1. While scavenging along a freeway, Goodlife found a diamond ring. The true owner is unknown. Goodlife took the ring to a jeweller to have it cleaned. The jeweller now refuses to return the ring to Goodlife. Goodlife wants to sue to recover the ring from the jeweller:

a. Goodlife should sue in trover.

b. Goodlife can only succeed in recovering the ring by asserting a jus tertii under which he does not claim.

c. The court should refuse to allow the jeweller to defend by asserting a jus tertii under which he does not claim.

d. Goodlife should not be able to recover the ring from the jeweller because Goodlife has no more right to the ring than the jeweller does.

2. Reanswer the previous question.

3. Evans, a person in good health and not expecting to incur any unusual risks, had a collection of 47 rare LP records. He wanted to give these LPs to his nephew, Jim, who was 2000 miles away. However, neither Evans nor Jim is in a position to travel and the two cannot meet face to face:

a. Evans can meet the delivery requirement for a legal gift by declaring himself to be trustee of the LPs for the benefit of Jim.

b. Evans can make an effective gift of equitable title by declaring himself to be trustee of the LPs for the benefit of Jim.

c. The delivery requirement for a legal gift would be waived in a case such as this.

d. All of the above.

4. Reanswer the previous question.

5. Suppose Evans said to Terry, who was visiting with him, "Here are some LPs that I want to give to Jim. Please see that he gets them." Terry accepted possession of the LPs but, before Terry could take them to Jim, Evans fell out of a tree and was unexpectedly killed.

a. If Terry is deemed to have been acting as Jim's agent, Jim owns the LPs.

b. If Terry is deemed to have been acting as Evans's agent, Jim owns the LPs.

c. Both of above.

d. Terry holds legal title to the LPs in trust for Jim.

6. Reanswer the previous question.

7. Emily lent her co-worker Lucy an umbrella and $10 cash to take a taxi home. As a result there was probably:

a. A bailment of the umbrella and the cash.

b. A bailment of the umbrella and a transfer of title to the cash.

c. A transfer of title to both the umbrella and the cash.

d. A bailment of the cash and a transfer of title to the umbrella.

8. Reanswer the previous question.

9. Davey found a wallet on the floor of a supermarket in a "public or semi-public place." As finder, Davey would probably have a claim to the wallet that is:

a. Good against supermarket owner.

b. Good against the whole world.

c. Enforceable by Davey even if he was trespassing at the time he made the find.

d. None of the above. Davey would probably have no valid claim to the wallet.

10. Reanswer the previous question.

11. Last year, Carrie lent a wooden rocking chair to Ed. Later, without being asked, Ed put in several hours sanding and stripping the chair and then he brushed on $5 worth of his own varnish. The chair remains of little value, however. Carrie now demands the chair from Ed.

a. Carrie has no right to reclaim possession of the chair from Ed because Ed has incorporated his own personal labor into it.

b. Carrie has no right to reclaim possession of the chair from Ed because Ed has incorporated his varnish into it.

c. Both of above.

d. Carrie should be able to recover possession of the chair in a replevin action.

12. Reanswer the previous question.

13. Pelwell lent a rare old violin to Boe, who later took it to a shop for routine repairs. The shop owner cracked the neck of the violin and, embarrassed, refused to return it. Boe sued and the shop owner paid a jury verdict against him as full damages for the value of the violin. If Pelwell now claims the violin from the shop owner:

a. The shop owner should be entitled to retain the violin because he has paid full damages to the bailee.

b. The shop owner should be entitled to retain the violin because, by paying the jury award, he is in the same position as a bona fide purchaser for value, who cuts off prior equities.

c. The shop owner should be entitled to retain the violin only if he has already held the violin for a period specified by the statute of limitations on actions to recover possession.

d. The shop owner should not be entitled to retain the violin.

14. Reanswer the previous question.

15. Delacorte decided to give a solid gold bracelet as a present to Patricia. He handed the bracelet to Patricia and she tried it on, but the clasp was defective and did not stay closed. Delacorte said: "Let me take it back to the jeweller and have it fixed. But this bracelet is yours." Patricia returned the bracelet to Delacorte.

a. There is no way that the delivery requirement could be found to have been met on these facts.

b. It appears that the donor has become the donee of the bailee.

c. It appears that the donor has become the bailee of the donee.

d. In law, Delacorte has become the trustee of the bracelet.

e. The gift is, in effect, in suspension until Delacorte redelivers the bracelet to Patricia.

