PACE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

Facts for Tenkler-Wentoff-Cranse questions

Tenkler bought a golf cart from Wentoff, who in turn had acquired it from the Cranse Cart Company. Tenkler paid the full market value for the cart. He did not know or have reason to know that Wentoff may have gotten the cart using questionable means. No statutes of limitations have run on any applicable causes of action.

1. If Wentoff had gotten the golf cart from the Cranse Cart Company by falsely representing himself to be a wealthy individual, inducing Cranse to sell it to him on credit, who would now have the best entitlement to possess the cart?

a. Tenkler.

b. Wentoff.

c. Cranse Cart Company.

d. Cannot be determined from the facts given.

2. Reanswer the previous question.

3. If Wentoff had stolen the golf cart from the Cranse Cart Company, who would now have the best entitlement to possess the cart?

a. Tenkler.

b. Wentoff.

c. Cranse Cart Company.

d. Cannot be determined from the facts given.

4. Reanswer the previous question.

5. If Wentoff had gotten the golf cart from the Cranse Cart Company for a "test run," falsely representing that he wanted to try it out before deciding whether to purchase it, who would now have the best entitlement to possess the cart?

a. Tenkler.

b. Wentoff.

c. Cranse Cart Company.

d. Cannot be determined from the facts given.

6. Reanswer the previous question.

7. The best explanation for why different persons are protected under the different facts of the three preceding odd-numbered questions is that:

a. The law is somewhat erratic, deciding issues case by case, with consistency being at best a serendipitous by-product.

b. When the equities are equal, equity follows the law.

c. Victims of the theft are morally superior to victims of fraud, whose own stupidity and foolish trust should not be allowed to become a burden on others.

d. There is no difference to explain. The same person would be protected in all three of the preceding odd-numbered questions.

8. Reanswer the previous question.

9. Suppose again that Wentoff had stolen the golf cart from Cranse and that, after Tenkler bought it, Tenkler painted it with some paint of his own.

a. Tenkler would probably now be considered the owner of the painted golf cart.

b. Tenkler would probably be able to prevail if Cranse sues in replevin to recover the painted cart.

c. Both of the above.

d. Cranse Cart Company should be able to maintain a successful replevin action to recover the painted cart.

e. Cannot be determined from the facts given.

10. Reanswer the previous question.

11. Suppose again that Wentoff had stolen the golf cart from Cranse and that, after buying, Tenkler had spent a number of hours fixing it up. The cart was worth $1000 before Tenkler's refurbishing work and $1200 after. If Cranse then sued Tenkler in trover, how much money could Cranse recover?

a. According to some precedents, Tenkler should not, as an innocent converter, be liable to Cranse for more than $1000.

b. Under virtually all of the cases, Tenkler would be liable to Cranse for the $1200 current value of the cart.

c. Cranse could recover possession of the cart in trover but it could not recover money. If Cranse wants to recover money it must sue in conversion, not trover.

d. Cranse could recover possession of the cart in trover but it could not recover money. If Cranse wants to recover money it must sue in replevin, not trover.

12. Reanswer the previous question.

13. Assume that the local Statute of Frauds applies (as does New York's) to leases for "more than one year." Philomena made an oral lease of Whiteacre to Sandor, who entered into possession:

a. If the agreed term of the lease was 6 months, the immediate result would be to create a term of years.

b. If the agreed term of the lease was 3 years, the immediate result would be to create a term of years which is enforceable for only one year.

c. Both of the above.

d. If the agreed term of the lease was 3 years, the immediate result would be no tenancy at all.

14. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Framwell-Jason questions

Framwell wrote a letter to his son, Jason, saying: "I want you to have the painting of Greeley Manor that hangs over the mantel, but I want to keep possession of it for my lifetime. By sending you this letter, I mean to make an effective gift to you of a right to have the painting from and after my death." Framwell signed the letter and had it taken to Jason on his birthday. The painting is still over the mantel, unmoved.

