after the covenants were made, a number of multi-unit garden apartment complexes were built in the vicinity of Cimmion’s land. Under the majority rule:

a. That fact would count more heavily against enforcement of the covenants if the complexes were built inside rather than outside the restricted zone.

b. That fact would count more heavily against enforcement of the covenants if the complexes were built outside rather than inside the restricted zone.

c. It would not matter whether the complexes were built outside or inside the restricted zone since the construction of the complexes would be essentially irrelevant to the question of the enforceability of the covenants.

d. That fact could have no legal effect on Cimmion’s ability to enforce the covenant against the developer.

36. Reanswer the previous question.

37. In order for Cimmion to be able to enforce the restrictive covenants as equitable servitudes, she would have to show:

a. That the developer took title with notice of the covenants.

b. Privity of estate.

c. That the covenants were actually easements.

d. That the original deeds from Devlin intended to create equitable servitudes rather than real covenants.

38. Reanswer the previous question.

39. To say that a deed covenant “touches and concerns” the land means that:

a. The parties intend it to be binding upon and inure to the benefit of themselves, their heirs, successors and assigns.

b. It is personal rather than real.

c. It affects the parties to the covenant as landowners by, for example, having some economic impact on the parties’ ownership rights in the benefited or burdened land.

d. Has the characteristic of “vertical privity.”

40. Reanswer the previous question.

41. Dave was out on horseback looking for wild horses (which you may assume to be “ferae naturae”). He spotted large stallion, and he commenced pursuit. When he was just about to get a rope on the stallion, Corliss appeared out of nowhere and intercepted it, eventually roping the stallion. Despite Dave’s protests, Corliss took it. Dave has brought an action against Corliss

a. Dave would be entitled to the stallion as against Corliss if Dave had a reasonable prospect of capturing it.

b. Dave would be entitled to the stallion as against Corliss if these events had occurred on Dave’s land, and Corliss was trespassing.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Dave would not be entitled to the stallion unless Dave had actually achieved first occupancy.

42. Reanswer the previous question.

43. Jasper told his friend, Obert, that he could hunt and fish on Jasper’s land any time he wanted to. Recently, however, Jasper learned that Obert has discovered an outwash on Jasper’s land where there are many ancient arrowheads, relatively easy to dig out. Obert has been digging out the arrowheads and selling them to collectors. Assume that the arrowheads are not considered a part of the soil or “mislaid” property:

a. Jasper can have no claim to the arrowheads unless he can show either that he already knew they were there or that he had put them there.

b. Jasper can have no claim to the arrowheads since Obert was on the land with permission at the time he found them.

c. If the court were to conclude that the scope of Obert’s license from Jasper were limited to hunting only, that conclusion would strengthen Jasper’s claim to the arrowheads.

d. Obert would be entitled to the arrowheads as the finder even if his activity in digging them up constituted a technical trespass.

44. Reanswer the previous question.

45. Hopewell Garson was walking down the street when the door of a passing car opened briefly and a $50 bill flew out. Hopewell reached up and tried to grab it as it sailed past, but his fingers barely grazed the bill and he merely deflected it toward a shopping bag carried by Margaret Playne. When the bill hit the top of the shopping bag, it fell inside without being noticed by Margaret. Hopewell accosted Margaret pointing at the bag and saying, “Give me that. It’s mine!” Confused, Margaret looked down and saw the $50 bill and picked it up. Hopewell grabbed it from her hand and started off, but he was tackled by a police officer and arrested. Nobody saw the license plate on the car, and no one has come forward claiming to be the true owner of the money.

a. Hopewell is guilty of larceny.

b. Hopewell has a better claim to the $50 bill than Margaret because he was first to spot and touch it.

c. Neither Margaret nor Hopewell has any legal claim to the $50 bill because, obviously, neither one of them owns it.

d. Margaret has the best claim to the $50 bill because she was the most recent known possessor of it.

46. Reanswer the previous question.

47. Victor needs to have some repairs done to the side of his house. Because of the small size of his lot, it will be necessary to use a couple of feet of the neighbor’s lot for ladders, equipment, etc. Recently, however, Victor has had a falling out with his neighbor and the latter has refused permission for any intrusions or encroachments, no matter how minor or temporary, on his land.

a. As long as any incursions by Victor or his contractor are reasonable and result in no real damage, the neighbor would have no legal right to object and refuse permission.

b. As long as the incursions are necessary for repairs to Victor’s house, Victor would recognized as having an easement by necessity in most jurisdictions.

c. If Victor went ahead and used a portion of his neighbor’s yard in making repairs to his house, he would be liable to his neighbor in trespass.

d. If Victor went ahead and used a portion of his neighbor’s yard in making repairs to his house, he would be liable to his neighbor in nuisance.

