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Facts for Davis-Tex questions. While waiting for his rental horse to be saddled at Clip-a-clop Riding Stables, Davis noticed something shiny in the grass. It turned out to be a jeweled key ring that somebody had lost. Davis reported it to, Tex, the owner of Clip-a-clop. Tex was surprised and said he had no idea whose it might be. However, Davis agreed to leave the ring with Tex “in case the person who lost it comes back to get it.” After a month or so, Davis called Tex and asked about the key ring. Tex said nobody had come back for it so last week he just went ahead and pawned it, for $500, at the Good Time Friday Night pawnshop.

1. When Davis heard how much Tex had gotten from the pawnbroker, he demanded that Tex let him have the $500 “or at least share it.” Tex refused saying: “Hey, dude, it was on my private property.” If Davis sues Tex for the $500:

a. Most courts would probably make Tex share the money with Davis.

b. Some courts would decide that Davis has a legal right to the money even though the key ring wasn’t his in the first place.

c. Most courts would probably decide that neither Davis nor Tex was entitled to the money.

d. Davis may have a replevin action against Tex, but definitely not a trover action.

2. Reanswer the previous question.

3. Davis decided he’d rather have the key ring than the $500 that Tex got from the pawnbroker. Davis explained the circumstances to Fripps, the owner of Good Time Friday Night. However, Fripps refused to give the ring to Davis, claiming that he bought it in good faith and with no reason to believe that Tex was not the rightful owner. The local law of finding generally follows the so-called American rule:

a. Fripps would be a converter.

b. Davis would have an action in replevin against Fripps.

c. Fripps would be absolutely liable to Davis if he redelivered the ring to Tex.

d. All of the above.

4. Reanswer the previous question.

5. After Davis called Tex and threatened a lawsuit, Tex decided he’d better get the ring back out of hock. Tex got possession of the ring again. A little later, Davis sued Tex to recover possession of the ring. Davis pointed out that, although he found the ring in a private area on Tex’s property, he was not a trespasser there inasmuch as he was a customer waiting to be served. The court decided that the true owner had lost the ring.

a. In many states, Tex would probably have the better claim to the ring as owner of the locus in quo, even if Davis was not trespassing.

b. In many states, Davis would probably have the better claim to the ring as long as he was not a trespasser at the time he found it.

c. Both of the above.

d. Since neither Davis nor Tex is the owner of the ring, the best thing for the court to do is simply leave it with the person that has it.

6. Reanswer the previous question.

7. Again assume that Tex got the key-ring back out of hock. Further assume that the case arises in an “American-rule” state that recognizes the distinction between lost and mislaid property. If the jury concludes that the ring got into the grass by falling out of the owner’s pocket without his knowledge, then:

a. Tex would probably have a better claim to the ring as the owner of the locus in quo.

b. Davis would probably have a better claim to the ring as the person who actually found it.

c. The court would probably order that the ring be sold and the proceeds be split between Davis and Tex.

d. Davis would have the better claim to the ring because it was “mislaid” rather than “lost.”

8. Reanswer the previous question.

9. Suppose that Tex urgently needed some cash and so he re-hocked the key ring at the pawnbroker. The available evidence shows that the key ring was worth as much as $1,800. As is usually the case, however, Tex got a lot less than that from the pawnbroker. In fact, Tex only got $500. If Davis were able, on some sort of legal theory, to succeed as finder against Tex for conversion of the ring, the amount of damages he could recover from Tex:

a. Would probably be nominal because Davis was a mere possessor and not the owner of the ring and, therefore, he hasn’t suffered much actual injury.

b. Would probably be limited to the $500 that Tex received for the ring from the pawnbroker.

c. Should be equal to the full fair value of the ring, as found by the jury—perhaps as much as $1800.

d. Would probably be nil unless Davis could prove that Tex pawned the ring with full knowledge that he didn’t have any legal right to it.

10. Reanswer the previous question.

11. Marilee Collins, a lawyer, left her new BMW at Bumperkarz Parking Garage while attending a deposition for a client. The garage was operated with a valet parking arrangement, which made it a bailee of the car. When Collins returned after the deposition, the power mirror was missing from the car’s passenger side. She complained. One of the attendants ran upstairs and returned with missing mirror, which he handed to Collins.

a. Bumperkarz is strictly liable for the damage to the mirror.

b. Bumperkarz is liable only if the mirror was broken off due its failure to use ordinary care.

c. Bumperkarz is liable for “misdelivery” of Collins’s car.

d. None of the above. There was no bailment of the mirror (as distinguished from the car) unless the attendant actually knew that it was on the car when he accepted the bailment.

12. Reanswer the previous question.

13. Suppose in the preceding question that Collins, not wishing to look too ostentatious at the deposition, left her $75,000 diamond bracelet in the BMW’s trunk. She did not mention this to the Bumperkarz attendant when she’d left off her car. When she went to put the broken-off mirror in the trunk, however, she noticed that the bracelet was missing. She told the attendant, who replied: “You gotta be kidding, lady!” Collins sues for both the broken mirror and the value of the bracelet. As to the bracelet:

a. Some courts would accept the argument that there was no bailment of the bracelet if nobody at Bumperkarz had knowledge that it was in the trunk.

b. Even if Bumperkarz had a bailee’s duties with respect to the bracelet, the duty of care could be fulfilled by doing essentially nothing special to protect the bracelet since nobody at Bumperkarz even knew it existed.

c. Both of the above.

d. Collins should have no problem in recovering the value of the bracelet since there is a “presumption of negligence” whenever a bailee cannot return the object that was bailed.

14. Reanswer the previous question.

15. Two people were fishing from a boat floating down a stream. After they had already caught two fish, the person who owned the land on both sides of the stream (and the streambed) saw them from the shore, He shouted for them to pull over. The landowner demanded that the boaters give him the two fish and get their boat out of there “now.”

a. If the stream was “navigable in fact,” then the boaters would not be trespassers for merely navigating on it.

b. The boaters would have been trespassing by floating their boat over the landowner’s streambed unless the stream was “navigable in law.”

c. If the boaters were not trespassers by navigating over the landowner’s streambed, then the landowner would have no legal basis to claim the fish.

d. The navigation servitude means that the boaters would not be trespassers unless they touched the privately-owned bottom or banks of the stream.

