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1. Gibson owned a parcel land that included a well-known pheasant hunting meadow. People from the city paid him for the privilege of going on his land to hunt wild pheasant. Last year Gibson’s neighbor entered the meadow and hunted without permission. Gibson objected. This led to a feud, and now the neighbor is firing guns and making other loud noises on his own land in order to scare the wildfowl away from Gibson’s land.

a. Before the pheasants are shot or captured they are ferae naturae and belong to nobody (except, perhaps, the state).

b. Gibson’s neighbor has just as much right to make noise on his land as Gibson has to use his own land for pheasant hunting, even if the neighbor’s purpose is to interfere with Gibson’s gainful activities.

c. There are no circumstances under which a court would allow the neighbor to do what he’s doing if the effect is to interfere with a valuable business of Gibson.

d. When the pheasants are on Gibson’s land they are the property of Gibson, and therefore his neighbor has no right to scare them off.

2. Reanswer the previous question.

3. Suppose that, during his foray without permission onto Gibson’s land (in the preceding question), his neighbor shot three pheasants and found a valuable signet ring that had apparently been lost by another hunter. As between Gibson and his neighbor:

a. The pheasants would belong to the neighbor, since he was the first captor.

b. The ring could be retained by the neighbor unless it were deemed to be mislaid property.

c. The ring could be retained by the neighbor unless it were deemed to be lost property.

d. Gibson would be entitled to both the pheasants and the ring under the rationale of the doctrine of ratione soli.

4. Reanswer the previous question.

5. While attending a baseball game as a spectator, Lenny found himself in the direct path of a foul ball, which he made an effort to catch (using a mitt he’d brought along, just in case). The ball struck the top in his mitt, and flew up in the air, and another fan, Timmy, jumped up in an effort to intercept it. Timmy may have held the ball momentarily but, in any case, he dropped it when he made an awkward landing. Lenny grabbed the ball as it rolled past his feet:

a. If Timmy is found to have actually held the ball, he would have a better claim to it than Lenny.

b. If it’s found that Timmy was entitled to the ball, the proper kind of action for damages that he should bring against Lenny would be trespass to chattels.

c. Both of the above.

d. Since Lenny was first to come into contact with the ball, the court would almost certainly conclude that Lenny has the better legal claim.

6. Reanswer the previous question.

7. For many years Dietrich operated a truck depot on a property adjacent to Brown’s. The way the two properties were laid out, however, trucks coming into Dietrich’s depot usually needed to traverse a portion of Brown’s land as they backed into place. Until recently Brown was happy to accommodate Dietrich and repeatedly invited him to continue making the use. However, Brown has now had a change of heart and has forbidden the further use of his land. If Dietrich has no sufficient basis for claiming an easement:

a. Then he is in the unfortunate position of a person who’s had a license and whose license has been revoked—which a licensor may do at any time.

b. If Dietrich continued to make the now forbidden use, he would be liable—perhaps even for punitive damages—as a trespasser.

c. Both of the above.

d. As a neighbor, a person in Dietrich’s position would generally have the right to make reasonable use of the next-door property as long as no harm is caused. Courts ignore unreasonable people like Brown.

8. Reanswer the previous question.

9. Carrolberg Mfg. Co. pumps large quantities of natural gas into a natural subterranean cavity for storage. It later uses the gas in its operations. It acquires the gas from a long distance pipeline company. Recently, Carrolberg has discovered that one of its neighbors has been pumping out the gas and selling it on the open market. The gas is pumped from a portion of the cavity that extends under the neighbor’s land.

a. By analogy to ferae naturae, there’s no basis to conclude that Carrolberg’s ownership rights in the gas were affected when it flowed away to the neighboring land.

b. Some courts would hold that doing what Carrolberg does amounts to a “trespass” because it is making unpermitted use of another’s land.

c. If Carrolberg has been using the underground cavity for a sufficiently long period of time, it very probably has a ripened title to it by adverse possession (or, at least, an easement by prescription).

d. If Carrolberg were found to be trespassing with the gas, the neighbor should be entitled to the offending gas since forfeiture of the intruder’s offending property is a normal remedy for cases of trespass.

10. Reanswer the previous question

11. When the Watermores filled their swimming pool last summer, using percolating water, the well located on their neighbor’s land went dry. The neighbor, Harrod, has sued.

a. The Watermores would more likely be liable if the state applies the so-called English rule rather than the so-called American rule on underground waters

b. Under the so-called American rule, the Watermores would have absolute ownership of the water under their land, and they could pump as much as they wanted.

c. Under the so-called American rule, the Watermores would be liable if their use was not a reasonable use of the underground water, for example if they wasted it or consumed it negligently or maliciously.

d. Under the so-called English rule, the Harrods had “absolute” ownership of the water under their land and, therefore, the Watermores would almost certainly be liable for causing the Harrods’ water to flow away.

12. Reanswer the previous question.

13. While camping at a private campground, Mr. and Mrs. Gordon Goodlife took their cartop kayak for a brief excursion on a tiny adjacent stream. They were spotted by a neighbor, Benton Twistidd, who hated the campground because of the noisy late-night alcoholic revels that occurred there. To make a point, Twistidd sued the Goodlifes for trespass on the ground that he owned the bed and banks of the stream along which they have traveled.

a. If the stream is navigable in fact, the Goodlifes would not have been trespassing even though they were traveling over (underwater) land owned by Twistidd.

b. Even if the stream is not navigable in fact, the Goodlifes could not be held liable for trespass over Twistidd’s land as long as they did not touch the stream’s bed or banks.

c. If were the custom of the country to allow people to go boating on small streams in the vicinity, the Goodlifes might prevail on the basis that the custom confers an irrevocable license to navigate on the stream.

d. All of the above.