48. Reanswer the previous question.

49. Foley owned a dairy farm and provided water for his herd from a natural spring. A large nearby parcel was owned by a Coe Coal Company (CCC) which, as it mined deeper, found it necessary to pump out groundwater that seeped into its mine. This pumping lowered the water table in the immediate vicinity and, as a result, Foley’s spring dried up in the warmer, drier months of the year.

a. Foley probably has an action against CCC under the so-called American Rule.

b. Foley probably has an action against CCC under the so-called English Rule.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

50. Reanswer the previous question.

51. Kevin and Marie paddled a canoe down a small stream. The bed and banks of the stream were owned by Gruff, the owner of the land on either side. Although the stream is navigable in fact, Gruff had told Kevin and Marie that he did not want them canoeing through his land. They went down the stream anyway.

a. Gruff would not have a trespass action against Kevin and Marie unless he had actual or constructive possession of the land through which they traveled.

b. Gruff would have a trespass action against Kevin and Marie because they did not have his permission to travel down the stream.

c. Gruff would have no trespass action against Kevin and Marie if they only touched the water, but if they touched the bed or banks of the stream at all, that would make them liable in trespass.

d. Gruff would have an action in trespass against Kevin and Marie unless the stream were deemed to be navigable in law.

52. Reanswer the previous question.

53. While a houseguest in the home of an old college friend, Flavia accidentally dropped her keys through the grill of a cold-air return register. In the course of retrieving them she had to remove the grill with a small screwdriver that she carried in her purse. Under the grill she found a diamond and sapphire ring. She told her hostess, who was quite surprised. Her hostess said that she’d never heard that anyone had lost such a ring at her house, which was about 45 years old. Flavia wants to keep the ring, but her hostess claims it’s hers because it was found in her house.

a. In states that follow the so-called American rule, Flavia is probably entitled to the lost ring, although there may be some question as to whether the scope of her license extended to getting into the cold air ducts with a screwdriver.

b. In states that follow the so-called English rule, Flavia’s hostess, as owner and possessor of the house, would probably be held to have a better entitlement than Flavia to the lost ring.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. It is apparent from the facts that neither Flavia nor her hostess can meet the burden of proof showing that she is the true owner entitled to the ring.

54. Reanswer the previous question.

55. In the preceding question, treating the ring as “lost” rather than “mislaid”:

a. In states that follow the so-called American rule, the prior owner of the house (prior to Flavia’s hostess) would have a strong claim to the ring as against Flavia.

b. In states that follow the so-called English rule, the prior owner of the house (prior to Flavia’s hostess) would have a strong claim to the ring as against Flavia.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Under no body of authorities could the prior owner of the house have a plausible claim to the ring.

56. Reanswer the previous question.

57. While traveling long-distance by bus, Olmstead placed his watch in the seat-back pouch in front of him. He forgot to retrieve it when he got off the bus, which was owned by the Basic Buses InterCity Transit Corp., a new no-frills surface transportation company. The watch was found by a cleaner employed by Basic while the bus was parked at a terminal on land owned by the Municipal Transit Authority. The whereabouts of Olmstead are not known.

a. The best claim to the watch (other than that of Olmstead himself) is probably that of Basic, because that would be the choice most likely to get the property back in the hands of the true owner.

b. In states that make the distinction between lost and mislaid property, it makes the most sense to award the watch to the Municipal Transit Authority, as the owner of the locus in quo.

c. In states that make the distinction between lost and mislaid property, it makes the most sense to award the watch to the employee who found it, since she is the one whose industry and labor brought the watch to light.

d. If the watch is claimed by the employee who found it, her claim would be nearly insurmountable, since finders ordinarily win as long as their presence at the locus in quo is not a trespass.

58. Reanswer the previous question.

59. One morning a customer entered Irwin’s Pharmacy in order to buy some toothpaste. While making her selection, she noticed a small purse that had been apparently kicked under the display shelves. The purse turned out to contain over $300.

a. In states that follow the so-called American rule, the finder should ordinarily have the best entitlement to the purse and money (other than the true owner).

b. In states that follow the so-called English rule, the finder should ordinarily have the best entitlement to the purse and money (other than the true owner).

c. In states that follow the so-called English rule, the pharmacy owner should logically have the best entitlement to the purse and money (other than the true owner) if the finder was the first customer to enter the store that day, after it had been locked up all night.

d. All of the above.

60. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Gloria-garage owner questions. While Gloria was on her way home from doing some errands, her car stalled on the highway and was towed to a garage. Gloria went home on a bus. Because she couldn’t carry all her purchases on the bus, she asked the garage owner if she could leave them at the garage. He agreed.