16. Reanswer the previous question.

17. A group of commercial fishermen found an injured dolphin a few miles off shore and they brought it to Sealife Gardens. Sealife nursed the dolphin back to health in a special pen than was next to (but fenced from) the bay. During a storm, the fence was breached and the dolphin escaped to ocean. Later, a dolphin was found by other commercial fisherman who then “sold” it to SeeSea Park, a competitor of Sealife. Under the rules applicable to ferae naturae:

a. Sealife probably lost its rights in the dolphin when it regained its natural liberty.

b. Sealife would have the better claim to the dolphin if it had animus revertendi.

c. Both of the above.

d. SeeSea could not have a legal right to the dolphin if it was the same dolphin that escaped from Sealife.

18. Reanswer the previous question.

19. Mercator owned a 3-acre parcel of mountain land abutting a small lake. The lake was the one of the few remaining habitats for Kentucky blind trout, a rare and endangered species. Under the state’s Protected Species Act, a special permit is needed to build on any land where the construction might affect the habitat of any endangered species. Mercator has been told he may not erect any structure that might pollute the runoff into the lake, require the creation of a septic system within 500 yards of the lake or require cutting any trees bigger than 4” in diameter. These restrictions severely limit what Mercator can build on his land. Nearby similar (but fully buildable parcels) are worth over $50000 per acre. Mercator has a claim under the takings clause if:

a. His land has been substantially reduced in value.

b. The restrictions deprive his land of all economically viable use.

c. Both of the above.

d. He cannot erect any structure that would be actually habitable.

e. All of the above.

20. Reanswer the previous question.

21. A bag of cement fell off the back a truck belonging to Acme Contracting Co. Before Acme’s driver could circle back to retrieve it, the bag was spotted by a driver for Bass Builders, who picked it up off the street and threw it in his own truck, intending to use it on a job. A short time after that, however, the bag slipped off the Bass truck and was found by Harry Holen, who put it in his car and took it home. The whole series of events was captured by on-street video cameras, and copies of the tapes are in the possession of Acme’s lawyer:

a. One bag of cement is pretty much like any other (of the same brand), so even if Acme originally owned the cement, Acme would have lost title to it once it fell off Acme’s truck.

b. Since neither Bass nor Harry ever owned the cement, Bass would have no better right to the cement than Harry.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Acme could recover from Bass in trover.

22. Reanswer the previous question.

23. Daisy lives in a rented house with her three children. She takes the bus to work every day. Her house is on a long and curvy private road. By following the private road to the main highway Daisy has about a 1½ mile walk to the bus stop. However, if Daisy uses a shortcut across the neighbor’s vacant woodlot, the walk to the highway (and a different, closer bus stop) takes about 5 minutes. Last month the neighbor, Lance, asked Daisy to come over to his house “for dinner, some wine and an evening you’ll remember.” When Daisy said “no, thanks”, Lance became irritated and told her never to step foot on his property again. Winter is arriving and the wind-chill in these parts sometimes goes below zero. Daisy is worried about her personal safety (not to mention comfort) walking the badly-plowed 1½ miles to the bus, especially since she has to leave home before daybreak and doesn’t return again until after dark.

a. If Daisy’s shortcut would cause no harm to Lance’s woodlot, especially in winter when everything is covered by snow, the crossings would not be actionable as trespasses.

b. Lance was fully within his rights to forbid Daisy from taking a shortcut through the woodlot to get to the bus.

c. Because of Daisy’s dire need, Lance would be legally required to let her make reasonable minor entries on his land.

d. If Daisy uses the shortcut anyway but Lance doesn’t say anything, there is no chance her use could eventually ripen into an easement by prescription.

24. Reanswer the previous question.

25. Dagger Mining Co. has mineral rights for much of the land in the town of McNalley. In order to keep its underground mines safe and dry, Dagger constantly has to remove groundwater that accumulates in its shafts. As a result of this pumping, some nearby houses, including Bogg’s, are sinking. In Bogg’s case, the surface of his front yard is already almost level with his first-floor window sills. In an action by Bogg against Dagger:

a. Presumptively, the underground waters that Dagger is pumping out would be considered percolating waters.

b. If the present state of local law leaves them a choice, the lawyers for Bogg should probably argue for the so-called English rule to apply.

c. Under the so-called English rule, Dagger’s right to continue pumping would depend whether the court agreed that the pumping was reasonably necessary for some useful or beneficial purpose.

d. All of the above.

26. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Carson questions. Carson built a vacation home on some acreage he had next to the state forest preserve. The state later built a short stretch of public trail to connect a new parking lot with a major hiking trail on the state’s land. This new public trail cuts across a corner of Carson’s land, affecting about 2% of his total property.

27. When Carson applied for a building permit, the state denied the permit because the proposed structure would intrude on “protected wetlands.” In fact, about 66% of Carson’s land consists of protected wetlands. The permit denial means Carson is essentially unable to sell any of the 66% for anything approaching what he’d get if he could offer it as sites for vacation-homes. The remaining 33% retains its full market value. Under the takings clause, Carson would be entitled to compensation for:

a. The value that his property lost due to the wetlands restrictions.

b. The value of his property taken for the short stretch of trail.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

28. Reanswer the previous question.

29. After Carson’s death, his adult children inherited the vacation-home property in equal shares, as tenants in common. None of them, however, took possession of any part of the land. While the land was thus unoccupied, Lockhart went in without permission and removed a number of mature walnut trees, having a value of over $70,000. Carson’s children now would like to bring an action against Lockhart.

a. The children will not be eligible to bring a trespass action against Lockhart because they were not in possession of the land.

b. The children will be eligible to bring a trespass action again Lockhart because courts have abolished the old requirement that a person must have possession to sue in trespass.

c. The children will be eligible to bring a trespass action against Lockhart because there is not and never was a requirement that a person must have possession to sue a wrongdoer in trespass.

d. The children would be legally regarded as having “possession” sufficient to maintain a trespass action against Lockhart.