14. Reanswer the previous question.

15. Last spring Gene Fiddler planted a crop of genetically modified corn on his 255 acre farm. Later, in June, the county commissioners adopted an ordinance prohibiting genetically modified grains on the ground they might cross-pollinate with crops of nearby “organic” growers. That could cause the latters’ crops to be unsalable at “organic” prices, which are generally much higher. The commissioners wanted to protect a valuable county reputation for organic foods. Pursuant to the new ordinance, a team of county ag agents went out and plowed under all of Fiddler’s corn, causing a loss in the $100,000s. Under the U.S. Constitution:

a. Fiddler is not entitled to compensation for a taking.

b. Fidder would be entitled to compensation if he could show that his crop was planted before the neighboring organic farmers planted theirs.

c. Fidder would be entitled to compensation if he could show that his crop was on the whole more valuable than the organic farmers’ crops.

d. Fiddler would be entitled to compensation, period.

16. Reanswer the previous question.

17. Maria Muddflatt bought a 10-acre parcel of tidal wetland. She got it at a very favorable price because of the development restrictions imposed under state law. Now Maria is challenging the development restrictions on the ground that they constitute an unconstitutional taking of private property. Although she’s had offers from conservancy groups to buy the land for over $100,000, she argues that it would be worth over $1,000,000 if she could use it to build luxury seaside homes. The most difficult counter-argument that she’s likely to face is:

a. She bought the land with the intention of challenging the restrictions.

b. The land manifestly retains substantial value, as evidenced by the offers to purchase.

c. The building of more luxury homes is not a particularly socially compelling use.

d. Her complaint is about a mere regulation and not an actual physical taking of land.

18. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Hudson-Thayer cases. Hudson was a guest in a home belonging to Thayer, his friend. While there, Hudson found a diamond earring behind a night table, which he had moved to retrieve a cold lozenge that he’d accidentally dropped. Thayer said, “I don’t know whose earring it is, but that’s the guest bedroom, so it could belong to any of a number of people. Why don’t you just let me keep it.” Valuing the earring more than the friendship, Hudson refused to give it up..

19. If Thayer wants to recover possession of the earring from Hudson and the law will permit it, the proper kind of action would be:

a. Trover.

b. Conversion.

c. Replevin.

d. Trespass to chattels.

20. Reanswer the previous question.

21. Disregarding the distinction, if any, between lost and mislaid property, Thayer should have a better chance of recovering the earring or its value from Hudson:

a. In states that follow the so-called American rule.

b. In states that follow the so-called English rule.

c. In states that reject the doctrine of ratione soli.

d. In states that follow the rule of animus revertendi.

22. Reanswer the previous question.

23. Again disregarding the distinction, if any, between lost and mislaid property, Thayer’s theory for recovering the earring (in states where he could prevail) would be:

a. Hudson is an ungrateful guest should be disfavored by the law.

b. By virtue of owning the locus in quo, Thayer was the owner of all contained in it.

c. The question of who owns the ring is one that goes back potentially forever, and it is barred by the rule against perpetuities.

d. He had possession of the earring before Hudson.

24. Reanswer the previous question.

25. In a state that makes the distinction between lost and mislaid property:

a. The earring would be considered mislaid if it fell behind the night table accidentally and unnoticed, and the owner was later unable to find it.

b. It would be better from Thayer’s standpoint if the earring were deemed to be lost rather than mislaid.

c. Hudson would have a better claim to the earring than Thayer if the true owner had concealed it behind the night table and then later forgot to retrieve it.

d. None of the above.

26. Reanswer the previous question.

27. On a business trip Wheeler rented a car from Squirtz Rent-a-Car. While parked at the Dentem Parking Garage, the car developed a flat tire. Wheeler was required to change the tire on the garage premises. As he was rooting around for the jack in the car’s trunk, Wheeler came upon a stash of $10,000 that somebody had apparently concealed there. In states that follow the logic of the distinction between lost and mislaid property:

a. Dentem should have a better claim to the $10,000 than Wheeler or Squirtz.

b. Squirtz should have a better claim to the $10,000 than Wheeler or Dentem.

c. Wheeler should have a better claim to the $10,000 than Dentem or Squirtz.

d. None of the above. The money would be held by the police for the true owner.

28. Reanswer the previous question.

29. Hanksworthy went onto some unoccupied land owned by the Gresham Timber Co. and, over a period of years, harvested more than 300 tons of mushrooms, at a considerable personal profit. Now Gresham would like to bring an action against Hanksworthy for trespass.

a. As owner Gresham would be deemed in constructive possession of the land for purposes of suing Hanksworthy for trespass, provided there was no adverse possession.

b. As owner Gresham would be deemed in constructive possession of the land purposes of suing Hanksworthy for trespass, irrespective of whether there was an adverse possessor.

c. Hanksworthy probably could successfully defend by showing that Gresham wasn’t using the mushrooms anyway, so it suffered no loss.

d. As owner of the land, Gresham could maintain an action in trespass against Hanksworthy whether or not it had any sort of possession of the land.