15. The best way to interpret the letter from Framwell to Jason is as:

a. An invalid will, because it does not have the required attestation of witnesses.

b. A valid inter vivos gift whose effect is to vest a legal ownership interest in Jason beginning at the death of Framwell.

c. A valid inter vivos gift whose effect is to vest a legal ownership interest in Jason at the time of the delivery of the letter.

d. A valid testamentary gift of a future interest to Jason.

16. Reanswer the previous question.

17. In evaluating the validity of this attempted gift from Framwell to Jason, a court should rule that the delivery requirement:

a. Is properly dispensed with, because both donor and donee are members of the same family.

b. Was met by delivering the letter, which can be deemed to be a deed of gift.

c. Has not been met, meaning that the attempted gift has failed as an inter vivos gift.

d. Will be met when Jason takes possession of the painting after the elder Framwell's death.

18. Reanswer the previous question.

19. Suppose that, soon after Jason received the letter, the painting was destroyed in a fire negligently ignited by a contractor working on the elder Framwell's house. The painting had a market value of over $150,000, which the contractor's insurance company is prepared to pay. Both the elder Framwell and Jason have put in claims for payment. The policy provides that payment should go to the person or persons affected according to their respective property interests in the thing destroyed:

a. The elder Framwell should get the entire $150,000.

b. Jason should get the entire $150,000.

c. Jason should get the present value of $150,000, discounted in accordance with the time remaining (as per mortality tables) until the elder Framwell's death. The elder Framwell should get the rest.

d. The elder Framwell should get the present value of $150,000, discounted in accordance with the time remaining (as per mortality tables) until his death. Jason should get the rest.

20. Reanswer the previous question.

21. Jagger decided to give a Lincoln autograph to Twist. When told that he was receiving a gift of the autograph, Twist said "Thank you." At Jagger's suggestion, Twist removed the autograph from a display case in another room and took it with him when he left for home later that day. Jagger was critically ill and thought he was about to die when all these events occurred.

a. Since Jagger was on his deathbed, he could only have made a gift causa mortis.

b. Under the usual presumptions, the gift would have been a gift causa mortis.

c. There is not yet a valid gift because there still has not been a delivery by the donor to the donee.

d. There is not yet a valid gift because the donor is not yet deceased.

22. Reanswer the previous question.

23. Suppose again Jagger, critically ill and thinking he was about to die, decided to give a Lincoln autograph to Twist. After doing all that was necessary to make a valid gift causa mortis of the autograph, Jagger recovered from his illness and did not, as expected, die of the illness after all. When Twist tried to return the autograph, Jagger said: "Yes, I guess my time had not come. I'd best take it back." The autograph was returned to its display case in Jagger's library. Several years later Jagger died of an unrelated ailment.

a. The gift causa mortis was revoked by Jagger's survival of the illness.

b. The gift causa mortis was revoked by Twist's return of the autograph after Jagger had survived the illness.

c. The gift causa mortis was not revoked under these facts, but rather the donor became the bailee of the donee.

d. The gift causa mortis went into suspension under these facts, but now that Jagger has died, Twist is finally entitled to the autograph.

24. Reanswer the previous question.

25. Don Carlson bought a silver cup to give as a birthday present to his fiancee, Betty. He wanted to have it engraved but could not find an engraver who could do the job in time. On her birthday, Don gave Betty the cup in a gift-wrapped package, saying: "Here. This is yours." When Betty opened it, he explained the engraving problem. After admiring the cup, she handed it back to Don so he could find somebody to do the engraving work for her. Under these facts:

a. There has been a revocable gift "in contemplation of marriage," which was revoked by the fact that Don took back the cup.

b. No completed gift ever occurred because the donor still has possession of the subject matter of the gift.

c. The donor has become the bailee of the donee.

d. The most reasonable interpretation is that there has been, in the eyes of the law, either a non-acceptance of the gift or a re-gift by the donee back to the donor.

26. Reanswer the previous question.

27. Later on that year, Don and Betty got married and received many presents. Two weeks after they got married, Don took some his savings and went out alone and bought some furniture for their new apartment. Under the most sensible factual analysis, using the common law legal approach:

a. The wedding presents belong to whomever the donors intended them to belong to.

b. The furniture belongs to Don and Betty jointly.

c. Both of the above.

d. The wedding presents all belong exclusively to Betty, whatever the donors may have had in mind, and the furniture belongs to Don alone.