30. Reanswer the previous question.

31. Suppose in the preceding question that the land had been occupied by an adverse possessor, Neville, at the time Lockhart entered and took the trees.

a. Neville would be permitted to recover damages from Lockhart.

b. Some courts would not allow a person in Neville’s position to recover the full value of the trees, creating the possibility that Lockhart may never be required to pay full damages to anybody at all.

c. Both of the above.

d. Under the Winkfield principle, if Lockhart were in fact required to pay full damages to Neville, that should bar any subsequent action by Carson’s children against Lockhart.

e. All of the above.

32. Reanswer the previous question.

33. Following the trespasses by Lockhart described in the preceding two questions, Carson’s children decided they’d better not leave the land unattended. One of them, Elizabeth, went to live in the house on the property. Several years later, Elizabeth’s brothers and sisters decided that maybe she ought to be paying something for having the use of the house as a place to live.

a. Ordinarily, under the majority rule, Elizabeth would, as sole occupant, be automatically expected to pay a fair rental value to her out-of-possession siblings.

b. In many states Elizabeth would be protected from any obligation to pay rents to her co-tenants under the so-called Statutes of Anne, which eliminate any such liability.

c. Under the majority rule, Elizabeth would be liable for mesne profits at least to her brother Todd if Todd wanted to live in the house but Elizabeth refused to let him.

d. Under the minority rule, Elizabeth would be liable to her out-of-possession co-tenants only if she agreed to make such payments or committed an ouster.

34. Reanswer the previous question.

35. If, in the preceding question, Elizabeth’s brothers and sisters did nothing to stop her from simply occupying the house alone for an extended period of years:

a. Her occupancy could eventually ripen into a sole ownership (tenancy in severalty) to the exclusion of her brothers and sisters.

b. The other siblings could acquiesce in her living there without fear of losing their share of the ownership because possession by one co-tenant is forever deemed to be possession of all.

c. The other siblings could acquiesce in her living there without fear of losing their share of the ownership because co-tenants can’t sue each other in ejectment and so the statute of limitations on ejectment would not apply.

d. The other siblings might someday have a serious problem since there is no way that one co-tenant can hold sole occupancy for a long period of time without eventually becoming the sole owner under the doctrine of adverse possession.

36. Reanswer the previous question.

37. Randi was standing in her living room with her daughter, Cleo, and pointed to a small carving on the wall saying: “I want you to have that as soon as you move into a place of your own. We’ll leave it up there for time being, but once you get an apartment, it’ll be yours.” As of this point:

a. Cleo owns the carving.

b. Randi has made an unenforceable gratuitous promise.

c. There may not have been an expression of in praesenti donative intent, but the delivery requirement would be dispensed with in a case like this.

d. The gift in not yet complete, but Cleo would have a cause of action to recover it if Randi doesn’t turn it over within a reasonable period of time.

38. Reanswer the previous question.

39. Ambrose, in apprehension of death from a serious illness, said to Janis: “Here’s my ring that I received when I was initiated into the secret society. I want you to have it.” Janis took the ring and later left with it. Unexpectedly, Ambrose recovered from his illness, but when Janis tried to return the ring Ambrose refused, saying: “No, Janis, I gave that to you. I never meant to have it back. It’s yours.”

a. The gift made by Ambrose would have been presumptively causa mortis.

b. Under the usual presumption, the gift by Ambrose would have been revocable by him (before his death) whether or not Ambrose survived the illness.

c. On the evidence, Ambrose made an inter vivos gift of the ring.

d. All of the above.

40. Reanswer the previous question.

41. Ambrose, again on his deathbed (located in an apartment in the city), said to Janis: “Here’s the deed to my cottage out at Larch Lake. I want you to have it and all the furniture.” The deed conveyed to Janis a fee simple in the cottage real estate, subject to a life estate retained by Ambrose. The deed made no mention of the furniture:

a. The furniture would be presumptively included with the conveyance of the cottage even though the deed made no mention of it.

b. In any event, the conveyance of the cottage to Janis under this deed would constitute a delivery of the furniture in the cottage, since Janis became the cottage’s owner.

c. The gift of the furniture would in any case be complete once Janis took possession of the cottage and furniture following the death of Ambrose.

d. None of the above.

42. Reanswer the previous question.

43. Ambrose, again on his deathbed, said to Janis: “Ten years ago I salted away a bag of gold coins for a rainy day. Since I’m not going to be needing them, I’m now giving them to you. You should go get them as soon as you can.” Under the principles and policies generally applicable to “constructive delivery”:

a. The delivery would be complete if Ambrose, on saying these words, handed Janis the only key to the distant safe deposit box where the coins were located.

b. The delivery would be complete if Ambrose, on saying these words, also told Janis the exact location where the coins were buried.

c. The delivery could be completed only when Janis goes and takes actual physical possession of the coins, either before or after the death of Ambrose.

d. All of the above.

44. Reanswer the previous question.

45. Banfield handed Owen a letter which said: “I hereby give you my Model T Ford automobile, beginning from and after my death.” For several years, now, Banfield had kept the car in a garage on Owen’s property, meaning Owen was (as a favor to Banfield) the gratuitous bailee of the car. After Owen received the above letter, the car continued to be kept in Owen’s garage, all the way up until Banfield’s death. The delivery requirement could be considered to have been met:

a. By handing over the letter.

b. By virtue of the fact that the car was already in Owen’s possession.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Since this was, in effect, a testamentary gift the delivery requirement did not have to be met.

46. Reanswer the previous question.

47. William gave a valuable ring to his fiancé, Caroline. Later, at a college dance, the couple had a major tiff after Caroline spent too much time dancing with Ben, a linesman on the football team. The next day William sent Caroline an IM stating: “U R dumped”. The wedding was called off and William wants back the ring.

a. In general, inter vivos gifts are legally irrevocable, so in this case William could get the ring back only by showing that the gift to Caroline was a gift causa mortis.

b. All gifts between fiancés must be returned on demand if the contemplated marriage does not occur.

c. In New York, William probably could not get the ring back because it appears that he was not the one at fault in causing the final break up.

d. In some states, William could get the ring back even if the gift was inter vivos and he was the one at fault in causing the break-up.