61. One item in Gloria’s car was a bottle of vintage cognac, worth $700. Like most people, the garage owner didn’t know the fine points of such things, and he saw it as simply a bottle of booze. Gloria didn’t tell him the value for fear he wouldn’t be willing to keep it for her. When Gloria returned the next day, she was chagrined to learn that some guys washing clothes in the laundromat next to the garage had wandered in, found the vintage cognac, mixed it with Coca-cola and consumed it.

a. There was no bailment of the cognac.

b. There was a bailment of the cognac but the garage owner would not be liable for the loss unless he was negligent or committed a conversion.

c. From these facts it is clear that the amount of care that the garage owner would be expected to use is that care that would be appropriate for a $700 bottle of cognac

d. In proving her case against the garage owner, Gloria would not have the benefit of any particular presumptions, but would initially have to bring forward evidence as to each and every element of her case.

62. Reanswer the previous question.

63. In the preceding question:

a. Gloria would have a cause of action in trover against the guys from the laundromat who drank the vintage cognac.

b. The garage owner would have a cause of action in trover against the guys from the laundromat who drank the vintage cognac.

c. Both of the above.

d. In a trover action by the garage owner over the cognac, any recovery would be his to keep since he had lawful possession of the cognac and, “as against a wrongdoer, possession is title.”

e. All of the above.

64. Reanswer the previous question.

65. Suppose that when Gloria left her car at the garage, her PDA worth several hundred dollars was hidden under her car’s front seat—unbeknownst to the garage owner. When she returned the next day, the car was there but the PDA had disappeared, and she wants to hold the garage owner responsible for the loss. Under the better rule:

a. The garage owner would be liable for the loss of the PDA if he used no particular care to protect it, even though he had no idea it was in the car.

b. The garage owner would be considered the bailee of the PDA even though he did not know it was in the car.

c. Both of the above.

d. The garage owner would not be considered the bailee of the PDA since he did not even know it was in the car.

66. Reanswer the previous question.

67. Owen has a wooded tract of land that he does not occupy or physically possess. He has discovered that Mervin has been occasionally entering the land and taking shellfish from the small streams that flow there. For purposes of a trespass action by Owen against Mervin:

a. An owner like Owen is considered to constructively possess the land he owns, provided the land is not possessed by an adverse possessor.

b. An owner like Owen is considered to constructively possess the land he owns, whether or not the land is possessed by an adverse possessor.

c. It would not matter whether an owner like Owen could be considered to have possession of the land he owns

d. None of the above

68. Reanswer the previous question.

69. In 1986 Anthony died intestate while holding title in fee simple absolute to Blackacre. Howard was his sole heir. In 1987, Simpson saw that Blackacre was unoccupied and took possession of it—engaging in the sort of conduct that would ordinarily cause title to eventually ripen in him as an adverse possessor. In 1995, however, Simpson died while still in possession of the land, and possession was promptly assumed by Cordell, who still holds it today. Howard wants to sue Cordell in ejectment.

a. Irrespective of the relationship between Cordell and Simpson, Howard’s action ought to succeed since Cordell has only held possession for 9 years.

b. Howard’s action would probably not succeed if Cordell and Simpson had been in “privity of estate.”

c. It would be essentially irrelevant if Cordell were the heir of Simpson because, at the time Simpson died, he had not yet acquired any ownership of the land.

d. None of the above.

70. Reanswer the previous question.

71. In the preceding question, assume that Howard did not know he was the sole heir of Anthony, and has only recently found out. Under the better rule (and the one we studied in class):

a. The adverse possession of Simpson and Cordell should not be considered “open and notorious” because Howard had no way of knowing of it.

b. Howard will still be allowed to sue in ejectment, and the statute of limitations will not be considered to have run, because it would be inequitable to extinguish a person’s cause of action before he has a reasonable chance to bring suit.

c. The adverse possession of Simpson and Cordell should not be considered “hostile and under claim of right” because they never did anything to indicate to Howard that they were claiming his land.

d. None of the above.

72. Reanswer the previous question.

73. The Erskines’ backyard has a fence on both sides and is bordered in the rear by the back wall of their neighbor’s garage. Since they bought their property and moved in, the Erskines have simply assumed that they own all the way to the wall of the garage but, in fact, the record property line is six inches on their side of the garage wall. Thus, the Erskines have been occupying, mowing and otherwise caring for a six-inch strip of what was, originally at least, their neighbor’s property. Now, after 11 years of this, their neighbor has brought an action in ejectment to recover the 6” strip.

a. In some states it would hurt the Erskines’ defense if they possessed the strip in the honest but mistaken belief that it was theirs.

b. In some states it would help the Erskines’ defense if they possessed the strip in the honest but mistaken belief that it was theirs.

c. In some states it would theoretically neither hurt nor help the Erskines’ defense if they possessed the strip in the honest but mistaken belief that it was theirs; it would be their objective manifestations that count.

d. All of the above.