28. Reanswer the previous question.

29. Griffith runs a salvage lumber business that specializes in selling weathered planks from old barns to people who use them to create the chic "old barn" look in new construction. Without permission, Griffith hauled away most of the material from an old tumbledown barn on Fallowacre, which was and is owned by Bithwell. However, neither then nor since has Bithwell been in actual possession of Fallowacre. Should Bithwell be able to recover damages from Griffith in trespass?

a. Yes. It was never necessary for an owner to be in possession in order to maintain an action in trespass.

b. Yes. It is no longer necessary for an owner to be in possession in order to maintain an action in trespass.

c. Yes. Although possession has always been necessary in order to maintain an action in trespass, it is now enough to show that the owner had constructive possession.

d. No.

30. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Gordon-Joan questions

Preparing to go on a very dangerous journey, and motivated by thoughts of his possible demise, Gordon handed Joan the sole key to a certain safe deposit box, saying: "I want you to have the General Motors bonds in the box if anything happens to me." Gordon explained that the box was located in a city 250 miles away, and that he did not have time to retrieve the bonds himself before his journey. Gordon did not return alive. The bonds are still in the box, untouched by Joan:

31. Under these facts:

a. Joan would probably be considered to be the owner of the bonds.

b. The delivery of the key would probably be deemed an effective constructive delivery of the General Motors bonds in the box.

c. Both of the above.

d. The gift would probably be considered to have failed because the delivery was not completed during the donor's lifetime.

32. Reanswer the previous question.

33. Suppose Gordon had said, instead: "I want our daughter Lara to have the General Motors bonds in the box if anything happens to me."

a. Joan is clearly acting solely as "agent" for Gordon, so that the gift could not be considered complete unless the Joan delivered the bonds or, at least, the key to Lara before Gordon's death.

b. Joan is clearly acting solely as "agent" for Lara, so that the gift could be considered complete even if Joan delivered neither the bonds nor the key to Lara before Gordon's death.

c. Neither of the above answers is really fully satisfactory because, this being (presumptively) a gift causa mortis, Joan was in a real sense acting as "agent" for both Gordon and Lara until the question of Gordon's survival was resolved.

d. None of the above.

34. Reanswer the previous question.

35. Popper walked over to a friend's house, about a 1/2 hour away. While Popper and his friend were chatting, it began to rain very hard. Popper had neither an umbrella nor money for a taxi, and his friend said: "Here, I'll lend you this umbrella and I'll also lend you $5 for a taxi." Assuming that the friend did not in fact intend to make a gift, the most reasonable interpretation is that:

a. There was a bailment of the umbrella but not a bailment of the $5.

b. There was a bailment of the $5 but not a bailment of the umbrella.

c. There was a bailment of both the umbrella and the $5.

d. There was a bailment of neither the umbrella nor the $5.

36. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Forrest's fence questions

Forrest bought a house with a yard enclosed by a waist-high fence. Every year, Forrest planted a garden along the fence. Some years after Forrest moved in, his neighbor decided to sell and, in connection with the sale, a survey was done of the neighbor's property. The survey showed the record boundary between the two properties, and it turned out that the fence had been erected 2 feet on the neighbor's side of the line. Forrest agreed that the neighbor could move

the fence to the record boundary line, as indicated by the survey, and it was moved. Now, three years later, Forrest would like to move the fence back to its earlier location.

37. Assume that Forrest had occupied his property and the boundary strip for eight years before the survey was done and fence was moved:

a. Forrest would be, even without more facts, clearly entitled to resume possession of the land that he would take by moving the fence back to its earlier location.

b. It would strengthen Forrest's case for moving the fence back to its earlier location if the person who sold to Forrest had maintained the fence at the earlier location for three years before selling.

c. Forrest should not be able to move the fence to its earlier location because, in allowing the fence to be moved the first time, he effectively abandoned the ripened title that he had acquired by adverse possession.

d. Forrest should not be able to move the fence to its earlier location because, in allowing the fence to be moved the first time, he reconveyed to his neighbor whatever rights he may have acquired by adverse possession.