48. Reanswer the previous question.

49. United Pyro Inc. is a large user of natural gas, all of which is piped in from far away. After it arrives, the gas has to be stored until needed. United places the gas into natural underground cavities, which extend under neighboring parcels of land. In the ground the gas tends to flow around under neighboring parcels until United pumps it back out. Recently United learned that one of its neighbors, Kellerman, has been removing gas from the ground. Chemical testing has revealed that the gas removed by Kellerman is the same gas as that was pumped into the ground by United.

a. If the law is that United ceased to own the gas while it was flowing under neighboring parcels, then United could not be considered a “trespasser” for storing the gas this way..

b. According to some of the cases, purporting to apply the doctrine of “capture,” the gas that United pumps into the ground would cease to belong to United.

c. Both of the above.

d. It is almost universally held to be larceny for a person to take valuable natural gas from the ground knowing that somebody else bought the gas and placed it there.

50. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Adams-Gibbons questions. Adams has owned a parcel of land along the Cummins River for many years. Although this property has river access, the area nearest his house is marshy, and Adams has always gone upstream about 200’ to reach the edge of the river, land his boat, etc. Recently, Adams received a letter from a lawyer stating that the area where he’s been accessing the river was actually owned by Gibbons, who wants to build a small marina there. The marina would greatly annoy Adams by destroying the now rather pristine nature and isolated “feel” of the place. Adams wants to know if he might, by his many years of use, have acquired ripened title to the area where Gibbons wants the marina

51. In general, in order to prove he has a ripened title by adverse possession, Adams would not have to show which of the following “elements”:

a. Continuous and exclusive possession for the requisite period.

b. Reasonable notice to Gibbons that Adams was using his land.

c. Actual physical possession of the area he claims.

d. Open and notorious possession.

52. Reanswer the previous question.

53. Suppose that Gibbons was fully aware of the river-side uses Adams was making, but that both he and Adams thought the property line was about 50’ further upstream than it actually is. In other words, all these years both he and Adams had been assuming (erroneously) that Adams was using only his own land.

a. If Adams was wrongfully possessing the Gibbons land due to an honest mistake of fact, some courts would hold that no title could ripen because the element of hostility is missing.

b. Under the better understanding of the hostility requirement, Adams could acquire ripened title only if he actually had a genuine belief that he was wrongfully possessing land that belonged to another person.

c. Both of the above.

d. If neither Adams nor Gibbons knew the location of the actual property line, then the possession by Adams of the Gibbons land could not have been “open and notorious.”

e. All of the above.

54. Reanswer the previous question.

55. In order to establish that he had adverse possession of the area he now claims, Adams would have to show that:

a. He had built a fence, a house or at least some permanent structure on the land.

b. He had an actual belief that the land was his.

c. He acted with respect to the land like a true owner would.

d. All of the above.

56. Reanswer the previous question.

57. Ruth inherited a piece of land from her grandmother, Edith. Four years earlier, Edith had bought the land from Ingborg. Five years before that, Ingborg had contracted to buy the land from a subdivider named Malley, but never made any payments after the first one and he never received a deed. Nonetheless, Ingborg took possession of the land, built a house on it and lived there until he sold to Edith. As I turns out, Malley himself had a defective title to the land, having “bought” it from a man purporting, without authority, to be acting on behalf of Koch—the farmer who originally owned it all. Now the creditors of Koch (who has since become insolvent) are threatening an ejectment action against Ruth. In computing whether the statute of limitations has run out:

a. Ruth may tack her possession onto that of Edith.

b. Ruth may tack together the possession of herself, Edith and Ingborg.

c. Both of the above.

d. Edith may tack together the possession of herself, Edith, Ingborg and Malley.

e. All of the above.

58. Reanswer the previous question.

59. In 1985 O was the owner of Blackacre. Later an adverse possessor, A, entered into possession and has remained ever since. Assuming that the local statute of limitations is like the one we studied in class (with a basic 21-year period and a 10-year disability period), A would acquire a ripened title in:

a. 2006 if O was under no disability in 1985, died in 1986, and left H, age 5 years, as his heir.

b. 2008 if O was insane in 1985, died in 1998 while still insane, and left H, age 5, as his heir.

c. Both of the above.

d. 2006 if O was under no disability in 1985, became insane in 1986, and died in 2004 while still insane, leaving H, an adult, as his heir.

e. All of the above.

60. Reanswer the previous question.

61. In 1985 the state highway department leased a section of Wilson’s farm to provide a storage site for road maintenance materials, salt, machinery, etc. The term of the lease was 25 years. Wilson had previously used a pathway across the section to take his cows to and from his east pasture. He continued to do so, without the state’s permission, after making the lease. Recently the new highway commissioner sent Wilson a letter demanding that he stop using the pathway. Because an alternate route is inconvenient, Wilson is not pleased:

a. As landlord of the property, Wilson would in any event have a right to make innocuous entries on and use of the area leased by the state.

b. Even if Wilson only used the pathway during the summer pasturing season, his usage would probably be considered continuous enough for him to acquire an easement by prescription (assuming that is possible against the state in his jurisdiction).

c. The fact that Wilson’s claim for an easement would be against the state doesn’t have any particular legal relevance under the usual law applicable to easements by prescription.

d. By merely using the pathway a couple of times a day to access the pasture, Wilson would not come anywhere near making sufficient use to acquire an easement over the pathway by prescription.