30. Reanswer the previous question.

31. Otterbein owned a piece of riverfront land. About 25’ from shore there was an island of several acres. Although Otterbein did not own the island, he had built a makeshift pontoon bridge over to it, and the only easy way to get to the island was across Otterbein’s land. For the past 15 years, Otterbein generally has acted as though he were the owner of the island, chased people off who landed from the river and presumed to give permission to fisherman and trappers to go there. However, at no time did Otterbein ever live on the island or maintain any sort of occupancy there. Under these facts:

a. It looks like it would be just about impossible for Otterbein to have acquired a ripened title by adverse possession because he never actually occupied the island.

b. Generally, as a matter of common law some sort of structure or permanent cultivation is required to claim a ripened title by adverse possession.

c. Lacking a fence or other enclosure, it would very difficult for Otterbein to show that he had “exclusive” or “continuous” possession of the island.

d. These facts appear to present at least a jury question whether Otterbein has acquired a ripened title to the island.

32. Reanswer the previous question.

33. Redd bought Blueacre from Turnbull 7 years ago. Suppose that the activities of Redd with respect to the land, and those of Turnbull before him, have been of the sort that could, in enough time, ripen into title by adverse possession.

a. Redd could well have a claim to ripened title to the land if there was “privity of estate” between Redd and Turnbull.

b. In order for Redd to have a likely claim to a ripened title to the land, there’d need to be not only “privity of estate,” but also conduct that touches and concerns the land, and an intention that possession run with the land.

c. There’s no way for Redd to have a claim to ripened title to the land. The duration of his possession is simply too short.

d. Privity of estate, or its absence, has nothing to do with whether Otterbein has a claim to a ripened title to the island.

34. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Ruffitt questions. Ruffitt and his family starting camping on a certain area of vacant land over 15 years ago. Even though they have never built a dwelling (using their camping trailers instead), they have made a number of durable improvements to enhance the convenience of their time spent there. The cleared area that they intensively use is about 3 acres. However, they have frequently used the trails in a larger area (up to 100 acres), picked berries and mushrooms in the larger area and also hunted there. Others also use the larger area, for purposes similar to those of the Ruffitt family.

35. Now Ruffitt wants to claim a ripened title by adverse possession:

a. It is practically essential to his claim that Ruffitt has stated to one or more others that he is owner of the land

b. It is practically essential to his claim that Ruffitt gave actual notice to the true owner that he was claiming by adverse possession.

c. The hostility requirement could be met by Ruffitt’s acting on the land as though he’s the true owner.

d. Ruffitt could not have a ripened title to this land by adverse possession because he never built a dwelling there.

36. Reanswer the previous question.

37. The land (if any) to which Ruffitt may have acquired a ripened title is:

a. Quite possibly the 3 acres, but probably not the 100 acres.

b. Quite likely not only the 3 acres but also the 100 acres.

c. Most likely neither the 3 acres nor the 100 acres.

d. Whatever he has constructively possessed.

38. Reanswer the previous question.

39. If Ruffitt wants to claim a ripened title by adverse possession, the kinds of factors that would affect whether Ruffitt’s acts could result in a ripened title would include:

a. The nature and situation of the property, kinds of things it was useful for, and the kinds of uses that Ruffitt could personally afford to make.

b. The nature and situation of the property, kinds of things it was useful for, and the kinds of uses that an ordinary owner might make of land similarly situated.

c. The nature and situation of the property, the kinds of uses that Ruffitt could personally afford to make, and the kinds of uses the true owner proposes to make if he is allowed to retain the land..

d. Mostly, whether Ruffitt placed any sort of permanent dwelling on the land or a fence around it.

40. Reanswer the previous question.

41. Baden Croacher owned and lived on a parcel of land near a railroad track. He didn’t own up all the way up to the tracks, however. He was separated from them by a strip of land owned by Roberts, who lived and owned the parcel that was (mostly) on the other side. For more than 10 years, Croacher openly occupied right up to the rail bed, using the strip of Roberts’ land for garden, lawn and other usual domestic purposes of the sort that were normal for land in the vicinity. When asked about this situation, Croacher said once that he didn’t think Roberts realized he owned the strip “and I hope he doesn’t find out.”

a. Croacher cannot acquire a ripened title to the strip by adverse possession because his possession is not open and notorious.

b. In order for Croacher to acquire a ripened title to the strip by adverse possession, he’d need to notify Roberts that he’s in “hostile” possession of Roberts’ land.

c. Both of the above.

d. An adverse possessor can acquire a ripened title even if the true owner doesn’t realize he owns the land in question and the adverse possessors does nothing to apprise him.

42. Reanswer the previous question.

43. In 1980 Milton put up a boundary fence around his land. He accidentally enclosed about 40 sq. feet of land belonging to his neighbor, Kellman. Neither noticed the discrepancy. Kellman recently had a survey done and, when apprised of the situation, Milton apologized and immediately removed the fence.

a. If Milton had indeed acquired a ripened title to the 40 sq. feet by adverse possession, he could not undo it by merely apologizing and moving the fence.

b. In some jurisdictions, Milton’s acts of apologizing and moving the fence might be taken as evidence that there never was a hostile claim of right in the first place.

c. The best way to clear this situation up is probably for Milton to deliver Kellman a quitclaim deed to the 40 sq. feet.

d. All of the above.