16. Reanswer the previous question.

17. Hammond Deggs decided to give an engagement ring to Marcy. For the occasion he took her out to La Jambe de Grenouille, a very fancy restaurant. Secretly, Hammond delivered the ring to the waiter with instructions that it be brought to Marcy perched on top of a chocolate mousse dessert. The real value of the ring greatly exceeded its apparent value. Before the waiter could bring the ring to Marcy, he somehow lost it.

a. The waiter could be liable for, at most, the apparent value of the ring.

b. In an action by Deggs to recover for the loss of the ring, negligence on the part of the waiter would be presumed.

c. In an action by Deggs to recover for the loss of the ring, negligence on the part of the waiter would be irrebuttably presumed.

d. The waiter could be liable for the loss of the ring only if he misdelivered it.

e. There can be no liability in this case because the bailment was gratuitous.

18. Reanswer the previous question.

19. During his 1991 visit to Aunt Elizabeth, Randolph made an admiring comment about her album of old family photos. Elizabeth said, "You always did like that album, ever since you were a little boy. After I'm gone, I want you to have it. Don't let anybody else take it. I want it to be for you." The album remained in Aunt Elizabeth's possession for six more years, until she passed away.

a. Randolph should be entitled to the album based on the described statements, assuming they can be proved.

b. If a typed note is found in the album stating that Randolph should get the album, then Randolph should be entitled to the album.

c. If, during Randolph's 1991 visit, Aunt Elizabeth handed Randolph a note, signed by her, saying: "I hereby give you my album of family photos, but I keep possession of it until my death," then Randolph should be entitled to possess the album after her death.

d. Aunt Elizabeth's attempted gift of the album could succeed only if she delivered the album itself to Randolph during her lifetime.

20. Reanswer the previous question.

21. Suppose that Randolph later visited Aunt Elizabeth at a time when she was very ill and believed she was on her deathbed. He picked up an old tea tray that was lying on a table across the room from where Aunt Elizabeth lay, and she said: "I want you to have that tea tray. It's yours." Randolph took the tea tray with him when he left later that same afternoon. Aunt Elizabeth regained her full health shortly thereafter.

a. The attempted gift probably was not complete because there is nothing in these facts to indicate that there was a delivery.

b. The attempted gift probably was not complete because there is nothing in these facts to indicate that there was donative intent (as opposed to testamentary intent).

c. Aunt Elizabeth would probably have the right to get the tea tray back now that she has regained her full health.

d. All of the above.

22. Reanswer the previous question.

23. Suppose that when Aunt Elizabeth was actually on her deathbed, she told Randolph: "I want you to have that green vase. It's yours," and Randolph took the vase away. Assume also that, after Aunt Elizabeth's death a few days later, it was discovered that she had made a will specifically bequeathing the very same green vase to Shirley. The vase should be held to belong to Shirley if:

a. The will had been made before the (attempted) gift of the vase to Randolph.

b. The will had been made after the (attempted) gift of the vase to Randolph.

c. The will had been made before or after the (attempted) gift of the vase to Randolph.

d. None of the above. Will or no will, Randolph should be entitled to the vase.

24. Reanswer the previous question.

25. For many years Liddelton has not objected when people from the surrounding rural neighborhood come onto his land and fish from a stream that runs through it. Recently, however, he has discovered that one of his neighbors, DuCran, has been maintaining a trap line to catch fur-bearing animals along the stream. In an action by Liddelton against DuCran to recover the value of the furs obtained from animals caught on Liddelton's land:

a. Liddelton should be able to recover on the ground that he is the owner of the wild animals located on his land.

b. Liddelton should be able to recover on the ground that a trespasser should not profit from his own trespass.

c. Liddelton should have no chance of recovering anything since it was his past practice not to object when people came on his land to fish.

d. Liddelton should have no chance of recovering anything since, under the common law rule of "occupancy," wild animals are held to be the property of the person who captures them.

26. Reanswer the previous question.

27. Barker raises and trains red foxes to perform in TV commercials. His foxes all bear ear brands showing they belong to Barker. A few weeks ago, several of Barker's foxes chewed through their cage grills and got away. Later on, a hiker found one of them, still alive, in one of DuCran's traps--this one located with permission on land belonging to Anton. Similar foxes occur naturally in the vicinity.

a. Barker should be entitled to the fox if it has a habit of returning, or animus revertendi.

b. There is no reasonable argument under which Barker would be entitled to the fox since it had regained its natural liberty before getting caught in DuCran's trap.

c. Anton should be entitled to the fox since it was caught on his land.

d. The hiker should be entitled to the fox since it was the hiker who found it.