62. Reanswer the previous question.

63. Suppose that in 1995 a private contractor, Mickey’s Road and Paving, leased a parcel of land to provide a storage site for road maintenance materials, salt, machinery, etc. The parcel was owned in fee simple by a private corporation, Dunwoody Enterprises, Inc., and the term of the lease was 25 years. Wilson had previously used a pathway across the parcel to take his cows to and from his west pasture. He continued to do so, without Mickey’s permission. Now, after more than ten years of not objecting to Wilson’s use of the pathway, Mickey’s want to put a stop to the use:

a. It will probably succeed because basically Wilson could not get an easement against a mere lessee, like Mickey’s.

b. Wilson’s use can be terminated but not by Mickey’s. As owner of the land, Dunwoody is the proper party to decide whether Wilson’s use can or cannot continue.

c. If Wilson’s conduct has been such as would meet the requirements for an easement by prescription, then he has one, to use for as long as he needs it.

d. If Wilson’s conduct has been such as would meet the requirements for an easement by prescription, then he has one, but it will only last until the end of Mickey’s lease.

64. Reanswer the previous question.

65. Boron conveys “to Mirella and her heirs, but if babies are born on the moon, then to NASA.” This conveyance:

a. violates the rule against perpetuities.

b. does not violate the rule against perpetuities.

c. is not subject to the rule against perpetuities.

d. none of the above.

66. Reanswer the previous question.

67. Lee Wheeler owns a vintage 1959 Lightning sailboat worth $4,000. He wants his daughter, Thelma, to have it but he wants to be able to sail it as long as he is able. He writes a letter saying that he is “hereby” giving the boat to Thelma but that he is retaining the “possession for life” for himself. He delivers the letter to Thelma. Subsequently, he hears that Thelma can’t wait for him to die so she can auction off the boat on EBay. Wheeler is devastated. He writes Thelma a letter revoking the gift. Under the circumstances:

a. Wheeler has full title to the boat; Thelma has nothing.

b. Thelma has full title to the boat; Wheeler has nothing.

c. Wheeler has a life estate; Thelma has a future interest..

d. None of the above.

68. Reanswer the previous question.

69. Which one of the following devises in the will of O does not create a future interest that violates the common law rule against perpetuities? (All named persons are living at the time the will becomes effective).

a. To Aaron and his heirs, but if scientists at Rockefeller University ever discover a cure for cancer, then to Aaron's children living at the time of such discovery.

b. To Aaron for life, then to Boron for life if scientists at Rockefeller University discover a cure for cancer.

c. To Aaron for life, then to Boron and his heirs if scientists at Rockefeller University discover a cure for cancer.

d. To Aaron and his heirs, but if scientists at Rockefeller University ever discover a cure for cancer, then to Boron’s children living at the time of Aaron’s death.

70. Reanswer the previous question..

71. If Bill leased Whiteacre to Greg who then assigned the lease to Helen, who did not assume the lease. Helen and Bill are:

a. in privity of estate

b. in privity of contract

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above

72. Reanswer the previous question.

73. Same facts as preceding question. If Bill sued Helen for nonpayment of rent, his suit would be founded on:

a. The reservation of rent in the original lease.

b. The promise to pay rent in the original lease.

c. Nothing. Bill could not recover rent from Helen.

d. The usual law of subleasing.

74. Reanswer the previous question.

75. If Manfred leased Albanacre to Greg, and Greg later assigned the lease to Elmer, who assumed the lease, then Manfred and Elmer are

a. in privity of contract

b. in privity of estate

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

76. Reanswer the previous question.

77. Irwin leased an apartment to Brian and Gail for five years, with the lease stating that it would expire at 12:01 am on December 10, 2011. In the lease the tenants agreed that there would be no assignment or sublease without the lessor’s express, written consent. Brian and Gail then split up and want no more to do with each other. Conway is happy to take over the apartment but Irwin says “no.” Nonetheless, a document is drafted transferring possession to Conway until 12:01 am on December 10, 2011. If Irwin chooses to terminate under a provision allowing forfeiture on tenant breach, she would (under the traditional rule):

a. Likely lose unless she had a good reason for withholding consent.

b. Likely win because the law disfavors subleases.

c. Likely win because the lease forbids subleasing without the landlord’s consent.

d. Likely win because the lease forbids assignment without the landlord’s consent.

78. Reanswer the previous question.

79. Same facts as previous question except the document stated that Conway’s possession would expire on December 9, 2011. Irwin’s attempt to terminate will:

a. Likely succeed because the assignment now would put her in both privity of contract as well as privity of estate.

b. Likely succeed because the lease forbids assignment without the landlord’s consent.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. There is no assignment here.

80. Reanswer the previous question.

81. Last week, Polk made an oral lease of 1567 Back Street to Linkletter for one year. The rent reserved was stated to be $120,000 per year payable in monthly installments of $12,000 each. The local statute of frauds applies to leases of more than one year. Linkletter, having entered into possession, has:

a. a tenancy from month to month.

b. an estate for years

c. a tenancy from year to year.

d. a tenancy at will.

82. Reanswer the previous question.

83. Same facts as preceding question except the agreed term of the lease is exactly two years. Linkletter has just entered into possession. He has:

a. Nothing. The oral lease is void.

b. A term of years for one year.

c. A tenancy at will that may convert into a tenancy from year to year.

d. A tenancy at will that may convert into a tenancy from month to month.

84. Reanswer the previous question.

85. Polk demised 1577 Front Street to Sutter for three years. Two weeks after the end of the three years, Sutter continues to occupy the property. However, no new lease has been discussed or entered into:

a. Under the common law rule Polk can hold Sutter for a new term.

b. Sutter can be removed as a holdover tenant.

c. Sutter is a tenant at sufferance

d. All of the above.

86. Reanswer the previous question.

87. Marlboro demised a run-down apartment loft to Slim from month to month starting on December 1, 2006. On December 7, one week into the lease, Marlboro decided that he wanted to terminate. The earliest date that Marlboro could regain possession by causing Slim’s tenancy to terminate would be:

a. January 1, 2007

b. January 7, 2007

c. February 1, 2007

d. February 7, 2007

88. Reanswer the previous question.

89. Same facts as preceding question except that the lease is for a term of one year. The reserved rent is $1600 per month. In order to provide any notice required by law so that Slim will have to vacate at the end of the term, Marlboro would have to give notice by:

a. July 1, 2007

b. June 1, 2007

c. January 1, 2007

d. None of the above. No notice is required to terminate at the end of the term.