38. Reanswer the previous question.

39. Assume that Forrest had occupied his property and the boundary strip for 11 years before the survey was done and fence was moved, but that he did so in the honest but mistaken belief that he actually owned the boundary strip.

a. The fact that Forrest carried on his "adverse" possession due to an honest mistake of fact would be enough, in some states, to prevent Forrest from acquiring a ripened title by adverse possession.

b. The fact that Forrest carried on his "adverse" possession due to an honest mistake of fact would not, in some states, the prevent Forrest from acquiring a ripened title by adverse possession.

c. Both of the above.

d. The fact that Forrest carried on his "adverse" possession due to an honest mistake of fact would not matter because, once the period of limitations time has run out, the possessor's previous state of mind becomes irrelevant.

e. None of the above.

40. Reanswer the previous question.

41. In order to acquire title to the boundary strip by adverse possession, Forrest would have to show that his possession met the applicable requirements. If he does not have a deed purporting to give him title to the strip, then his possession must be (pick the one that does not apply):

a. Open and notorious.

b. Exclusive.

c. Continuous.

d. Actual.

e. Under color of title.

42. Reanswer the previous question.

43. Assume that in 1996 Forrest acquired title to the boundary strip by adverse possession. If the period of limitations on trespass is 3 years:

a. His neighbor should be able to recover damages for trespass for at least the more recent years of Forrest's adverse occupancy.

b. Forrest's trespassory acts contributing to the acquisition of title by adverse possession should be considered retroactively privileged.

c. Forrest should be able to recover damages to his garden done by the trespassory acts of Tonkas during 1995.

d. Both b. and c. above.

44. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Ebert and the excavator questions

Ebert paid $300,000 to buy Greenacre, took possession and received a deed to the land from Dunn. Seven years later, while Ebert was out of town on business, an excavating company stripped off all of the top soil from Greenacre, leaving a surface of gravelly clay. The effect is a permanent injury to Greenacre, reducing its value by $120,000. Ebert has sued the excavator for $120,000.

45. Suppose that the excavator's defense is that Dunn had no right to sell Greenacre to Ebert because Dunn claimed title under a defective deed. If Dunn indeed had no title to convey to Ebert, then in some states:

a. Ebert would not be able to recover from the excavator in trespass at all because Ebert is not the owner of Greenacre.

b. Ebert would not be able to recover the full $120,000 from the excavator because Ebert is not the owner of Greenacre.

c. Both of the above.

d. The wrongdoer would be entitled to assert a jus tertii, which would allow a recovery of full damages by Ebert.

46. Reanswer the previous question.

47. Suppose that Dunn had an ownership interest in Greenacre, but that it was only a life estate under a conveyance "to Dunn for life, remainder to Freddie Fuchure and his heirs." Fuchure did not join in the conveyance to Ebert. In states that apply the Winkfield principle to land:

a. The excavator could be held liable for the full $120,000 in a trespass action by Ebert.

b. Ebert would have received a fee simple from Dunn, but he may owe some money to Fuchure.

c. Ebert would have received at most a life estate from Dunn, and Ebert's estate would therefore come to an end at Ebert's death.

d. Fuchure can at any time bring ejectment against Ebert and recover possession of the land.

48. Reanswer the previous question.

49. Assuming that Ebert only received a life estate in Greenacre and that the remainder interest is held by Freddie Fuchure:

a. The amount of loss sustained by Fuchure as a result of the excavator's tort is properly valued at $120,000.

b. The amount of loss sustained by Ebert as a result of the excavator's tort is properly valued at $120,000.

c. The amount of loss sustained by Fuchure as a result of the excavator's tort is properly valued as the present discounted value of $120,000 payable at the projected end of the life estate.

d. The amount of loss sustained by Ebert as a result of the excavator's tort is properly valued as the present discounted value of $120,000 payable at the projected end of the life estate.

50. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Tenant-Landlord questions

Landlord leased Blackacre to Tenant. Later, Tenant moved to a new city in connection with his employment, and he transferred Blackacre to X.