28. Reanswer the previous question.

29. Rachel lent her car to her sister, Elaine, so that she could drive to her college reunion, 350 miles away. On the way, Elaine was involved in an accident caused by the sole negligence of Sims. There was $4000 damage to Rachel's car:

a. Sims is liable to Rachel for the $4000 damage to her car.

b. Sims can be held liable to either Rachel or Elaine for the $4000 damage to Rachel's car.

c. Both of the above.

d. Elaine is liable to Rachel for the $4000 damage to her car.

e. All of the above.

30. Reanswer the previous question.

31. Earlier this year the Kellertons bought a 150 year old house with the intention of fixing it up. Several months after moving in, they engaged a contractor to replace the kitchen floor. While taking up some old floor boards, the contractor discovered a small hidden box that turned out to contain 25 gold coins from the Civil War era.

a. In states that apply the so-called English rule (generally preferring the one who had the locus in quo), the contractor would have a better claim than the Kellertons to the coins.

b. In states that apply the so-called English rule (generally preferring the one who had the locus in quo), the Kellertons would have a better claim than the contractor to the coins.

c. In states that apply the distinction between lost and mislaid property, neither the contractor nor the Kellertons would have an enforceable claim to the coins.

d. The Kellertons should be entitled to the coins because, as owners of the house, they would be deemed the true owners of the coins.

32. Reanswer the previous question.

33. Assume again that the Kellertons engaged a contractor to replace their kitchen floor and that, while taking up some old floor boards, the contractor discovered a small hidden box containing Civil War gold coins. Haddem Ferst, the previous owner of the house, has now demanded possession of the coins. Ferst lived in the house until the Kellertons bought it earlier this year:

a. Ferst has no reasonable legal basis to claim the coins unless he can show he was the true owner of them.

b. Ferst has no reasonable legal basis to claim the coins unless he can show that he at least knew of their presence at the time he lived in the house.

c. Ferst has no reasonable legal basis to claim the coins unless the coins could be considered to have become a part of the house, analogously to buried things becoming a part of the soil.

d. Ferst has a reasonably good legal basis for claiming the coins if the jurisdiction follows the rule that would prefer the Kellertons' claim over that of the contractor who found them.

34. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Lunkin-Della questions

Lunkin leased an apartment to Della for a term of 4 years. After possessing the demised premises for one year, Della was transferred by her employer to another city.

35. Assume that Della simply moves out of the apartment, in breach of the lease:

a. Della would have no further obligation to Lunkin under the common law rule.

b. Lunkin would be required to take reasonable steps to mitigate his damages under the common law rule.

c. Lunkin would be entitled to let the apartment remain vacant and make Della pay the full rent as it accrues for the rest of the lease term under the common law rule.

d. Della would still be liable to Lunkin for rent but she would be able to terminate this liability as of the end of any month by giving Lunkin one month's notice of her intention to do so.

36. Reanswer the previous question.

37. Assume that Della finds a co-worker, Janeway, who is willing to take over the apartment and Della signs a document called a "sublease" transferring the apartment to Janeway for the entire remaining term of the lease. Once Janeway takes possession and moves in:

a. Janeway would be the assignee of Della and the tenant of Lunkin.

b. Janeway would be the subtenant of Della.

c. Janeway would be the subtenant of Lunkin.

d. Della would have no further obligation to Lunkin under the lease.

38. Reanswer the previous question.

39. Assume again that Della found a co-worker, Janeway, who was willing to take over the apartment. Della made an assignment of her lease to Janeway, who "assumed" the lease. Janeway took possession and moved in. Later, however, he was also transferred to a new city by the boss, and he simply abandoned the apartment, without lawful cause, and ceased paying rent.

a. Janeway would continue to be liable to pay rent.

b. If Janeway failed to make a rent payment that came due, Lunkin would be entitled to recover the amount from Della.

c. Both of the above.

d. Lunkin would have no legal recourse against either Janeway or Della.