90. Reanswer the previous question.

91. Garbo rented an apartment from Whitestone Properties (“Whitestone”). Afterwards. Whitestone leased a neighboring lot, which it also owned, to Alcott Mills for use as a small furniture factory. Now, however, the noise from the factory’s machinery, especially the power saws, is very disturbing to Garbo. She asks you whether she can cease paying rent without penalty. You should tell her that:

a. If the factory noise makes her apartment untenantable, she would be justified in ceasing to pay rent even if Whitestone did not cause the noise and had no means to prevent it.

b. Under the traditional rule, Garbo could not claim a constructive eviction if she does not at least partially vacate the premises.

c. Both of the above.

d. Neither of the above. Under the traditional rule Garbo could cease paying the rent if Whitestone’s failure to prevent the noise was a material breach.

92. Reanswer the previous question.

93. Harriet leased a house in Westchester County for $60,000 per year, payable at the rate of $5,000 per month. Within weeks of moving in, she discovered that the roof leaked all over the house and that water was collecting in virtually every room. Dennis, her landlord, made a few attempts to solve the problem, but the leaks and water still remain. Due to the resulting dampness and mold, Harriet can hardly stand to live there and is ready to move out, but Dennis says he intends to hold her liable for future accruing rent until the originally agreed end of the lease. If Harriet promptly moves out, she would likely not be liable for future rent:

a. Because, under the traditional rule she could probably claim to have been constructively evicted.

b. Because Dennis has breached the implied warranty of habitability.

c. Both of the above.

d. Simply because she would no longer be using the premises.

e. All of the above.

94. Reanswer the previous question.

95. Same facts as above except Harriet has trouble finding another place to live and so, for the time being, she continues to stay in the leaky house.

a. Under the contract doctrine of mutual dependence covenants (the real one) she would probably be legally excused from paying all or at least part of the rent.

b. Under the “contract” doctrine of mutual dependence covenants which courts sometimes say they apply to leases, she would probably be legally excused from paying all or at least part of the rent.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Absent constructive or actual eviction, there is no legal basis for excusing a lessee from paying the full agreed rent before the end of the lease.

96. Reanswer the previous question.

97. Crimmett has a driveway easement to cross Malloy’s property to get to her own. The purpose of the easement is to give Crimmett automobile ingress and egress. One day Crimmett cut down some cherry trees that were growing along the line that her deed describes as the boundary of the easement. Malloy sues. Crimmett will probably:

a. Win if the trees were inside the easement boundary even if she cut them down in order to use the wood to burn in her stove.

b. Lose if the trees were just outside the easement boundary line even if, with her new car, she needed the additional width in order to safely negotiate the driveway.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

98. Reanswer the previous question.

99. Janet and Michael owned Northland Farms as joint tenants. Michael conveyed his interest to Jerry. As a result:

a. Jerry and Janet are tenants in common.

b. Jerry and Janet are joint tenants.

c. Janet is a joint tenant and Jerry is a tenant in common.

d. None of the above; the conveyance is not lawful because a joint tenant can separately convey an undivided joint interest in land..

100. Reanswer the previous question.

101. The White Plains Railroad Company (“Company”) needed to use a thirty foot wide and 500 yard long plot of land owned by the Baileys. The two sides negotiated a deed of conveyance. The deed stated that the Baileys “give, grant, bargain, sell, and convey to said Company, a Right of Way for railroad purposes over and across . . . [it then listed the plat coordinates].” Several years later, the railroad stopped running through White Plains and the Company made a “lease” of the strip to an ice cream shop franchisee. The Baileys filed suit seeking to enjoin construction of the ice cream shop. The best argument for the Baileys is:

a. An easement in gross is always non-transferable.

b. The proposed use by the franchisee is outside the scope of the easement

c. The deed created a fee simple on special limitation rather than an easement.

d. All of the above are very good arguments for the Baileys.

102. Reanswer the previous question.

103. Devon conveyed a portion of his land to Edwin “reserving the use of the existing driveway by the grantor personally for as long as the grantor shall need it or find it convenient as an accessway to the land which the grantor retains.” Now Edwin is dumping piles of boulders in a effort to block the driveway. If Devon sues to assert a right to use the driveway, he should probably:

a. Lose because the word “personally” means he could only have received a license.

b. Win because he clearly has reserved an easement that is appurtenant to his retained land.

c. Win because inclusion of the right to use the driveway in the deed would make this right an executed parole license.

d. Win because Edwin is interfering with what was apparently intended as an easement in gross.

104. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Hasbrooke-Bettman questions.: Fred Hasbrooke owned Greenacre and built an opulent mansion on its western side. An underground power cable was laid across the property to connect to the main power line on the eastern boundary of the property. Hasbrooke later divided the property and sold the eastern half to Marge Bettman. The deed made no mention of any easements. Shortly after the closing, Bettman went out to plant potatoes and found that her garden plot has a big cable running through it. She wants Hasbrooke to remove the cable immediately..

105. Suppose Bettman sues for an injunction ordering removal of the cable. With respect to the element of “necessity” Hasbrooke will probably have (in theory at least):

a. A better chance of winning if the state recognizes a distinction between easements by implied grant and those by implied reservation.

b. A better chance of winning if the state does not treat easements by implied reservation differently from those by implied grant.

c. No chance of winning irrespective of whether the state treats easements by implied grant differently from those by implied reservation.

d. No better chance of winning in some states as compared with others since all states treat easements by implied grant and those by implied reservation the same.

106. Reanswer the previous question.

107. In Bettman’s action against Hasbrooke for removal of the cable, she would (in the absence of additional facts) most likely:

a. Win because the power cable was not an apparent “quasi-easement.”

b. Win even if she had actual notice of the cable’s existence before she bought.

c. Win even if a court decides that she reasonably should have figured out that such a cable must have existed, given the location of the power line and Hasbrooke’s house

d. Lose because as the owner of the dominant tenement, Hasbrooke was entitled to deference and respect.