74. Reanswer the previous question.

75. Suppose in the preceding question that the period of limitations for trespass actions (including for mesne profits) is 3 years.

a. Since the period of limitations for trespass actions is 3 years, the neighbor would be able to recover only for mesne profits accruing during the most recent three years.

b. Since it appears that title ripened a year ago, the neighbor would be able to recover only for mesne profits accruing during the first two of the past three years (up until the title ripened in the Erskines).

c. Since title acquired by adverse possession “relates back” to the beginning of the possession, the neighbor would not be able to recover for mesne profits for any of the past three years.

d. Since title acquired by adverse possession “relates back” to the beginning of the possession, the neighbor would be able to recover only for mesne profits accruing during the first two of the past three years (up until the title ripened in the Erskines).

76. Reanswer the previous question.

77. In 1980 AP entered into adverse possession of Greenacre. At the time, the owner of Greenacre, O, was insane. In 1985, O died intestate, and H was his heir. Using a statute of limitations such as the one that we studied in class (with a 21 year based period and a 10 year disability period), title would have ripened (or will ripen) in AP:

a. in 1995.

b. in 2001.

c. in 2005.

d. in 2011.

78. Reanswer the previous question.

79. Yerba owned a parcel of land (“Troutacre”) along a trout fishing stream in the Catskills. Although a portion of Troutacre touched on a road, the only convenient access to the area near the stream was via a dirt lane across land belonging to Wiggins. Wiggins had once owned Troutacre, too, but in 1992 he sold it to Plumm, and a year later Plumm sold it to Yerba. Since Yerba purchased Troutacre, he has used the dirt lane almost daily during trout season, and at least every couple of weeks during the warmer portion of the year. In the winter, however, months at a time might pass without Yerba’s making any use of the lane whatsoever. Neither Plumm nor Yerba had ever received an express grant to use the lane.

a. On these facts it looks clear that Yerba would have an easement by necessity to use the lane.

b. On these facts Yerba appears to have a strong case for asserting that he has acquired an easement over the lane by prescription.

c. Yerba could not (yet) have acquired an easement by prescription to use the lane because his use has manifestly not been continuous.

d. Yerba could not (yet) have acquired an easement by prescription to use the lane because his use has manifestly not been uninterrupted.

80. Reanswer the previous question.

81. There are two ways to reach Gruner’s home. One way is entirely on his own property and the other, shorter way crosses land belonging to Belusoi. For the past 15 years (since 1989), Gruner has reached his home almost exclusively by using the way that crosses the Belusoi land because it gives him easier access to and from town. However, until two years ago the Belusoi land was owned by the state—which deeded it to Belusoi as part of a program to get rid of “surplus” state lands.

a. It looks very clear that Gruner has an easement by prescription to use the easement, based on his use for the past 10+ years.

b. It could pose no problem that the servient land was acquired by Belusoi from the state because Gruner’s adverse use against the state can simply be tacked onto his use against Belusoi.

c. In at least some states, adverse use against the state cannot ripen into a legal easement and, in those states Gruner would not have an easement by prescription.

d. Gruner could not in any event have acquired a easement by prescription because he has an alternate access to his home that is entirely on his own land.

82. Reanswer the previous question.

83. Suppose that the shortest way to Lambert’s house is on a way that goes across land belonging to Howitz. Howitz has owned the land in fee since 1966. Suppose further, however, that from 1988 until 2002, the Howitz land was in the possession Kerner, who held it under a term of years. If Lambert has used the way since 1989 and his use of the way were such that it could ripen into a prescriptive easement:

a. Lambert could have acquired a prescriptive easement good against Kerner and Howitz as early as 1999.

b. Lambert could have acquired a prescriptive easement good against Kerner but not Howitz as early as 1999.

c. Lambert could have acquired a prescriptive easement good against Howitz but not Kerner as early as 1999.

d. Lambert could not have acquired a prescriptive easement good against either Howitz or Kerner as early as 1999.

84. Reanswer the previous question.

85. In the preceding question, the main analytical problem for Lambert in trying to assert and easement by prescription against Howitz is:

a. Howitz would not have had a trespass action against Lambert for the latter’s use of the shorter way (across the Howitz land) until 2002.

b. Howitz was not in privity of estate with Kerner, and therefore there could be no “tacking” of the use against Kerner onto the use against Howitz.

c. Before 2002, Howitz would not necessarily have had any way to know that Lambert was making open and notorious use of the way and, therefore, Lambert’s use would not be considered open and notorious as against Howitz.

d. Before 2002, Lambert would not necessarily have had any way to know that Howitz was the fee owner of the land and, therefore, Lambert’s use would not be considered “hostile” as against Howitz.

86. Reanswer the previous question.

87. In 1997, Mr. and Mrs. Carpenter bought a single-family house, and have possessed it ever since. Last month, a driver lost control of his car and it crashed into the house, causing $25,000 of “permanent” damage to the house. The Carpenters have sued and, as part of his defense, the driver points out that there is a defect in one of the deeds in their chain of title and, therefore, the Carpenters (from the legally admissible evidence) appear to be adverse possessors.

a. Some courts would treat the title defect as a sufficient basis to prevent the driver from being liable for permanent damages to the Carpenters.

b. Courts that follow the Winkfield principle would not allow the title defect to prevent a recovery by the Carpenters of permanent damages.

c. In any event, the Carpenters should, as possessors, be entitled to damages for the injury to their possession—if, for example, due to the accident they were unable to live in the house for several weeks.

d. All of the above.