40. Reanswer the previous question.

41. Florence was about to undergo a dangerous operation. In the presence of witnesses, she handed an antique quilt to her granddaughter and said: "I've always wanted this to be yours after I'm gone." Florence did not die during the actual operation itself but a few days later, before she could really recuperate, she succumbed to complications. Under the better rule:

a. The gift is presumptively revocable.

b. The gift was probably revoked by the fact that the donor survived the actual operation.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. There is no basis on these facts for supposing that the gift was revocable.

42. Reanswer the previous question.

43. Alice parked her car in a parking garage that had valet parking. An attendant employed by the garage owner took the car at the entrance and drove it to the interior of the garage. Another attendant retrieved it again when Alice returned. After Alice picked up the car, she claimed that $100 of emergency money that she had hidden under the seat was now missing. Pick the best answer.

a. The garage owner was not a bailee of the car or the money.

b. The garage owner was a bailee of the car but not the money.

c. The garage owner was a bailee of both the car and the money but should not be held liable for loss of the latter (assuming ordinary care in safeguarding the car).

d. The garage owner was a bailee of the car and the money and should be held liable for the loss of the latter.

44. Reanswer the previous question.

45. Fred owned a car and allowed Sandy to use it. Needing some money to pay off a gambling debt, Sandy sold the car to Alan, a bona fide purchaser for value. Sandy fraudulently used a forged power of attorney that purported to authorize him to sign the title papers. Sandy would be guilty of common-law larceny in selling the car:

a. If he had borrowed the car from Fred.

b. If he had use of the car as Fred's employee, solely for purposes related to the course of his employment by Fred.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

46. Reanswer the previous question.

Facts for Garland-Portice questions

Garland leased an apartment to Portice at a rental of $1200 per month "for a term of three years as long as tenant complies with [certain specified tenant obligations spelled out in the lease]."

47. The forfeiture provision in the lease would best be described as:

a. A conditional limitation.

b. A condition subsequent.

c. A right of re-entry.

d. Unenforceable on its face.

48. Reanswer the previous question.

49. Once Portice takes possession of the premises:

a. Garland must give Portice reasonable advance notice if he wants to terminate the lease at the end of the term.

b. The lease will come to an end automatically if Portice breaches one of the specified tenant obligations referred to in the forfeiture provision.

c. The lease may come to an end if Portice breaches one of the specified tenant obligations referred to in the forfeiture provision, but only if Garland elects to terminate Portice's estate.

d. Garland may apparently terminate this lease as of the end of any month by giving Portice one month's notice of his intention to do so.

50. Reanswer the previous question.

51. If Portice takes possession and does not leave the premises at the end of the lease term:

a. Garland may hold Portice for a "new term" under the common law rule.

b. Portice would be considered a tenant at sufferance under the common law rule.

c. Portice would be subject to eviction under the common law rule.

d. All of the above.

52. Reanswer the previous question.

53. If Portice takes possession and Garland fails to comply with the landlord's contractual obligations under the lease with respect to maintaining the premises, then under the traditional common law rule:

a. Portice could retain possession and withhold rent.

b. Portice could lawfully abandon possession and claim a constructive eviction if Garland's breaches have caused the premises to become untenantable.

c. Portice would have rights under the "implied warranty of habitability."

d. Portice would have no rights to either damages or an injunction against Garland.

54. Reanswer the previous question.

55. Last February, Parker demised Brownacre to Hinton from month to month and Hinton has been paying rent monthly ever since. Each monthly period ends on the 28th of the month. The earliest date (from today) on which Hinton can lawfully terminate the tenancy is:

a. December 28, 1997.

b. January 8, 1998.

c. January 28, 1998.

d. January 31, 1998.

56. Reanswer the previous question.

57. Palko conveyed Blackacre "to Arnold for life, then to Arnold's first child to reach the age of 18, and his or her heirs." At the time of the conveyance, Arnold had one child, Cassandra, age 3. The rule of the destructibility of contingent remainders does not apply in the state. By the terms of this conveyance:

a. The future interest must vest, if at all, during the lifetime of Arnold.

b. The future interest must vest, if at all, during the lifetime of Arnold or, at latest, within 18 years of his death.

c. The future interest must vest, if at all, during the lifetime of Cassandra.

d. The future interest is void under the rule against perpetuities.

58. Reanswer the previous question.

59. Palko conveyed Greenacre "to Arnold for life, then to Arnold's eldest child to survive him, and his or her heirs." At the time of the conveyance, Arnold had one child, Cassandra.

a. Cassandra can serve as the "life in being" that makes the future interest valid.

b. Arnold can serve as the "life in being" that makes the future interest valid.

c. Both of the above.

d. The future interest is void under the rule against perpetuities.