108. Reanswer the previous question.

109. If the court does hold that Hasbrooke has an easement to maintain the cable across Bettman’s land, it will probably be:

a. an easement by necessity.

b. an easement in gross.

c. an appurtenant easement.

d. an easement by estoppel.

110. Reanswer the previous question.

111. Parchman bought hunting and fishing rights to Cactus Ranch from McGee, the owner in fee. McGee later sold Cactus Ranch to Festor, who decided to convert it into a golf course. Parchman wants to sue to enjoin construction of the golf course. Would such a suit likely succeed?

a. No, because Parchman’s profit a prendre could not run with the land.

b. Yes, if use of the land as a golf course would unreasonably interfere with the hunting and fishing rights.

c. No, unless there is a covenant running with the land limiting the uses that the owner may make of the Cactus Ranch property..

d. Yes, because so-called “natural” uses of land are preferred to uses such as golf.

112. Reanswer the previous question.

113. Assume that, a year after buying the hunting and fishing rights in the preceding question, Parchman permanently moved from the area for employment reasons, and he hasn’t been back or used the rights for 11 years. He has sold his home and all his property in the area and has established himself 2000 miles away. Festor decides to run a hunting preserve business on the Cactus Ranch, a use that would be inconsistent with the profit a prendre supposedly held by Parchman.

a. Without more, a court would probably be able to conclude that Parchman’s profit a prendre has been extinguished by abandonment..

b. Without more, a court would probably be able to conclude that Parchman’s profit a prendre has been extinguished by prescription..

c. Without more, a court would probably be able to conclude that Parchman’s profit a prendre has been extinguished by necessity..

d. On these facts, Parchman would have a good chance of obtaining an injunction against Festor’s proposed business.

114. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Papa-Sam-Jackie Questions.: Papa owned 100 acres. He divided the tract into ten lots, conveying Lots 1-5 to Sam and Lots 6-10 to Jackie. Written into the deeds (duly recorded) was a restriction that the lots “may only be used for single family dwellings, this restriction to be binding upon and enure to the benefit of the parties hereto, their heirs, successors and assigns.”.

115. Sam conveys Lot 2 to Ernie, who hopes to build an inn on the property. Can Jackie enforce the restriction as a real covenant?

a. Yes. It’s enough that Ernie acquired the land with notice of the restriction.

b. No, because horizontal privity is lacking.

c. No, because the restriction does not touch and concern the land.

d. Yes because the intent, privity, and touch and concern criteria are all adequately met.

116. Reanswer the previous question.

117. In the preceding question, can Jackie enforce the restriction as an equitable servitude?

a. Yes, as long as Ernie acquired the land with notice of the restriction.

b. No, because horizontal privity is lacking.

c. No, because the restriction does not touch and concern the land.

d. Yes because the intent, privity, and touch and concern criteria are all adequately met.

118. Reanswer the previous question.

119. Willie owns a parcel adjoining the 10 lot tract, but he did not receive his parcel from Papa. Willie would also like to stop Ernie’s construction proposal.:

a. Willie probably will be able to enforce the covenant under ordinary privity-of-contract principles.

b. Willie probably will be considered to be in horizontal but not vertical privity

c. Willie probably will not be able to get an injunction against the proposed construction.

d. Willie probably will be unable to show that the covenant touches and concerns Ernie’s property

120. Reanswer the previous question.

121. Rosie owns 150 acres of land that she obtained from Godwin. She wants to sell 30 acres to the Ring Fellowship for use as a hospital for children. Allen owns a nearby parcel of one acre, one of 43 small parcels that were deeded by Godwin from the same original tract before he sold the 150-acre balance to Rosie. All of the deeds from Godwin conveying parcels out of the original tract, including Rosie’s, contained the same restrictive covenant limiting the parcel to residential use. Allen refuses to waive the restriction. Rosie points out that much of the surrounding land just outside the original Godwin tract has recently been changed to commercial or light industrial uses. If Rosie sues to extinguish the covenant, she will probably:

a. Succeed because the surrounding land areas are being used in ways that justify a claim of changed circumstances or obsolescence.

b. Fail because the owner of any parcel in the restricted tract has the right, running with the land, to enforce the restrictions against any other owner.

c. Succeed because equities weigh in favor of the children’s hospital

d. Fail because she is not the dominant tenant in this situation.

122. Reanswer the previous question.

123. Harvey owns Blueacre, an empty 10-acre lot. The easiest access to Blueacre is over an easement crossing Brownacre. This easement was expressly created, after Harvey had acquired Blueacre, by a deed to Harvey from Browne, the owner of Brownacre. Harvey has had problems getting a permit to build on Blueacre because of the many wetland areas there, but he has a chance to buy the slightly elevated parcel right behind Blueacre for a good price. He’s thinking about buying this parcel, Grassacre, and building his house there.

a. Harvey’s easement over Brownacre could be lawfully used as access to his newly expanded Blueacre.

b. When Grassacre comes under the same ownership as Blueacre, it will automatically (unless otherwise agreed) become part of the dominant tenement.

c. Both of the above.

d. If Harvey’s easement over Brownacre is “in gross,” he has a strong argument that he can use it as an access to Grassacre, once he buys Grassacre.

e. All of the above.

124. Reanswer the previous question.

125. Suppose that Harvey decided not to buy Grassacre in the preceding question but, instead, sold off a part of the Blueacre. The buyer now wants to use the easement across Brownacre as access the portion of Blueacre that he’s just purchased. The deed to the buyer did not mention any easements.

a. The buyer should be able to use the easement across Brownacre if it was created as an appurtenant easement.

b. The buyer should be able to use the easement across Brownacre if it was created as an easement in gross.

c. The buyer would be able to use the easement across Brownacre only if it is absolutely necessary for him to have such use.

d. None of the above. There’s no way the buyer could have a right to use the easement across Brownacre without first making a deal with Browne.

