PACE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1. Canby carried a large garment bag on to an airplane. He could not get it under the seat in front of him or into the overhead compartment. He asked the cabin attendant if it could be stowed "up front" and she reluctantly agreed. When he got the bag back at the end of the flight he checked for the gold bracelet he'd put in the pocket of a coat in the bag. The bracelet was missing. Under the best interpretation of these facts:

a. This was a gratuitous bailment and the airline is liable only for gross negligence.

b. The airline should not be considered liable for the loss of the bracelet as long as its employees used reasonable care in the bailment.

c. The airline cannot be considered a bailee of the contents of the bag unless its employees knew what those content were.

d. By bailing an object to a reluctant bailee, an owner "assumes the risk" of loss and cannot in justice claim damages from someone who has done him a favor.

2. Reanswer the previous question.

3. Phelps delivered an autographed photo of Clarence Darrow to his cousin, Melrose, saying: "I'm not going to last much longer, Mel. I want you to have this." Phelps did this in apprehension of death from a severe ailment. Melrose took the photo home with him. Later on, without having recovered from the ailment, Phelps made a will in which he made a specific bequest of the very same photo to Admas. Phelps then died. Under the better interpretation of these events:

a. Phelps presumptively made a gift causa mortis of the photo.

b. Phelps should be deemed to have made an effective testamentary gift of the photo.

c. Admas should now be entitled to the photo.

d. All of the above.

4. Reanswer the previous question.

5. Assume again that, in apprehension of death from a severe ailment, Phelps delivered an autographed photo to Melrose, saying "I'm not going to last much longer, Mel. I want you to have this." Melrose took the photo home with him. Phelps later made a complete recovery from the ailment and is now in good health. Applying the usual presumption for such cases:

a. Phelps probably has a right to revoke the gift to Melrose.

b. It is now too late for Phelps to revoke the gift to Melrose, and Melrose is the unconditional owner of the photo.

c. Phelps would be deemed to have made an inter vivos gift to Melrose.

d. The gift to Melrose is probably already revoked because Phelps has recovered from the ailment.

6. Reanswer the previous question.

7. Assume again that, in apprehension of death from a severe ailment, Phelps delivered an autographed photo to Melrose, saying "I'm not going to last much longer, Mel. I want you to have this." Melrose took the photo home with him. Later on, after Phelps made a complete recovery from the ailment, Melrose offered to return the photo. Phelps refused at first but then relented and took the photo saying: "OK, I'll hold on to it till I die, but the photo is yours. I wanted you to have it whether I lived or died."

a. Phelps's last-quoted statement could be taken as evidence that he intended to make an inter vivos gift in the first place.

b. Phelps's last-quoted statement could be interpreted as donative intent to make an inter vivos gift, with the delivery requirement being met by the return of the photo to Phelps.

c. Both of the above.

d. Phelps's last-quoted statement could be taken as evidence that he intended to make a testamentary gift of the photo, to take effect at his death.

8. Reanswer the previous question.

9. When Todd and his fiancee, Janey, got engaged, Todd gave Janey a diamond engagement ring. If the engagement is broken off (using the rule applicable in New York):

a. Todd could probably get back the ring in an ordinary breach of contract action.

b. Todd could probably get the ring back as a gift in contemplation of marriage if either he or Janey breaks off the engagement.

c. Todd probably could not get the ring back because it was obviously an inter vivos gift and, by definition, inter vivos gifts are never revocable.

d. Todd probably could not get the ring back unless Janey were the one to break off the engagement.

10. Reanswer the previous question.

11. Shortly after getting engaged, Todd and Janey were browsing the Web on Todd's computer. Janey commented that her computer still had an old 14.4 bps modem. Todd said, "Man, that's slow. I'm getting a new computer by mail order next week and, when it comes, this one is yours."

a. There is probably no valid gift of the computer because Todd did not express in praesenti donative intent.

b. There is probably no valid gift of the computer because Todd attempted to attach a condition subsequent to the gift.

c. Both of the above.

d. There could not have been a valid gift of the computer unless Janey expressed acceptance.

e. All of the above.