51. Tenant would now be the landlord of X if:

a. The transfer was a assignment.

b. The transfer was a sublease.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

52. Reanswer the previous question.

53. Tenant would normally remain liable to Landlord for the rent that he agreed to pay and which comes due after the date of the transfer to X if:

a. The transfer was a sublease.

b. The transfer was a assignment.

c. Landlord consented to the transfer of the premises.

d. All of the above.

54. Reanswer the previous question.

55. Once Tenant transferred Blackacre to X, Tenant would not be liable to Landlord for the rent that he agreed to pay and which comes due after the transfer if:

a. Tenant transferred the right to possess for the entire remaining duration of the lease, and the lease did not contain any contractual promise by Tenant to pay rent.

b. Tenant transferred the right to possess for less than the entire remaining duration of the lease, and the lease did not contain any contractual promise by Tenant to pay rent.

c. X became the tenant of Landlord in Tenant's place.

d. None of the above.

56. Reanswer the previous question.

57. At common law, the amount of notice that is required in order to terminate:

a. A term of years is one month's notice.

b. A periodic tenancy is one period's notice (with the exception of the tenancy from year to year).

c. A tenancy at will is 30 days' notice.

4. All of the above.

58. Reanswer the previous question.

59. Kimberly found a diamond ring at the bottom of the swimming pool at the home of her friend, Darlene. Nobody seems to know who the true owner of the ring is. Under the so-called English rule applicable to finders:

a. Neither Kimberly nor Darlene is entitled to possess the ring if neither is the owner.

b. Darlene, as the owner of the locus in quo, should have the better claim to possess the ring even if Kimberly was not trespassing at the time she found it.

c. Kimberly, as finder, should have the better claim to possess the ring unless she was trespassing at the time she found it.

d. Darlene would be considered to be the owner of the ring since the owner of the locus in quo is considered to own whatever is on her property.

60. Reanswer the previous question.

61. Assume again that Kimberly found a diamond ring at the bottom of the swimming pool at Darlene's home and that nobody knows who the true owner is. Under the so-called American rule applicable to finders:

a. Kimberly, as finder, should have the better claim to possess the ring unless she was trespassing at the time she found it.

b. Darlene, as the owner of the locus in quo, should have the better claim to possess the ring even if Kimberly was not trespassing at the time she found it.

c. Kimberly, as finder, should have the better claim to possess the ring whether or not she was trespassing at the time she found the ring.

d. Darlene would be considered to be the owner of the ring since the owner of the locus in quo is considered to own whatever is on her property.

62. Reanswer the previous question.

63. Kimberly found a portable electronic game stuffed in the seat pocket in front of her shortly after boarding an airliner for a holiday trip. In jurisdictions that apply the distinction between lost and mislaid property, it should be expected that:

a. The airline would probably have the preferred claim to hold possession of the game.

b. Kimberly would probably have the preferred claim to hold possession of the game.

c. Neither Kimberly nor the airline would enjoy any particular preference over the other in claiming a right to possess the game.

d. None of the above.

64. Reanswer the previous question.

65. Tolly bought a table for $3 at a garage sale. While checking out a wobble after he got the table home, Tolly found five $100 bills stuffed in a small gap between one of the legs and the table top. The bills had been stuffed in the gap by the husband of the seller of the table, who had forgotten he had put them there.

a. Tolly is entitled to keep the $100 bills because he is the finder.

b. Tolly is entitled to keep the $100 bills because he is the owner of the locus in quo where they were found.

c. Both of the above.

d. If Tolly does not report the find to the seller of the table, and offer to return the $500, he would probably be guilty of larceny.

66. Reanswer the previous question.

67. Tolly took his newly acquired table to Urban Varnish Inc. to have it refinished. While it was at Urban, a fire broke out there, destroying everything on the premises, including Tolly's table.

a. Urban could be liable for the loss purely because it was bailee of the table and bailees are responsible for any losses that occur.

b. In an action by Tolly against Urban for the value of the table, there would be a rebuttable presumption that Urban was negligent.

c. Urban could not be held liable for the value of the table if Urban was under a mistaken impression as to its actual value.

d. All of the above.