88. Reanswer the previous question.

89. Sharon was standing in her living room and, in the presence of several witnesses, said to her daughter: “This vase once belonged to your great grandmother and, when you marry and have a house of your own, I’m giving it to you.” The daughter took the vase from her mother’s hands and admired it for a few moments and then it was replaced on the mantel, where it remained until her mother’s death a several years later.

a. Based on these facts, in particular the manifest lack of in praesenti donative intent, there has been no valid gift of the vase to the daughter.

b. There should be no problem for the daughter in proving that there was a gift of the vase, since the delivery requirement was met when she held the vase and admired it.

c. Delivery or no delivery, the daughter will be able claim the vase based on these facts once she gets married and has a house of her own.

d. Since her mother is now deceased, the daughter has a substantial basis for claiming the vase as a gift cause mortis.

90. Reanswer the previous question.

91. For her birthday, Karen’s husband gave her a large flat-screen plasma TV (on which sports such as football showed up exceptionally well). When she arrived home from work that day, the new TV, a relatively bulky item, was already installed in their living room and her best friends were there, too, for a surprise party. Her husband announced at that time and on a number of later occasions that the TV was hers.

a. There probably is no gift in this case, since there is no evidence of any facts of “delivery.”

b. There probably is no gift in this case, since there is no evidence of any facts of “in praesenti” donative intent.

c. There probably is no gift in this case, since there is no evidence of any facts of explicit “acceptance.”

d. Due to the bulky nature of the TV and the fact that Karen and her husband were close family members living in the same household, it would probably be held that Karen became the owner of the TV by gift.

92. Reanswer the previous question.

93. Lenny’s mom bought a comfortable chair for him to study in when he started law school. Lenny arrived home one day and there was the chair in “his” room of his mom’s house. She also embroidered an antimacassar (a doo-dad that goes over the chair back) with the words “Lenny’s Chair” stitched in green thread, and she placed this on the backrest of the chair. Later, she executed and delivered a deed to Lenny granting him the house, “subject to a life estate” in herself. (As we all know, Lenny technically received an executory interest.) When mom passed away a year later, Lenny’s sister, as executor of her estate, claimed the chair.

a. Because the donor placed Lenny’s name on the chair, the delivery requirement can be dispensed with.

b. Even if there was no effective delivery of the chair during the donor’s lifetime, the possession of the chair (as part of the contents of the house) passed to Lenny at her death, thus meeting the delivery requirement.

c. Evidence of clear expressions of donative intent, plus the fact that the chair was placed under Lenny’s de facto control (in “his” room) and that the donor and donee lived in the same household, are factors of the kind that have led courts to relax the delivery requirement between family members.

d. Even if there was no effective delivery of the chair during the donor’s lifetime, the ownership of the chair passed to Lenny at her death, since a conveyance of real estate is usually presumed to include all of the contents.

94. Reanswer the previous question.

95. Believing himself to be on his deathbed, Jenkins said to his niece: “This is a watch that your great-great grandfather carried during the Civil War. I want you to have it.” He then handed it to her and she took it with her when she left. Several weeks later Jenkins made an unexpected full recovery.

a. The gift by Jenkins to his niece is presumptively a gift causa mortis.

b. Because Jenkins believed himself to be on his deathbed at the time of the gift, it could only be a gift causa mortis.

c. Because Jenkins made a full recovery and did not die as he had expected he would, the gift is presumptively a gift inter vivos.

d. Essentially what Jenkins was trying to do was to dispose of his property after his death and the only way to do that is by way of a testamentary gift. Hence, Jenkins’ purported gift to his niece would be void.

96. Reanswer the previous question.

97. Feldmann was on his deathbed and said to his longtime close friend: “Here is the key to my safe deposit box. In it are 100 shares of ExxonMobil that I want you to have.” The friend took the key, which was the only outstanding key to the box.

a. The gift could be effective as a completed gift even if the friend did not go to the box and retrieve the stock before the death of Feldmann.

b. Presumptively, Feldmann could, at any time, prior to his death revoke the gift.

c. The delivery requirement could be met in this case by delivery of the key.

d. All of the above.

98. Reanswer the previous question.

99. Gifts between fiancés “in contemplation of marriage”:

a. Are presumptively gifts causa mortis.

b. In many states are subject to a condition subsequent permitting revocation if the marriage doesn’t occur.

c. Both of the above.

d. Are inter vivos gifts subject to the condition precedent that the contemplated marriage actually occur.