12. Reanswer the previous question.

13. Ferral delivered a typewritten letter to Roggins. It stated: "After I am gone I want you to have the large sculpture, 'Birds as Prey,' that sits in my backyard. I want to keep possession as long as I live, but by this letter I intend to give you the right to possess it after my death." Ferral (and nobody else) signed the letter.

a. If the letter were interpreted as intending a testamentary gift of the sculpture, the gift would be invalid if the letter did not comply with the local statute of wills.

b. The letter can reasonably be interpreted as transferring, at the time it was delivered, a future interest in the sculpture to Roggins.

c. If the letter made an effective gift of a future interest, and Ferral later purports to donate the sculpture to a museum, the possessory rights of the museum would terminate at Ferral's death.

d. All of the above.

14. Reanswer the previous question.

15. Assume again that Ferral wanted Roggins to have the large sculpture, "Birds as Prey," that sat in Ferral's backyard, but that Ferral wanted to keep possession as long as he lived.

a. If Ferral were to provide for Roggins to receive the sculpture as a testamentary gift, he could not later revoke.

b. If Ferral were to make an inter vivos gift of the sculpture, he could later revoke.

c. If Ferral were to make an inter vivos gift, Roggins could receive an immediate legal interest or title in the sculpture, without necessarily receiving immediate possession.

d. If Ferral were to make a testamentary gift of the sculpture, a delivery of the sculpture would be required to make the gift effective.

16. Reanswer the previous question.

17. Suppose that Ferral decided to declare himself trustee of his backyard sculpture for the benefit of Roggins and, in the presence of mutual friends, Ferral made a declaration to that effect. As a result of such a declaration:

a. Ferral would still have the legal title to the sculpture.

b. Roggins would have the equitable title to the sculpture.

c. A delivery would not be required in order to make the gift effective.

d. All of the above.

18. Reanswer the previous question.

19. Cora had some corporate stock certificates in a safe deposit box down at the bank. One day she handed the only key to the box to her niece, Frances, saying: "The stocks in the my safe deposit box are all yours." Before Frances got around to going to the bank to retrieve the stocks, Cora suddenly and unexpectedly passed away:

a. Cora's estate probably is entitled to the stocks.

b. Frances probably is entitled to the stocks.

c. The gift will remain incomplete until Frances retrieves the stocks.

d. The gift in this case is probably not valid because the donor did not express in praesenti donative intent.

20. Reanswer the previous question.

21. Jackson bought some farm acreage. He recently discovered that a local building contractor had been removing planks from an old barn on the property. The planks were valuable for use in new construction because their natural weathered look made them attractive as interior wall surfacing. Although Jackson's land was unoccupied at the time the planks were taken, Jackson wonders if he can recover damages in trespass from the contractor.

a. Only a possessor of land can recover damages in trespass for injury to the land and, therefore, Jackson cannot recover in trespass.

b. An owner of land can recover damages in trespass for injury to the land even without possession of the land and, therefore, Jackson can recover in trespass.

c. Only a possessor of land can recover damages in trespass for injury to the land, but Jackson would have had constructive possession of the land if there was no adverse possessor.

d. Although Jackson owned the land, the contractor would have been deemed to have had constructive possession by virtue of the fact that he entered and removed the planks.

22. Reanswer the previous question.

23. Jackson recently discovered that a man named Trent has chopped down some big trees and placed a trailer, where he lives, on the back side of Jackson's farm. While Jackson's lawyer was in the process of preparing an ejectment action against Trent, he found a flaw in Jackson's chain of title. The deed to one of Jackson's predecessors had not been properly executed and, technically, Jackson does not have a good title to the land. A local statute allows a successful claimant in an ejectment action to recover damages in trespass for mesne profits and for injury to the land.

a. Jackson should not be able to succeed against Trent in an ejectment action.

b. Jackson should not be able to recover damages from Trent even if he succeeds in asserting a purely "possessory title" in an ejectment action.

c. Jackson may not be able to recover "permanent" trespass damages from Trent, but he should be able to succeed in ejectment and recover some damages.

d. Under the almost universally recognized rule, Jackson should be able to recover "permanent" trespass damages from Trent.