60. Reanswer the previous question.

61. Tonnerre conveyed Seedacre "to the Slimberg Children's Home, Inc., its successors and assigns, so long as the land is used for an orphanage." Based on the language of conveyance:

a. The children's home has received a fee simple determinable.

b. The children's home has received a fee simple on condition subsequent.

c. The children's home has received a fee simple on executory limitation.

d. The future interest is void under the rule against perpetuities.

62. Reanswer the previous question.

63. Tonnerre conveyed Weedacre "to the Slimberg Volunteer Fire Company, its successors and assigns, so long as the land is used for as a site for a fire house, then to Cranwell and his heirs." Based on the language of conveyance:

a. The fire company has a fee simple determinable.

b. The fire company has a fee simple on condition subsequent.

c. The fire company has a fee simple on executory limitation.

d. The future interest is void under the rule against perpetuities.

64. Reanswer the previous question.

65. Suppose Cordor conveyed Whiteacre "to Jitney for 10 years, then to Splending and his heirs."

a. Jitney would hold the seisin in Whiteacre during the 10 years.

b. The interest purportedly conveyed to Splending would, prior to the Statute of Uses, violate the rule against springing interests.

c. Splending's interest would be a contingent remainder in fee simple absolute.

d. The interest received by Jitney would be a non-freehold estate.

66. Reanswer the previous question.

67. Suppose Cordor conveyed Whiteacre "to Jitney for life, then to Splending and his heirs."

a. Unless Splending lives longer than Jitney, he will never be able to enjoy his interest and, therefore, Splending's interest is a contingent remainder.

b. Cordor retains a reversion, in case Splending predeceases Jitney.

c. Both of the above.

d. Splending's interest is a remainder in fee simple absolute.

68. Reanswer the previous question.

69. Lincoln demised Blueacre "to Thompson for 3 years." Thompson immediately entered into possession. The local Statute of Frauds applies to leases "for more than one year." Right after Thompson entered possession:

a. He became, in effect, an adverse possessor holding without a lease.

b. He became a tenant holding for an enforceable term of one year.

c. The three year lease became valid and enforceable according to its terms.

d. He became a tenant, but not a tenant for a term of years.

70. Reanswer the previous question.

71. Fifteen years ago Walter bought a piece of rural land whose boundaries were supposedly marked by certain piles of rocks. Due to a transcription error, the deed under which he took title also purported to convey a substantial chunk of the tract next door (that chunk being called "Parcel B"). Walter's vendor did not, however, own or have any power to convey Parcel B. Right after buying, Walter entered into exclusive possession of his new acquisition, based on the piles of rocks, and has held openly and continuous possessed ever since.

a. Walter might have acquired a ripened title to "Parcel B" even if he never actually possessed any part of "Parcel B" and his possession was confined entirely within the boundaries of the land he actually owned.

b. Walter may well have acquired a ripened title to all of "Parcel B" provided he had actual possession of at least part of "Parcel B."

c. Walter might have acquired a ripened title to portions of "Parcel B" but he could only have acquired such a title to those portions that he actually possessed for the requisite period of time.

d. None of the above. There is no way that Walter might have acquired a ripened title to any part of the "Parcel B" land.

72. Reanswer the previous question.

73. Denton erroneously placed a boundary fence 3 feet onto his neighbor's side of the property line running between their two lots. For 12 years the fence has remained in place, with neither party realizing the error. Last week, however, the neighbor just received the results of an accurate survey done in connection with a proposed sale of his house. The neighbor has asked Denton to move the fence.

a. If Denton has possessed the boundary strip pursuant to an honest mistake, that fact (the honest mistake) might effectively prevent him from successfully asserting a claim of ownership to the strip.

b. Even if Denton has acquired a ripened title to the strip, he can return full ownership to his neighbor in time for the impending sale by simply moving the fence to the original property line.

c. There is no basis in these facts for Denton to claim a ripened title to the strip since there is no evidence that he ever had a color of title to the strip.

d. Because no boundary fence can ever be exactly located on the property line, courts do not recognize adverse possession claims based on mistakes like the one made by Denton.