44. Reanswer the previous question.

45. Assume in the preceding question that Kellman was 8 years old when, in 1980, Milton erected his fence that enclosed the 40 sq. feet. Using the statute of limitations that we studied in connection with disabilities (with a 21 year basic period and a 10 year disability period), and assuming the age of majority is 18 years, the earliest that Milton could acquire a ripened title would be:

a. 1998

b. 2000

c. 2001

d. 2011

46. Reanswer the previous question.

47. When the bridge for Corbin’s driveway washed out 1996, he began getting from the road to his house by using a bridge on the neighboring property, which was the home of Cliff. However, Cliff was a tenant for years, holding under a 20-year lease from Hendricks. The lease expires in 2010.

a. If Corbin’s use ripens into an easement by prescription in 2006, it will be good against Cliff for the duration of the lease.

b. If Corbin’s use ripens into an easement by prescription in 2006, it will be good against Hendricks following the expiration of the lease.

c. Both of the above.

d. Either Cliff or Hendricks has standing to bring a trespass action against Corbin if he has been making unpermitted use of the bridge.

e. All of the above.

48. Reanswer the previous question.

49. Suppose in the preceding question that the following additional facts were present: Hendricks had originally taken possession of the neighboring property, now leased to Cliff, right after his uncle’s death. However, another person, Garner, was the uncle’s actual heir. Within a month of taking possession, Hendricks had leased the land to Cliff under the current 20-year lease. In this situation, during the time that Corbin was making unlawful use of the bridge on the property (and before an easement by prescription may have ripened):

a. Either Cliff or Hendricks had standing to bring a trespass action against Corbin.

b. Cliff, but not Hendricks or Garner, had standing to bring a trespass action against Corbin.

c. Neither Cliff nor Hendricks had standing to bring a trespass action against Corbin. Only Garner does.

d. As things currently stand, Cliff, Hendricks and Garner all would have had standing to bring trespass actions against Corbin.

50. Reanswer the previous question.

51. Some years ago Davis Gravel Co. bought a parcel of gravel land, Pebbleacre, and received a deed that described the conveyance as covering the whole Pebbleacre parcel. They opened up a pit on one side of Pebbleacre and took gravel from it, but so far they have never made a move to develop or use the other side, which has remained unoccupied and unused. Now it turns out that the seller of Pebbleacre did not have title, and the land belongs to the certain heirs who have not even yet been identified.

a. If Davis engaged in sufficient acts of possession to acquire a ripened title to one side of Pebbleacre, then they would get a ripened title to the whole thing.

b. If squatters established a permanent camp on the “unused” side of Pebbleacre, Davis should be able to maintain ejectment to remove them even before Davis’ title ripens.

c. Both of the above.

d. Davis can only acquire title by adverse possession to the land they actually possessed, and they cannot sue to remove squatters before the get actual ownership of the land.

52. Reanswer the previous question.

53. Sandra was standing in her living room and she said to her daughter, Brittany: “This vase has been in the family for generations, and when you get married it will be yours.” She took down the vase from the mantel, and handed it to Brittany to hold. Brittany said nothing (at least nothing legally relevant) and, when Sandra reached out to take the vase back, Brittany handed it to her. On these facts there is no completed gift because:

a. There are no facts that could be construed as delivery.

b. There was no in praesenti donative intent.

c. There was no acceptance.

d. All of the above.

54. Reanswer the previous question.

55. About to embark on a long journey, Leslie took out her jewelry box and selected one piece for each of her three grandchildren. She wrapped each of the pieces in gift wrap and wrote the name of the donee on the outside. Then, just before she left, she handed the parcels to her nephew with instructions to make sure they got to the grandchildren. Tragically, Leslie passed away before the nephew could carry out her instructions.

a. If the nephew were deemed to be agent for Leslie, there would be a completed gift of the jewelry.

b. If the nephew were deemed to be agent for the three grandchildren, there would be a completed gift of the jewelry as of the time Leslie passed away.

c. If the nephew were deemed to be agent for the three grandchildren, there would be a completed gift of the jewelry as of the time Leslie handed the parcels to the nephew.

d. It matters little who the nephew was acting as agent for. The courts dispense with the delivery requirement when donative intent is as clear as it is here.

56. Reanswer the previous question.

57. In a donative arrangement, Fillmore deeded his house to his old friend, Millard. Under the deed Fillmore was entitled to retain possession of the house during his lifetime. At the same time Fillmore also told Millard: “I’m hereby giving you all of the furnishings in the house. Take them whenever you want.” Fillmore continued to live in the house, while Millard lived in an apartment across town. Later Fillmore died and Millard took possession of the house and all its contents. Fillmore’s executor is demanding the furnishings that were still in the house at Fillmore’s death.

a. The gift of the furnishings appears to fail because the donor did not meet the delivery requirement.

b. The gift of the furnishings ought to succeed because delivery of the deed to the house should amount to a delivery of the contents.

c. The gift of the furnishings ought to succeed because, after Fillmore’s death, Millard took possession of the house and all its contents, thus effectuating delivery.

d. The gift of the furnishings ought to fail due to lack of in praesenti donative intent.

58. Reanswer the previous question.

59. Hoskins is on his deathbed after a serious heart attack. He is not expected to survive much longer. He says to his friend: “Here’s my ruby ring that you’ve always admired. I want you to have it now that I won’t be needing it anymore.” Under the usual presumption:

a. If Hoskins recovers, he would have a right to have the ring back

b. Even if Hoskins does not recover, he would be entitled to have the ring returned if he demands it at any time before his death.

c. Both of the above.

d. If Hoskins dies from a totally unexpected (and unrelated) cause, such as a boiler explosion in his house, it would make the most sense (give the rationale of gifts causa mortis) to say that the gift is revoked.

e. All of the above.