68. Reanswer the previous question.

69. Ferrel found some orphaned baby rabbits in a field that he owns near his home. He took them home and raised them. When they were fully grown he set them loose again in the same field. Now one of the rabbits has been captured by Ferrel's neighbor, Stew, whose plans for it run along culinary lines:

a. Ferrel should be entitled to the rabbit if it has animus revertendi.

b. Ferrel would have support in case law for recovering possession of the rabbit if it is marked with a distinctive notch that Ferrel put on its ear.

c. Ferrel should be entitled to the rabbit if Stew captured it while he was in Ferrel's field without license or permission.

d. All of the above.

e. None of the above. When Ferrel turned the rabbits loose in their natural habitat they became fair game and there is no way that Ferrel can claim one of them as against a subsequent captor.

70. Reanswer the previous question.

71. O conveyed "to the Rentonville Volunteer Fire Company, but if the land ceases to be used as a site for a firehouse, then to Plimptle and his heirs."

a. The estate that O is apparently attempting to create in the Company is a fee simple on executory limitation.

b. Plimptle has an executory interest.

c. The entire conveyance is valid under the rule against perpetuities.

d. All of the above.

72. Reanswer the previous question.

In answering the following TRUE/FALSE questions, assume (unless otherwise specified) that each conveyance is made by O, an owner in fee simple absolute. Remember that the conveyances are to be interpreted as set forth in the last two paragraphs on the instruction page. Assume that all life estates end at the death of the named life tenant.

73. If O conveys "to A for life," O would have a reversion.

74. O conveyed "to A for life, remainder to B and his heirs." B then died before A. The land will revert to O upon A's death.

75. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A." B would have a contingent remainder.

76. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A by more than six months." B would have a contingent remainder.

77. O conveys "to A and his heirs." A's heirs would have a remainder.

78. If O conveys "to A for life, then one day after A dies to B and her heirs," B would have an executory interest.

79. If O conveys "to A for 5 years, then to B and her heirs," B would have a remainder.

80. If O conveys "to A for 5 years, then to B and her heirs if B marries C," B would have an executory interest (if B has not yet married C).

81. If O conveys "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C," B would have a contingent remainder (if B has not yet married C).

82. At a time when Lee had one child, O conveyed "to Lee for life and then to Lee's first child to reach age 25, and his heirs." The conveyance is valid under the rule against perpetuities.

83. At a time when Lee had one child, O conveyed "to Lee for life and then to Lee's first child to reach age 18, and his heirs." The conveyance is valid under the rule against perpetuities.

84. If O conveys "to A for 5 years, then to B and her heirs if B outlives C," B would have a contingent remainder (both B and C are still alive).

85. If, during B's lifetime, O conveys "to A for life, then to B's heirs," the result would be a vested remainder in B's heirs.

86. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and his heirs if B is still living in Springfield 5 years after the death of A." B would have a springing interest.

87. If O conveys "to A for life, then to B for life," B would have a remainder.

88. O conveyed "to A for two years, then to B and her heirs." O would be construed to be the landlord of A in order to make B's interest valid.

89. A conveyance "to A for life, then to B's first child born after the death of A, and his or her heirs" would create an executory interest of the springing kind.

90. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C." If B is still unmarried when A dies, B's remainder would be destroyed at A's death.

91. If O conveys "to A and his heirs so long as the land is used for educational purposes," O would probably have a possibility of reverter.

92. O conveyed "to the Rentonville Volunteer Fire Company, but if the land ceases to be used as a site for a firehouse during the lifetime of any present member of the Company, then to Plimptle and his heirs." The future interest is invalid under the rule against perpetuities.

93. O conveyed "to A and his heirs, but if A dies without any children surviving him, then to B and his heirs." B has a shifting interest.

94. O conveyed "to A for life, remainder to A's heirs." Under the Rule in Shelley's Case, this conveyance would create a contingent remainder in A's heirs.

95. If O conveyed a fee simple on special limitation to A, O would have a right of re-entry.

<End of examination>