24. Reanswer the previous question.

25. Spelman was driving on a highway to a place where he goes hunting. A deer leaped out in front of Spelman's car and was hit. As the mortally wounded deer limped into the woods, Spelman chased after it. A couple a minutes later, shortly after losing sight of the deer, he heard a "bang." He ran in the direction of the sound and found Edgworth kneeling over a just-shot deer, one which bore unmistakable signs of having been hit by a car. Under the common law rules, the best claim to possession of the deer is probably held by:

a. Spelman, assuming his chase could be considered hot pursuit.

b. Edgworth, if he were the one to first take actual physical possession of the deer.

c. Barker, who owned the land where the deer was shot, but who had previously given Spelman and Edgworth permission to hunt on his land at any time.

d. Barker, Spelman and Edgworth would all have to share possession of the deer.

26. Reanswer the previous question.

27. Assume that, a bit later, Edgworth shot another deer while trespassing on land belonging to Bluddread. Edgworth got the deer to his car (with some help) and sold it to Clarix, who then cut it and packed it for freezing. Clarix's work increased the value 2-3 times. After Clarix had prepared the deer meat into steaks, chops, venisonburger, etc. he got a call from Bluddread demanding return of the "stolen meat." Clarix was astonished as he had bought and done the cutting and packing in the good faith belief that the deer had belonged to Edgworth.

a. There is no plausible legal theory on which the meat in question can be considered the property of anybody but Clarix.

b. If Clarix's cutting and packing work has caused a change in kind, Bluddread probably cannot recover the meat from Clarix in replevin.

c. Bluddread probably cannot recover damages in trover from Clarix.

d. Bluddread probably can make Clarix pay trover damages equal to fair market value of the meat as cut and packed by Clarix.

28. Reanswer the previous question.

29. Assume that Edgworth took still another deer to Clarix but, instead of selling it to Clarix, merely left it for cutting and packing in exchange for a fee. While at Clarix's, the meat was ruined because it was not properly refrigerated. Clarix would be liable to Edgworth for the loss:

a. If the refrigeration was left off due to the failure of Clarix to use ordinary care.

b. If Edgworth proved that he left the deer with Clarix and that the meat was spoiled while in Clarix's possession, and Clarix declined to put on any evidence in rebuttal.

c. Both of the above.

d. If Clarix proved that the refrigeration got cut off, despite Clarix's use of ordinary care, because a big storm had knocked out all the electric lines in the vicinity.

e. All of the above.

30. Reanswer the previous question.

31. Assume again that Edgworth took a deer to Clarix for cutting and packing in exchange for a fee. While at Clarix's, Edgworth's meat (along with a lot of Clarix's) was ruined because a drunken driver knocked down the utility lines leading into Clarix's house, cutting off the electricity to his freezer for many hours. Clarix sued the drunken driver for the lost value of all the meat in his possession that was ruined as a result of the driver's tort:

a. Clarix could recover the lost value of the meat belonging himself.

b. Clarix could recover the lost value of the meat belonging Edgworth.

c. Both of the above.

d. Once the driver pays full damages to Clarix, Edgworth will not be able to recover a judgment from the driver for the value of the ruined meat belonging to Edgworth.

e. All of the above.

32. Reanswer the previous question.

33. Ellen found a valuable rare old coin while a guest in the home of another. The true owner of the coin is not known. A technical rationale for preferring the claim of the possessor of the locus in quo over that of Ellen is:

a. The possessor of the locus in quo is the earlier possessor of the object and the general rule on possession is "first in time, first in right."

b. The possessor of the locus in quo is generally deemed to be the owner everything found or located there.

c. A guest would be very rude to claim something found in somebody else's home or business, and the law must take account of important social conventions in formulating its rules of conduct.

d. None of the above. There is no respectable body of authority under which the claim of the possessor of the locus in quo would be preferred over that of Ellen.