100. Reanswer the previous question.

101. Oscar wanted to make a gift of money to Carla and so he wrote her a check to $20000. Before Carla was able to present the check for payment, however, Oscar was tragically killed in a automobile accident.

a. In most states the bank would be required to honor the check as an assignment of the funds in Oscar’s account.

b. In most states delivery of the check would be treated as an effective constructive delivery of the funds in Oscar’s account.

c. In most states the attempted gift by check would not be complete until the check is paid by the bank and, since Oscar died before that occurred, the attempted gift failed.

d. In most states a gift of money cannot be made by the donor’s own check.

102. Reanswer the previous question.

103. Harrison wrote a letter to his son saying: “I want you to have my sailboat after I’m gone so I’m giving it to you now. By sending you this letter, I intend to make it yours, subject only to retention of possession by me for as long as I’m alive.” Harrison signed the letter but did not have it witnessed. His son received the letter and did not respond. The boat remained moored at the same local marina until Harrison’s death.

a. Harrison appears to have made an effective gift to his son of a future interest in the boat.

b. Harrison’s retained an ownership interest in the boat under his letter quoted above, but his ownership interest was worth substantially less due to the legal effect of the letter.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Harrison has tried to make a testamentary gift, but it would fail because he did not comply with the statute of wills.

104. Reanswer the previous question.

105. A basic difference between a possibility of reverter and a right of entry is that:

a. Under a possibility of reverter the possession reverts automatically when the triggering event occurs, whereas under a right of entry an election is required before the holder of the right of entry can resume possession.

b. A possibility of reverter follows a fee simple determinable whereas a right of entry follows a fee simple on special limitation.

c. Both of the above.

d. It is generally easier for the courts to relieve against forfeiture with a possibility of reverter than with a right of entry.

106. Reanswer the previous question.

107. Which of the following is true?

a. Allodial ownership means outright ownership in which the owner is not regarded as being in any “feudal” (or lord/tenant) relationship with any other person having an interest in the land.

b. Escheat refers to the right of the next higher person in the tenurial (“feudal”) hierarchy—today, usually, the state—to take possession of land when an owner in fee simple dies intestate without heirs.

c. Both of the above.

d. The Statute Quia Emptores generally prohibited any further transfers of fee simple estates by subinfeudation.

e. All of the above.

108. Reanswer the previous question.

109. In a conveyance “to A and his heirs”:

a. The reference to heirs means that A will share the ownership with his heirs in a tenancy in common.

b. The words referring to heirs are words of limitation, not words of purchase.

c. Both of the above.

d. The reference to heirs shows that the land is being transferred not just to A but also to his heirs, who are regarded as receiving a contingent remainder interest in the land.

e. All of the above.

110. Reanswer the previous question.

111. O made a grant of land “to A and his heirs, so long as the land is used for municipal purposes.” Recently, the municipality leased a portion of the land to a private putt-putt golf operator, who maintains a putt-putt facility for public use (for a fee).

a. Some courts would refuse to treat this conveyance as creating anything but a fee simple absolute to A because it contains no words of reverter or of re-entry.

b. The words “so long the land is used for municipal purposes” are in the usual form of words of special limitation.

c. Both of the above.

d. Under the general and traditional approach, courts would tend to construe the language of this conveyance liberally, resolving any ambiguities in favor of protecting O’s claim of re-entry (or that of his heirs) whenever possible.

e. All of the above.

112. Reanswer the previous question.

113. A wealthy landowner left an 80-acre tract of woodland “to the City of Marlboro, its successors and assigns, for use as a public park and, if it ceases to be so used, then to the Marlboro Land Conservancy (a private charitable organization).” Without building restrictions, the land would be very valuable as a building site—much more valuable than it is as a woodland or park. The city now proposes to use the tract as the site for a much-needed supplementary sewage treatment plant. The city plans to use its power of eminent domain to acquire the Conservancy’s interest:

a. If the city takes the Conservancy’s interest before changing the use of the land, it should not have to pay anything as just compensation because there has been no breach of the “public park” condition.

b. Even before a breach of the “public park” condition, the value of the city’s fee simple would, due to the condition, be much less than if there were no use restriction on the land and, logically, the value of the Conservancy’s interest is equal to this difference.

c. Both of the above.

d. The Conservancy’s supposed interest would be void because a remainder cannot follow a fee simple.

114. Reanswer the previous question.

115. Hibbert died leaving a will in which he said “My good and faithful servant Duggen may continue living in the carriage house for as long as he wants, but after that the carriage house shall go to whoever owns the main house at that time.” Under the best interpretation of this (to carry out Hibbert’s intent):

a. Duggen would be deemed to have a license.

b. Duggen would have a tenancy at will.

c. Duggen would have a determinable life estate.

d. Duggen would have an easement.