74. Reanswer the previous question.

75. A little over eleven years ago, Seffard made a contract to sell Leanacre to Phelps, who entered into open possession right away. Phelps continued in exclusive possession until his death, four months ago. Phelps never, however, made the payments required under the contract, nor did he ever receive a deed. Phelps's sole heir, Junior, is now claiming the land which, since the death of Phelps, has been held by Elton, who simply came along, saw the land vacant and entered into possession:

a. Junior probably has a better claim to the land than Elton.

b. Phelps probably had acquired a ripened title to the land by adverse possession prior to his death.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Junior has no basis to contest Elton's possessory claim to the land.

76. Reanswer the previous question.

77. Killian cut down some trees on a piece of land that had previously been conveyed "to Hancock for life, remainder to Monroe and his heirs." Hancock has sued Killian for the full value of the trees that Killian cut, which were valuable as timber.

a. Applying the Winkfield principle to land, Hancock should only be able to recover for his own interest in the trees, such as the value of "reasonable estovers."

b. As the life tenant, Hancock is the one whose possession was interfered with and, therefore, Hancock is the one who is ultimately entitled to all damages representing the full value of the trees unlawfully cut by Killian.

c. Some cases would allow Hancock to recover the full value of the trees from Killian, but would require that the amount recovered be shared with Monroe, since Monroe effectively lost the present discounted value of his remainder interest in the trees.

d. If neither Hancock nor Monroe was in actual possession of the land at time Killian cut the trees, neither should be entitled to any recovery, since trespass actions can be maintained only by persons in possession.

78. Reanswer the previous question.

79. Suppose that in 1984 a parcel of land had been conveyed to "to Hancock for life, remainder to Monroe and his heirs" and then, in 1985, Killian entered into adverse possession of it. If Hancock died in 1996:

a. Killian's title by adverse possession would have ripened in 1995, and that ripening would have extinguished Monroe's right to sue in ejectment and recover possession after Hancock's death in 1996.

b. Killian's title by adverse possession would have ripened in 1995, but that ripening would not have extinguished Monroe's right to sue in ejectment and recover possession after Hancock's death in 1996.

c. No title by adverse possession could have ripened in Killian in 1995, since Killian was only possessing against a life tenant.

d. From 1985 on, after Killian entered into possession, either Hancock or Monroe had the right to maintain an ejectment action to remove this unlawful intruder from their land.

80. Reanswer the previous question.

In answering the following TRUE/FALSE questions, assume (unless otherwise specified) that each conveyance is made by O, an owner in fee simple absolute, and that every named party is alive and unmarried at the time of the conveyance. Remember that the conveyances are to be interpreted as set forth in the last two paragraphs on the instruction page. Assume that all life estates end at the death of the named life tenant.

81. If O conveys "to A for life," O would have no further interest in the land.

82. O conveyed "to A for life, remainder to B and his heirs." B then died before A. The land will revert to O upon A's death.

83. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A." O would have a reversion.

84. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A." B would have a remainder.

85. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A by more than six months." B would have an executory interest.

86. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives O by more than six months." B would have an executory interest.

87. O conveys "to A and his heirs." A's heirs would receive no interest in the land as purchasers under this conveyance.

88. If O conveys "to A for life, then one day after A dies to B and her heirs," B would have a remainder.

89. If O conveys "to A for 5 years, then to B and her heirs if B marries C," B would have a remainder (if B has not yet married C).

90. If O conveys "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C," B would have a contingent remainder.

91. If O conveys "to A for 5 years, then to B and her heirs if B marries C," B would have an executory interest.

92. If, during B's lifetime, O conveys "to A for life, remainder to B's heirs," the remainder to B's heirs would be a contingent one.

93. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and his heirs if B is still living in Springfield 5 years after the death of A." B would have a springing interest.

94. If O conveys "to A for life, then one day after A dies to B and her heirs," B would have an executory interest.

95. O conveyed "to A for two years, then to B and her heirs." B would be construed to be the landlord of A in order to make B's interest valid (prior to the Statute of Uses).

96. A conveyance "to A for life, then to B's first child born after the death of A, and his or her heirs" would create a contingent remainder.

97. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C." If B is still unmarried when A dies, B's remainder could take effect as an executory interest.

98. If O conveys "to A and his heirs so long as the land is used for educational purposes," O would probably have a possibility of reverter.

99. O conveyed "to A and his heirs, but if A dies without any children surviving him, then to B and his heirs." B has a shifting interest.

100. O conveyed "to A and the heirs of his body." If A then made a ordinary simple grant "to B and his heirs," the common law result would be that A's lineal heirs would still inherit the land at A's death.