34. Reanswer the previous question.

35. Phillip took possession of an apartment in New York (the state of the Jamaica Builders case) under a 3-year written lease. After about 20 months, Phillip put up a partition in the living room and allowed another person to occupy a portion of his apartment. This action seriously violated a number of provisions of Phillip's lease. The landlord wants to get rid of Phillip as soon as possible.

a. The landlord is probably out of luck. Under the usual form of lease, she is probably stuck with Phillip for the remainder of the 3-year term despite the fact that Phillip has committed breaches.

b. The landlord could bring a holdover proceeding if the lease contains a conditional limitation that can be triggered by or in the event of breaches by the tenant.

c. The landlord could bring a holdover proceeding only if Philip's lease is a lease "on condition" rather than a lease "on conditional limitation."

d. The landlord could bring a holdover proceeding as a way of exercising her right of entry.

36. Reanswer the previous question.

37. Kelway received a deed conveying "to Kelway and his heirs as long as no livestock is kept on the premises."

a. This estate will end "automatically" (with no election required) if Kelway begins to keep livestock on the premises.

b. Kelway has a fee simple on special limitation.

c. Kelway's grantor holds a possibility of reverter.

d. All of the above.

38. Reanswer the previous question.

39. Suppose that Kelway received a deed conveying "to Kelway and his heirs as long as no livestock is kept on the premises." The restriction on use contained in this deed:

a. Will continue to apply potentially forever under the common law but may be limited by state statutes that provide for cutting off such restrictions.

b. Will last only as long as the grantor's right of re-entry continues in effect.

c. Would, according the general rule, be interpreted broadly and liberally, resolving any ambiguities or questions of application in favor of limiting the use of the land.

d. All of the above.

40. Reanswer the previous question.

41. Tellins handed some opera tickets to his son, Bill, and said: "These are for Leila. Be sure she gets them before the day of the performance." Leila was Tellins' ex-wife, and Bill's mother. Later, Tellins changed his mind, and asked Bill to bring the tickets back.

a. There could be no delivery under these facts until Bill actually turned the tickets over to Leila.

b. If Bill was acting as agent for Tellins then the gift is already complete and Tellins cannot revoke it.

c. If Bill was acting as agent for Leila then the gift is already complete and Tellins cannot revoke it.

d. No matter who Bill was acting as "agent" for, Tellins can revoke the gift. Donors retain that prerogative whenever gifts are made through intermediaries.

42. Reanswer the previous question.

43. Belmont received a deed that conveyed "to Belmont and the heirs of her body" in a state that still recognizes all of the common-law freehold estates.

a. If Belmont dies intestate her estate in the land would pass to her nearest surviving relatives.

b. If Belmont dies intestate her estate in the land would pass to her lineal heirs only.

c. During Belmont's lifetime she could not make any conveyance whatever of the estate that she received.

d. Belmont has a fee simple determinable.

44. Reanswer the previous question.

45. Grenner owns two separate parcels of land, each worth about $200,000. The government has taken a corner of Parcel A to widen a road, reducing the parcel's value about 10%. In a separate action, the government has prohibited any substantial construction on the other parcel, Parcel B, reducing its value about 70%.

a. Grenner has a good chance of recovering just compensation for the reduction of value of both parcels.

b. Grenner has a good chance of recovering just compensation for the reduction of value of Parcel A, but not Parcel B.

c. Grenner has a good chance of recovering just compensation for the reduction of value of Parcel B, but not Parcel A.

d. Grenner does not have a good chance of recovering any compensation for the reduction of value of either of the two parcels.

46. Reanswer the previous question.

47. While on a concert tour, Bowman needed an emergency repair to his rare old violin. He took it to a music shop. The shop owner's assistant, a high school student, had no way to recognize the specialness of Bowman's instrument, and Bowman did not inform him. The violin had an apparent value of about $250. After Bowman left, the assistant let the instrument remain out on the counter while he answered a phone in the back room. When he came back out, the violin was gone. Although Bowman's violin worth was $250,000, the jury found that the assistant did not use even the care that a reasonable person would have used for an ordinary $250 violin. The shop owner's liability to Bowman should be:

a. Nothing. There was no bailment because Bowman did not reveal the violin's value,

b. Whatever value the assistant thought the violin was worth.

c. $250.

d. $250,000.