116. Reanswer the previous question.

117. Crawford died leaving a will that devised his country house “to Robert for life, remainder to Joseph and his heirs.” Shortly before Robert’s subsequent death, a severe storm caused shingles to blow off the roof, resulting in $7000 of water and other damage. Joseph now has possession of the house and the damage still has not been repaired. Yesterday, a check arrived in the mail from the insurance company. It was in the amount of $7000 and was “for the “loss due to storm damage” to the house.

a. Since the house is now Joseph’s he should be entitled to keep the check, and it’s up to Joseph to repair the storm damage out of his own funds

b. Since the house is now Joseph’s he should be entitled to keep the check, but Robert’s estate has an obligation to repair the storm damage to the house.

c. Since the house was in Robert’s possession when the storm damage occurred, his estate should be entitled to the check, but it’s up to Joseph to repair the storm damage out of his own funds

d. Since the house was in Robert’s possession when the storm damage occurred, his estate should be entitled to the check, and Robert’s estate has an obligation to repair the storm damage to the house.

118. Reanswer the previous question.

119. Roebuck made a transfer “to Kemwell in trust for Evans for life, remainder to Wiggins and her heirs.” Assuming that the Statute of Uses did not execute the trust:

a. Kemwell has the legal title.

b. Evans has an equitable life estate.

c. Wiggins has an equitable remainder.

d. All of the above.

120. Reanswer the previous question.

121. Select the best statement:

a. The purpose and main effect of the Statute of Uses was to eliminate trusts.

b. The purpose of the Statute of Uses was to eliminate trusts, but a main effect was to permit conveyances of possessory interests by deed, without need for livery of seisin.

c. The purpose of the Statute of Uses was to eliminate trusts, but a main effect was to permit the creation of springing and shifting legal remainders.

d. The purpose of the Statute of Uses was to reinforce the law of trusts, making it easier to create and use these valuable legal devices.

122. Reanswer the previous question.

123. Which of the following conveyances purports to create a legal future interest that would be valid after the Statute of Uses but could not have been validly created before:

a. to A and his heirs beginning from and after my death.

b. to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.

c. Both of the above.

d. to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if B predeceases A, then to C and her heirs.

e. All of the above are correct.

124. Reanswer the previous question.

125. Which of the following conveyances purports to create a future interest that would not be valid under the traditional rule against perpetuities?

a. to A for life, remainder to A’s first child to reach age 18.

b. to A for life, remainder to A’s first child to reach age 21.

c. to A for life, remainder to A’s first child to reach age 25.

d. None of the above creates a future interest that would be valid under the traditional rule against perpetuities.

126. Reanswer the previous question.

127. Which of the following conveyances purports to create a future interest that would not be valid under the traditional rule against perpetuities?

a. to A for life, remainder to the Sparerod School District, its successors and assigns.

b. to the Sparerod School District, its successors and assigns until the land ceases to be used for school purposes, whereupon it shall revert to the grantor.

c. to the Sparerod School District, its successors and assigns until the land ceases to be used for school purposes, whereupon to A and his heirs

d. None of the above creates a future interest that would be invalid under the traditional rule against perpetuities.

128. Reanswer the previous question.

129. Assume that the statute of frauds for leases is one year. Taft would have a term of years if

a. Lincoln orally leased to Taft “for six months.”

b. Lincoln orally leased to Taft “for two years.”

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

130. Reanswer the previous question.

131. On September 3, 2003 Lincoln leased to Taft reserving a rent of $900 per month. Taft entered into possession on that same day and has been paying rent on a timely basis ever since. There was no binding agreement as to the duration of the lease. The earliest date from today (December 13, 2004) as of which Lincoln could terminate the lease is:

a. At will.

b. December 31. 2004.

c. January 2, 2005.

d. January 31. 2005.

e. February 2, 2005.

132. Reanswer the previous question.

133. In 1996, Lincoln leased to Timmins. the lease contained the usual covenant to pay rent. The agreed term of the lease was 10 years, ending in 2006. In 1999, Timmins made a transfer to Krauss of the entire remaining duration of his lease. Six months later Krauss made a transfer to Perkins of the entire remaining duration of his lease. Recently Perkins has fallen behind in the rent, though he remains in occupancy

a. Lincoln can recover the rent arrearages from Timmins.

b. Lincoln can recover the rent arrearages from Krauss if Krauss assumed the lease.

c. Both of the above.

d. Lincoln cannot recover the rent arrearages from Perkins unless Perkins has assumed the lease.

e. All of the above.

134. Reanswer the previous question.

135. When a leasehold tenant makes a transfer of possession, the best way to tell whether the transfer is an assignment or a sublease is to:

a. Look at what it says at the top of the document.

b. See whether the transferor retained a reversion (or, in some states, a right of entry), and conclude that it’s an assignment if he did.

c. See whether the transferor retained a reversion (or, in some states, a right of entry), and conclude that it’s a sublease if he did.

d. See whether the transferee assumed the lease and; if he did, it’s a sublease.