60. Reanswer the previous question.

61. Suppose that Lorillard on his deathbed gave his friend a check for $10,000. Under the majority rule:

a. The check would operate as an assignment of the funds in Lorillard’s account, so the gift would be complete.

b. If Lorillard dies before the check is cashed, the gift would fail.

c. Delivery of the check would be treated as a constructive delivery of the funds in the bank account

d. The check would be treated as a gift through an agent, namely, the bank.

62. Reanswer the previous question.

63. The distinguishing feature of a gift causa mortis (compared with inter vivos) is:

a. A gift causa mortis is always subject to a condition subsequent.

b. A gift causa mortis does not require a delivery.

c. A gift causa mortis can only be made to family members and close friends.

d. All of the above.

64. Reanswer the previous question.

65. Norma wrote a letter to her son at college saying, “I want you to have, beginning after my death, the Montblanc pen that your father used all his life. By this letter, I transfer to you the right to have it beginning at that time.” The most reasonable interpretation of this letter is:

a. A typical family communication without legal significance.

b. An invalid will that fails because Norma did not comply with the statute of wills.

c. A deed of gift of a future interest in the pen.

d. A deed of gift transferring an immediate present interest in the pen.

66. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Oliver-Hammer questions. Oliver took his Cadillac SUV to Frank Hammer’s Auto Repair for a wheel alignment. Hammer told Oliver the car would be ready the following day. During the night, Hammer locked the car inside his shop but left the keys on the car’s floor. During the night, thieves broke in through a locked window and stole the car. Oliver now seeks to hold Hammer liable for the value of the car ($40,000). Hammer claims that he is not liable because he had no idea that the car was so valuable.

67. Oliver’s suit for the value of the car will:

a. Likely succeed because Hammer was a converter.

b. Likely fail because Hammer did not know how much the car was worth and cannot therefore be held responsible for so much value.

c. Likely fail because Hammer did not know how much the car was worth and therefore cannot be deemed to have accepted a bailment of the car.

d. Likely fail because Hammer exercised reasonable care in safeguarding the premises.

68. Reanswer the previous question.

69. Oliver also seeks compensation for a pair of Hermes mittens that he had left in the glove compartment (valued at $200). Hammer claims that he is not liable for the mittens because he had no idea they were in the car. Under the better reasoned rule, Oliver’s suit for compensation for his lost mittens should:

a. Succeed because he bailed them to Hammer, who is liable for their value.

b. Fail because there was no delivery or acceptance of the mittens.

c. Succeed if Hammer is liable for the loss of the car because the loss of the contents was a direct and natural consequence of the loss of the container.

d. Fail because Hammer was unaware of the existence of the mittens.

70. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Cyndi-Jeff questions. On New Years’ Day in 1995 Cyndi began adversely possessing Jeff’s ranch, and has been in possession ever since. In January 2005, Cyndi successfully prosecuted a quiet title action, which established that she had acquired a ripened title to the ranch through adverse possession. Jeff is outraged and instructs his lawyers to get back at her in any way possible. The statute of limitations for trespass and mesne profits actions is 3 years. For the last 7 years, Cyndi has been running a very profitable school for ferret breeders on the property.

71. If Jeff seeks damages for trespass, he will:

a. Fail because the damages would be nominal.

b. Fail because he does not have what he needs to sue in trespass.

c. Succeed, but only for losses caused in 2003 and 2004

d. Succeed for losses caused in 2003, 2004 and 2005.

72. Reanswer the previous question.

73. If Jeff files an action in trespass seeking mesne profits prior to 2005, he will:

a. Succeed because Cyndi did not have title during that period.

b. Succeed because Cyndi was making a profit from her wrongful possession.

c. Fail, because Cyndi’s title relates back.

d. Fail because there were no mesne profits.

74. Reanswer the previous question.

75. The Statute Quia Emptores (1290) prohibited transfers of interests in fee simple absolute by:

a. Subinfeudation

b. Substitution

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

76. Reanswer the previous question.

77. George conveys “to Louise for life then to Louise’s first child now alive to reach age 24, and his heirs.” Louise has one child, Abernathy, age 2.

a. The future interest in the conveyance is valid under the traditional Rule Against Perpetuities

b. Abernathy is a workable life in being.

c. Both of the above.

d. The future interest in this conveyance is void under the traditional Rule Against Perpetuities.

78. Reanswer the previous question.

79. George conveys “to Louise for life then to Louise’s first child to reach age 24, and his heirs.” Louise has one child, Abernathy, age 2.

a. The future interest in the conveyance is valid under the traditional Rule Against Perpetuities

b. Louise is a workable life in being.

c. Both of the above.

d. The future interest in this conveyance is void under the traditional Rule Against Perpetuities.

80. Reanswer the previous question.

81. Wilmur leased an apartment from Bonhomme “for 3 years at an annual rental of $12,000 payable at the rate of $1,000 per month.” Wilmur has taken possession and paid rent monthly for several months, but the parties never signed the lease. The Statute of Frauds period for leases is one year. What type of tenancy does Wilmur now probably have?

a. A periodic tenancy from month to month

b. A periodic tenancy from year to year

c. A tenancy at will.

d. An estate for years for one year.