48. Reanswer the previous question.

49. Anthony is a collector of fine artwork. Last year he bought two paintings from a reputable art dealer in the city and, in good faith, paid close to $200,000 for them. Last week, the police came to Anthony's house and told him that one the paintings, "Mermaids," had been stolen a few years before he bought it. Anthony had paid $120,000 for "Mermaids."

a. In some states, if the statutorily fixed limitations period on replevin has run, Anthony might be able to keep the painting even though it was stolen.

b. In states that apply the "discovery rule," Anthony might not be able to keep the painting even though the statutorily fixed limitations period on replevin has run.

c. Both of the above.

d. In most states, even if the art dealer had a "void" title to the painting, Anthony would have gotten a good title because he bought in good faith.

50. Reanswer the previous question.

51. When Anthony bought "Mermaids" he also bought another painting, "Bauhaus," from the same dealer, and in good faith he paid nearly $80,000 for it. Last week, an attorney telephoned Anthony and said that his client, Cornelus, demanded the return of "Bauhaus." According to Cornelus, the art dealer had acquired the painting from Cornelus at an unfair price by fraudulently telling Cornelus that the work was a "cheap copy" worth less than $300.

a. Cornelus should be able to recover "Bauhaus" from Anthony in replevin.

b. Cornelus should be able to recover value of "Bauhaus" from Anthony in trover.

c. Both of the above.

d. Anthony should not be liable to Cornelus for money or for the return of "Bauhaus."

52. Reanswer the previous question.

53. Underwood has recently discovered that a man named Trude has set up residence on a remote corner of Underwood's woodland (which is otherwise unoccupied). If Underwood does not take action to remove Trude from the small area that he wrongfully occupies, then:

a. Trude may eventually acquire a ripened title to Underwood's whole woodland even if Trude does not have a deed or any other documentation giving him color of title.

b. Trude may eventually acquire a ripened title to Underwood's whole woodland but only if Trude has a deed or other color of title to the whole woodland.

c. Trude can not eventually acquire a ripened title to any part of Underwood's woodland by merely living there as long as he does not have a deed or other color of title.

d. Trude can not eventually acquire a ripened title to any part of Underwood's woodland unless he confronts Underwood and makes a hostile claim of right to it.

54. Reanswer the previous question.

55. Suppose that during the time of Trude's adverse possession of part of Underwood's woodland:

a. Underwood dies. Trude could still acquire a ripened title 10 years after Trude's original entry into possession.

b. Trude dies. Trude's heir could take over possession and acquire a ripened title 10 years after Trude's original entry into possession.

c. Underwood dies. Trude might not acquire a ripened title until at least 10 years after Underwood's death if Underwood had only a life estate in the land.

d. All of the above.

56. Reanswer the previous question.

57. Suppose that Trude made adverse possessory use of an area of Underwood's woodland for a period of more than 10 years. On the basis of such use Trude could probably make a successful claim to a ripened title by adverse possession even if:

a. Underwood also made frequent use of the very same area, similar to the uses made by Trude.

b. Trude's 10+ years of possession consisted of three separate time spans, one of 5+ years, one of 2 years and one of 3+ years--there being intervals of a couple of years between each time span of possession.

c. Trude merely used the land as an ordinary owner would use land of similar type and similarly situated, living there and maintaining a small area in cultivation for domestic consumption.

d. All of the above.

58. Reanswer the previous question.

59. Suppose that Trude acquired a ripened title to all or part of Underwood's woodland by adverse possession.

a. Trude would be entitled to a deed from Underwood.

b. Trude would be able to return Underwood's ownership to him at any time by simply withdrawing from the land and renouncing all claim to it.

c. Underwood would still be able to recover trespass damages from Trude for the time (within the period of limitations for trespass) that Underwood had still owned the land prior to the ripening of title.

d. Trude would have an ejectment action against Underwood if Underwood resumed possession of a part of the woodland that had, during the whole period of adverse possession, been adversely possessed by Trude.