136. Reanswer the previous question.

137. Lincoln leased to Taft and Taft later wanted to transfer the premises to Collins. The lease provided that Taft may not “sublet” without Lincoln’s consent but it did not say anything about “assignment.” Under the traditional rules:

a. Lincoln would be permitted to withhold consent only with reasonable grounds.

b. Taft may assign without even seeking Lincoln’s consent.

c. Taft may assign or sublet without even seeking Lincoln’s consent as long as the new tenant “assumes” the lease.

d. None of the above.

138. Reanswer the previous question.

139. Lincoln leased to Taft and Taft later transferred the premises to Collins:

a. If the transfer was a sublease, then Taft remains in a landlord-tenant relationship with Lincoln.

b. If the transfer was an assignment, then Taft is in a landlord-tenant relationship with Collins.

c. Both of the above.

d. If the transfer was a sublease, then Collins is not considered to be in privity of estate with Taft, and Taft cannot recover rent from Collins.

140. Reanswer the previous question.

In answering the following TRUE/FALSE questions, assume (unless otherwise specified) that, at the times of conveyance, O is an owner in fee simple absolute, and that every named party is alive and unmarried. Remember that the conveyances are to be interpreted as set forth in the last two paragraphs on the instruction page. Assume that all life estates end at the death of the named life tenant. When you see words appropriate for a defeasible fee simple, assume that the words of conveyance also include whatever additional words (such as words of reverter or re-entry) that may be required by law in order to create the defeasible estate.

141. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs.” B has a remainder.

142. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs.” B’s heirs have an executory interest.

143. O conveyed “to A for life, then to A’s heirs.” A’s heirs have a contingent remainder.

144. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B becomes a ballerina.” O has a reversion.

145. O conveyed “to A for life and then, one month after A’s death, to B and her heirs.” B has a remainder.

146. O conveyed “to A and her heirs so long as the land is used as a farm, then to B and her heirs.” B has a possibility of reverter.

147. O conveyed “to A and his heirs.” The heirs of A receive a contingent remainder under this conveyance.

148. O conveyed “to A and his heirs.” The heirs of A receive nothing under this conveyance.

149. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B attends A’s funeral.” B has a contingent remainder.

150. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs.” O has nothing.

151. O conveyed “to A for two years, then to B and her heirs.” B may be properly said to have a vested remainder.

152. O conveyed “to A for two years, then to B and her heirs if B becomes a ballerina.” B may be properly said to have a contingent remainder.

153. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B becomes a ballerina after the death of A.” B may be properly said to have an executory interest.

154. O conveyed “to A for two years, then to B and her heirs if B becomes a ballerina before the end of the two-year term.” B may be properly said to have a contingent remainder.

155. O conveyed “to A for life.” O is much older then A. The conveyance results in a possibility of reverter.

156. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if C survives A, then to C and her heirs.” B has a future interest that is vested subject to divestment.

157. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” B has a contingent remainder (at least).

158. O conveyed “to A and his heirs beginning after the time of my death.” The conveyance creates an executory interest.

159. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B for life, and then six days after B’s death, to C and her heirs.” B has a remainder.

160. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as Yellowstone remains a national park.” O has a possibility of reverter.

161. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A by at least one year.” B has an executory interest.

162. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B does not survive A.” B has a contingent remainder.

163. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” O has a reversion.

164. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” B has (at least) an executory interest.

165. O conveyed “to A and his heirs until Yellowstone ceases to be a national park.” O has a right of re-entry.

166. O conveyed “to A and the heirs of his body.” In states that still recognize the fee tail, this estate would not be inherited if, at A’s death, his sole heirs were one brother and one cousin.

167. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as the house be kept painted white with green shutters.” A has a fee simple determinable.

168. O conveyed “to A and his heirs on the condition that the premises be kept as a nature preserve and open to the public.” O has a right of re-entry.

169. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A by at least one year.” O has a reversion.

170. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if C survives A by at least one year, then to C and her heirs.” C has a future interest that is vested subject to divestment.

171. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C after the death of A.” B has an executory interest.

172. O conveyed “to A for life, and then to the heirs of B.” B is living but childless. This conveyance creates a contingent remainder.

173. O conveyed “to A for life, and then to the heirs of B” (a person recently deceased). This conveyance creates a vested remainder.

174. O conveyed “to A for life, and then one day after A’s death to the children of B.” B is living but childless. This conveyance creates a contingent remainder.

175. O conveyed “to A for 5 years, then to the heirs of B” (a living person). This conveyance creates a remainder.

176. O conveyed “to A for 5 years, then to the heirs of B” (a living person). This conveyance creates an executory interest.

177. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if C survives A by at least one year, then to C and her heirs.” B has a future interest that is vested subject to divestment.

178. O conveyed “to A as long as he desires to remain living on the land.” The more modern tendency is to interpret this conveyance as creating tenancy at will, rather than a determinable life estate.