82. Reanswer the previous question.

83. Ellis Snappease had a month to month tenancy running from the 12th to the 11th of each month. From today (December 21), what is the earliest date as of which the tenancy can be terminated?

a. December 31.

b. January 11.

c. January 21.

d. February 11

84. Reanswer the previous question.

85. Marko made a written lease of Wheatacre to Toste for three years at a rent of $500 per month and with the usual language of promises and reservations of rent. Toste then assigned his interest in Wheatacre to Chester, who wrongfully abandoned the property with one year left on the lease. If Chester had assumed the lease.:

a. Marko can recover rent from Toste

b. Marko can recover rent from Chester.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above

86. Reanswer the previous question.

87. Suppose in the preceding question Chester did not abandon possession but, instead, reassigned to Dorbin with 1 year left on the lease. Dorbin later abandons possession wrongfully.

a. Marko can recover rent from Chester since he assumed the lease.

b. Marko could have recovered rent from Chester even if he had not assumed the lease.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

88. Reanswer the previous question.

89. Flora leased Alice’s villa for two years under a written lease with the usual language of promises and reservations of rent. Flora then assigned her interest to Mel, who assumed the lease: Which the following is wrong?

a. Mel is in privity of contract with Alice.

b. Mel is in privity of estate with Alice.

c. Flora is in privity of contract with Alice.

d. Flora is in privity of estate with Alice.

90. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Mick-Charlie questions. Mick leased Stoneacre from Charlie for three years. The written lease contained a clause stating: “This lease may not be assigned without consent of the lessor.” It says nothing about sublets.

91. If Mick now needs to get out of the lease

a. Mick may sublet without getting Charlie’s approval.

b. Under the traditional rule, the Charlie could withhold consent to an assignment for any reason or no reason (except for a specifically unlawful reason).

c. Although Mick must have consent before he can sublet, such consent cannot be unreasonably withheld.

d. He can assign. Clauses limiting assignment are generally considered invalid as restraints on alienation.

92. Reanswer the previous question.

93. Suppose that, after taking possession under the original lease, Mick immediately transferred the possession to Keith for all but one day of the three-year term. Charlie then sued claiming that Mick violated the anti-assignment provision of the lease. Mick says he did not. Who wins?

a. Charlie wins because Mick has relinquished control over the premises

b. Mick wins because he retains a reversion.

c. Charlie wins because the lease requires that Mick get permission to transfer the premises to somebody else

d. Mick wins because he remains in privity of contract with Charlie.

94. Reanswer the previous question.

95. Turbine Corp. leased office space from Landmark Holdings Company. Right next door, there is an open lot also owned by Landmark. After Turbine moved in, Landmark leased this lot to an excavating and scaffolding contractor, which uses the space to store equipment and materials. Because of the nature of this use, there is constant noise and dust emanating from the lot, making it extremely difficult to use Turbine’s space for office purposes. After numerous complaints, Turbine wants to know if it has to continue paying rent for space that it essentially cannot use.

a. Turbine would be justified in abandoning and ceasing to pay rent only if Landmark was somehow responsible for or able to control and prevent the noise and dust coming from the lot.

b. If Turbine desires to be relieved of its obligation to pay rent based on constructive eviction, it would have to actually vacate its premises at least partially, in addition to showing some sort of breach of duty by Landmark.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Turbine is responsible for its own choice of leased premises, and it cannot look to the landlord to make the premises useful to Turbine.

96. Reanswer the previous question.

97. Dick leased a house to Jen. Part of the house’s attraction for Jen was that it would keep her dry and well protected from the elements. Furthermore, the lease contained an express provision that Dick would maintain the premises. During the first big rain, Jen discovered that the roof was full of leaks. Dick ignored her pleas for assistance and repairs. Under the “independent covenants” doctrine:

a. Jen is relieved of her rent obligations even if she retains possession.

b. Jen is not relieved of her rent obligations just because the landlord has breached.

c. Dick can evict Jen for nonpayment if Jen unjustifiably withholds rent.

d. All of the above.

98. Reanswer the previous question.

99. Same facts as previous question except the lease did not contain an express provision that Dick would maintain the premises. Under modern legal reforms applicable to residential tenancies:

a. Jen would have a right to roof repairs even without the express provision.

b. Jen could remain in possession and withhold rent as a result of the leaks.

c. Both of the above.

d. On these facts. Jen has been constructively evicted

e. All of the above.

100. Reanswer the previous question.

101. Maria and Arthur own Sweetacre as joint tenants. If Maria attempts to sell her interest to Lancelot:

a. She will not succeed because the tenancy is indivisible

b. She will not succeed and, as a result of her attempt, the tenancy will convert to a tenancy in common.

c. She will succeed but Arthur and Lancelot will hold as tenants in common

d. She will succeed and the tenancy will be a joint tenancy between Arthur and Lancelot.

102. Reanswer the previous question.

103. O delivered a deed conveying “to A, B and C and their heirs as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.” Later, B conveyed his interest to A and then A died with a will leaving all his real property interests to X. Under the usual presumptions, the land is now owned by:

a. X has an undivided 1/3 as tenant in common with C, who has an undivided 2/3

b. X has an undivided 1/3 as joint tenant with C, who has an undivided 2/3

c. X and C own 50-50 as tenants in common.

d. C owns the whole thing, alone.

104. Reanswer the previous question.

105. A and B inherited a house, which they then owned 50-50 as tenants in common. However, only A occupied the house. B preferred to live elsewhere. After about 12 years of this arrangement, A started going out with strange guys and otherwise violated B’s moral sensibilities. B decided to demand that A pay rent, including back rent. Under the majority rule:

a. B has a cause of action against A for back rent (unless A has acquired a sole title by adverse possession).

b. B has an action against A in ejectment (unless A has acquired a sole title by adverse possession).

c. A owes B nothing (as rent or the like) for A’s sole occupancy.

d. Since B allowed A to live alone in the house for several years, it is likely that that B’s interest was extinguished by A’s adverse possession.