126. Reanswer the previous question.

127. Milton conveyed Blackacre “to A, B, and C and their heirs as joint tenants.” If this occurred in a state that recognizes the joint tenancy:

a. The three grantees would definitely be joint tenants.

b. If there is a joint tenancy and C mortgages her interest to Bicks Bank, the mortgage would sever the joint tenancy as to her interest.

c. Both of the above.

d. If B takes sole occupancy of Blackacre right after the conveyance then, under the majority rule, he would owe A and C payment for their proportionate share.

128. Reanswer the previous question.

129. Milton conveyed Blackacre “to A, B, and C and their heirs” using language in the deed that made them joint tenants. If C dies, survived by A and B, then:

a. A and B would be tenants in common, each holding an undivided one-half.

b. A and B would be joint tenants, each holding an undivided one-half.

c. A, B and X would own Blackacre as tenants in common if C had conveyed her interest to X shortly before her death.

d. A, B and X would own Blackacre as tenants in common if C had devised her interest to X in a will that she signed shortly before her death.

130. Reanswer the previous question.

131. Gary and Suzanne are husband and wife who live in a state that recognizes the tenancy by the entirety. In 2002 they bought a single family suburban house. The granting clause of the deed simply stated “to Gary and Suzanne Norber and their heirs,” without specifying any particular concurrent estate. Last week Gary missed a red light and caused a serious accident, for which he may incur substantial liability. (Ignore any considerations posed by federal bankruptcy law.)

a. Under the majority rule, the house would not be available to satisfy an eventual tort judgment against Gary alone.

b. If local law allows Gary’s judgment creditors to levy execution on Gary’s interest in the house, then they could force Suzanne to move out.

c. If Gary settled with his judgment creditors by transferring to them his interest in the house and if the creditors nonetheless let Suzanne stay in residence, then after ten years she would likely be the sole owner as a result of the adverse possession.

d. All of the above..

132. Reanswer the previous question.

133. Gary and Suzanne are husband and wife who live in a community property state. In 2002 they bought a single family suburban house. So far, all amounts paid for the house, including the down payment and the monthly mortgage bills, have been paid from Suzanne’s earnings as an architect. Last week Gary missed a red light and caused a serious accident, for which he may incur substantial tort liability. (Ignore any considerations posed by federal bankruptcy law.)

a. Fortunately, the house is presumptively Suzanne’s and Gary’s tort creditors from the accident probably can’t get to it.

b. Unfortunately, the house is presumptively Gary’s and there is little Suzanne can do to prevent Gary’s tort creditors from getting the whole thing.

c. The house is presumptively owned 50-50 by Gary and Suzanne.

d. The house is presumptively owned by Suzanne alone.

134. Reanswer the previous question..

In answering the following TRUE/FALSE questions, assume (unless otherwise specified) that, at the times of conveyance, O is an owner in fee simple absolute, and that every named party is alive and unmarried. Remember that the conveyances are to be interpreted as set forth in the last two paragraphs on the instruction page. Assume that all life estates end at the death of the named life tenant. When you see words appropriate for a defeasible fee simple, assume that the words of conveyance also include whatever additional words (such as words of reverter or re-entry) that may be required by law in order to create the defeasible estate.

135. O conveyed “to A and his heirs.” The heirs of A receive a vested remainder under this conveyance.

136. O conveyed “to A and his heirs.” The heirs of A receive a contingent remainder under this conveyance.

137. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs.” B has a remainder.

138. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs.” B’s heirs have a remainder.

139. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B becomes a probate lawyer.” O has no future interest.

140. O conveyed “to A for life and then, one month after A’s death, to B and her heirs.” B has an executory interest.

141. O conveyed “to A and her heirs so long as the land is used as a farm, then to B and her heirs.” O has a reversion.

142. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs.” O has an executory interest.

143. O conveyed “to A for two years, then to B and her heirs.” B may be properly said to have a remainder.

144. O conveyed “to A for two years, then to B and her heirs if B becomes a probate lawyer.” B may be properly said to have a remainder.

145. O conveyed “to A for life.” O is much older then A. The conveyance results in a possibility of reverter.

146. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” B has a contingent remainder (at least).

147. O conveyed “to A and his heirs beginning after the time of my death.” The conveyance creates an remainder.

148. O conveyed “to A for life and then, six days after A’s death, to B and her heirs.” B has a remainder.

149. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A by at least one year.” B has an executory interest.

150. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if C survives A, then to C and her heirs.” B has a future interest that is vested subject to divestment.

151. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B does not survive A.” B has a contingent remainder.

152. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B attends A’s funeral.” B has a contingent remainder.

153. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C.” O has a reversion.

154. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A by at least one year.” O has a reversion.

155. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C after the death of A.” B has an executory interest.

156. O conveyed “to A for life, remainder to the children of B.” B is living but childless. This conveyance creates a vested remainder.

157. O conveyed “to A for life, remainder to the heirs of B” (a person recently deceased). This conveyance creates a vested remainder.

158. O conveyed “to A for 5 years, then to the heirs of B” (a living person). This conveyance creates a contingent remainder.

159. O conveyed “to A for 5 years, then to the heirs of B” (a living person). This conveyance creates an executory interest.

160. O conveyed “to A for life, then to B and her heirs, but if C survives A by at least one year, then to C and her heirs.” C has a future interest that is vested subject to divestment.

161. O conveyed “to A and his heirs until the District of Columbia becomes a state.” This conveyance creates a fee simple on special limitation.

162. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as swans nest on Belle Isle.” O has a right of re-entry.

163. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as swans nest on Belle Isle.” O has a future interest that is properly called a reverter.

164. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as swans nest on Belle Isle.” O has a future interest that is properly called a reversion.

165. O conveyed “to A and the heirs of his body.” In states that still recognize the fee tail, this estate would not be inherited if, at A’s death, his sole heirs were one brother and one sister

166. O conveyed “to A and his heirs as long as the house be kept painted white with green shutters.” The premises will automatically revert back to the grantor if the house is painted green with white shutters.

167. O conveyed “to A and his heirs on the condition that the premises be kept as a nature preserve and open to the public.” O has a right of re-entry.

168. O conveyed “to A as long as he desires to remain living on the land.” The more modern tendency is to interpret this conveyance as creating a determinable life estate, rather than a tenancy at will..