106. Reanswer the previous question.

107. O delivered a deed conveying “to A, B and C and their heirs.” Later, A dies intestate. Under the usual presumptions, the land is now owned by:

a. B and C as joint tenants.

b. B, C and A’s heirs as joint tenants.

c. B and C as tenants in common.

d. B, C and A’s heirs as tenants in common.

108. Reanswer the previous question.

109. Griffith owned a country home on a lovely piece of land. Alban offered him $100,000 for a remote corner of the property on which Alban desired to build a house. Griffith agreed to sell but insisted that Alban covenant never to use the acquired land for any but residential purposes. Based on this and other terms, Griffith and Alban signed up the deal and closed. Later, Alban sold the land he’d acquired to Edward, who intends to convert the dwelling into a convenience store.

a. Edward could be required to comply with this restriction to residential use if he bought with either actual or record notice of it.

b. In order for Edward to be bound by “notice,” Alban’s promise would have to be contained in a deed recorded at the county recorder’s office.

c. In order for Edward to be bound by “notice,” there would have to be actual notice from observable facts, and it would not be sufficient that there was record notice from a deed recorded at the county recorder’s office.

d. There is no way that Edward could be bound to comply with the restriction to residential use.

110. Reanswer the previous question.

111. Simmons owned Greenacre and lived in a lavish home on its western end. The house had a sewer line that ran eastward across the property to connect with the municipal sewage system. In 1998, Simmons subdivided the property and sold the eastern half to Servot and kept the western half. Later, he sold the western half to Montague. One day, Servot awoke to find his basement filled with sewage from a broken sewer line. He sues to enjoin Montague from making any further use of the sewer line running underneath his property. What result?

a. Servot will likely lose on the ground that there is, appurtenant to Montague’s estate, an easement by implied reservation.

b. Servot will likely win because he purchased the property without knowledge of the sewer line.

c. Servot will likely win because any implied easement for the sewer line would have presumptively been in gross.

d. Servot will likely lose because Montague probably has an easement by anxiety.

112. Reanswer the previous question.

113. Before Simmons conveyed to Servot in the preceding question, he was using the eastern part of his land for the sewer, which benefited the use of the western portion. Looking back, we would call this use:

a. an appurtenant easement

b. an inchoate easement

c. a veritable servitude

d. a quasi-easement

114. Reanswer the previous question.

115. Hemingway owned 20 acres on top of a hill. Faulkner wished to build a cell phone tower on the hill and purchased a one acre plot on the top of the hill and an easement granting him the right of ingress and egress to his parcel along a specified route across Hemingway’s property. Afterwards, when Faulkner attempted to take equipment, trucks and a backhoe on the specified route across Hemingway’s land in order to bury the cable under the route, Hemingway objected, claiming that the construction vehicles interfered with his quiet enjoyment of his estate. If there’s a lawsuit:

a. Hemingway probably wins because the scope of the servitude does not expressly encompass construction vehicles.

b. Hemingway probably wins because an easement of ingress and egress normally does not implicitly authorize placing wires and conduits.

c. Faulkner probably wins because, under these facts, he has an easement by implication from prior use or by necessity.

d. Faulkner probably wins because the equities weigh in his favor.

116. Reanswer the previous question.

117. Polly purchased an easement from Wendell, which entitled her to lay fiber optic cable underneath a 5-foot wide pathway across Wendell’s land. The local gas utility (Gass) approached Wendell later and asked to bury some gas pipes in the part of the 5’ easement area that Polly wasn’t using. Wendell agreed but Polly sued Gass, claiming that Gass was encroaching on her rights to use the easement. What result?

a. Polly wins because the owner of the dominant tenement determines the manner of the easement’s use.

b. Wendell wins because, as servient owner, he has the fee simple and has the final say on the manner of its use.

c. Gass wins because, after the conveyance to Polly, Wendell retained an alienable right to make any use of the servient land not inconsistent with reasonable use of the easement by Polly.

d. Gass wins because that would maximize the utility of the servient estate.

118. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Plato-Guinness-Dominick questions. Plato conveyed 5 acres out of his 200-acre estate to Guinness, who built a small hunting cabin there. As part of the same deal, Plato also conveyed to Guinness “the hunting and fishing rights” on the remaining 195 acres. All deeds were duly recorded. Later, Plato’s 195-acre property was taken by the county and sold for property taxes. Dominick bought the land at the tax sale.

119. Guinness’ hunting rights are:

a. Gone.

b. Presumptively in gross.

c. Still in existence and unaffected by the tax sale, since they are presumptively an appurtenance of his 5-acre dominant tenement.

d. A quasi-easement.

120. Reanswer the previous question.

121. One day Dominick decided to strap on his waders and do a little fly-fishing on his newly acquired 195-acre property. Guinness saw this, became irate and sued for an injunction. What likely result?

a. Dominick will win because Guinness cannot exclude the landowner from making any use he wants of his own land.

b. Guinness will win only if Dominick purchased with actual notice of the easement.

c. Dominick will win because Guinness’ rights in the land were extinguished by the tax sale.

d. There is authority to the effect that Guinness should win because Plato conveyed “the” fishing rights exclusively to him.

122. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Madison-Claude questions. Madison owned Whiteacre in fee simple. In 1990, she sold a twenty-acre parcel of Whiteacre to Chester. Six months later, she and Chester exchanged covenants in which each agreed to use their respective parcels solely for residential purposes. In 1995, she sold 50 acres of Whiteacre to Claude, repeating the mutual restriction to residential purposes “for the benefit of all of” the original Whiteacre. That deed was recorded in 1996. In 2003, Claude sold his parcel to Strummin’ Walter, who wants to build a roadhouse and blues bar on the site.

123. Chester sues, claiming that Walter is barred from using the premises as anything but a residence. Which of the following is likely true?

a. Chester is not in horizontal privity of estate with Walter

b. Under the majority rule, Chester cannot enforce the covenant at law

c. Chester could enforce the covenant as an equitable servitude.

d. All of the above

124. Reanswer the previous question.

125. Suppose that Madison sues to stop Walter from building his proposed roadhouse. Suppose also that, since 1995, the whole area around the proposed roadhouse has been built up and, due to these changes in the neighborhood, the parcel purchased by Walter is no longer suitable for residential use.

a. Due to the changes it appears that the covenant no longer “touches and concerns” the land and, therefore, it wouldn’t run with the land.

b. Changes exclusively outside the restricted zone would present a weaker basis for a court’s refusal to enforce the restrictions—substantially weaker than changes inside the restricted zone.

c. The residential restriction does not appear in Walter’s direct chain of title and, therefore, is not binding on Walter unless he took with actual notice of it.

d. If a court refuses to enjoin Walter’s proposed roadhouse on equitable grounds, Madison could still recover damages for breach on either a real covenant or an equitable servitude theory.

126. Reanswer the previous question.

If you have a “word” from the Estate System Proficiency Test, be sure it is written after your name on the answer sheet, and do not do the following questions.

In answering the following TRUE/FALSE questions, assume (unless otherwise specified) that, at the times of conveyance, O is an owner in fee simple absolute, and that every named party is alive and unmarried. Remember that the conveyances are to be interpreted as set forth in the last two paragraphs on the instruction page. Assume that all life estates end at the death of the named life tenant. When you see words appropriate for a defeasible fee simple, assume that the words of conveyance also include whatever additional words (such as words of reverter or re-entry) may be required by law in order to create the defeasible estate.

127. O conveyed “to A and his heirs.” The heirs of A have no interest in the land.

128. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” O has no remaining interest in the land.

129. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” B has a contingent remainder.

130. O conveyed “to A and her heirs, then if A dies childless, to B and her heirs.” B has an executory interest.

131. O conveyed “to A for two years, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” B has a remainder.

132. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs.” If B dies before A, the land will revert to O.

133. O conveyed “to A for life.” The conveyance results in a reversion.

134. O conveyed “to A to take effect in possession beginning from and after my death.” The conveyance would create a life estate and remainder.

135. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A by at least one year.” B has an executory interest.

136. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A by at least one year.” O has a reversion.

137. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if C survives A by at least one year, then to C and her heirs.” B has an executory interest that is subject to divestment.

138. O conveyed “to A for two years, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” B has an executory interest.

139. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B’s first child to reach the age of 21 years.” B has three children, aged 15, 12, and 8. This conveyance creates a vested remainder, subject to divestment.

140. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B’s first child born before the death of A.” B is living but childless. This conveyance creates a contingent remainder

141. O conveyed “to A for life, remainder to B and the heirs of her body if B gives A a suitable burial.” In a state that still recognizes the fee tail, B would have a contingent remainder.

142. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” C then dies, never having married. B has no interest.

143. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C after the death of A.” B has an executory interest.

144. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C after the death of A.” B has a contingent remainder.

145. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if B dies childless then to C and his heirs.” B has a vested remainder subject to divestment.

146. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if B dies childless then to C and his heirs.” O has a reversion.

147. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” O has a reversion.

148. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C after the death of A.” B has an executory interest.

149. O conveyed “to A for life, remainder to the children of B.” B is living but childless. This conveyance creates a vested remainder.

150. O conveyed “to A for life, remainder to the heirs of B” (a person recently deceased). This conveyance creates a vested remainder.

151. O conveyed “to A for 5 years, then to the heirs of B” (a living person). This conveyance creates a contingent remainder.

152. O conveyed “to A for 5 years, then to the heirs of B” (a living person). This conveyance creates an executory interest.

153. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if C survives A by at least one year, then to C and her heirs.” C has a future interest that is vested subject to divestment.

154. O conveyed “to A and his heirs until New York City because a separate state.” This conveyance creates a fee simple on special limitation.

155. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as swallows return to Capistrano.” O has a right of re-entry.

156. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as swallows return to Capistrano.” O has a future interest that is properly called a reverter.

157. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as swallows return to Capistrano.” O has a future interest that is properly called a reversion.

158. O conveyed “to A and the heirs of his body.” In states that still recognize the fee tail, this estate would not be inherited if, at A’s death, his sole heirs were one brother and one sister

159. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as the old oak tree stands.” The premises will automatically revert back to the grantor if the old oak tree is cut down for firewood.

160. O conveyed “to A and his heirs on the condition that the premises be kept as a beach that is open to the public.” O has a right of re-entry.

161. O conveyed “to A as long as he desires to remain living on the land.” The more modern tendency is to interpret this conveyance as creating a determinable life estate, rather than a tenancy at will.