60. Reanswer the previous question.

61. Seven months ago Anderson entered into possession of an apartment that had been orally leased to him by Gordon for an agreed term of 2 years. Anderson has regularly paid and Gordon has accepted the agreed monthly rent on a timely basis since then. The local Statute of Frauds applies to leases of "more than one year."

a. Anderson probably has a no estate at all under the lease.

b. Anderson's tenancy can probably be terminated by Gordon at the end of any lease month by giving at least one month's advance notice.

c. Anderson's tenancy probably cannot be terminated by Gordon until the end of the two years unless Anderson breaches the lease.

d. Anderson probably has a term of years with a duration of one year.

62. Reanswer the previous question.

63. Several months ago Anderson entered into possession of an apartment under a written lease from Gordon for an agreed term of 2 years. The local Statute of Frauds applies to leases of "more then one year."

a. Anderson is legally considered the owner of an estate in land during the 2 years of the lease.

b. If Anderson remains in possession after the end of the 2 years Gordon would, under the common law rule, have option of holding Anderson for a new term.

c. Both of the above

d. Gordon would be required to give Anderson at least one month's notice of termination in order to terminate the lease at the end of the two years.

e. All of the above.

64. Reanswer the previous question.

65. Assume again that, several months ago Anderson entered into possession of an apartment under a written lease from Gordon for an agreed term of 2 years. At the time of making the lease, Gordon held a fee simple absolute in the premises. The local Statute of Frauds applies to leases of "more then one year."

a. The entry into possession by Anderson under the lease would be a "demise."

b. The Gordon would hold a reversion.

c. Both of the above.

d. Anderson would be considered to have mere possession and Gordon would be considered to have the seisin.

e. All of the above.

66. Reanswer the previous question.

67. While sitting in a doctor's office waiting room, Debbie found a wristwatch that had fallen in a small crevice between the seat in which she was sitting and the wall.

a. In some states Debbie would have a stronger claim to the watch than the doctor who owned the office.

b. In some states, the doctor would have a stronger claim to the watch than Debbie, assuming the waiting room were not deemed to be a public or semi-public place.

c. In some states, if the watch were deemed to have been mislaid, rather than lost, then the doctor would have a better claim to the watch than Debbie.

d. All of the above.

68. Reanswer the previous question.

In answering the following TRUE/FALSE questions, assume (unless otherwise specified) that each conveyance is made by O, an owner in fee simple absolute, and that every named party is alive and unmarried at the time of the conveyance. Remember that the conveyances are to be interpreted as set forth in the last two paragraphs on the instruction page. Assume that all life estates end at the death of the named life tenant.

69. If O conveys "to A for life, then to B and her heirs," O would have a reversion.

70. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A." B would have a contingent remainder.

71. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs." If B dies before A, then B never gets the possession and her remainder is destroyed.

72. O conveyed "to A for life, then one day after A's death to B and her heirs." B would have an executory interest.

73. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives O by more than six months." B would have a contingent remainder.

74. O sold and conveyed "to A and his heirs." Technically speaking, A's heirs would receive an interest in the land as "purchasers" under this conveyance.

75. O conveyed "to A for life, remainder to B's first child to reach age 25." If B is currently childless, then the remainder is void under the traditional rule against perpetuities.

76. O conveyed "to A for life, remainder to B's first child to reach age 25." If B currently has one child, age 2, then remainder is valid under the traditional rule against perpetuities.

77. If O conveys "to A for life, remainder to my heirs," O would have a reversion.

78. If O conveys "to A for life, then one day after A dies to B and her heirs if B marries C," B would have a remainder.

79. O conveys "to A for 5 years, then to B and her heirs," B would be construed to be the landlord of A in order to make B's interest valid (prior to the Statute of Uses).

80. O conveys "to A for life, remainder to A's heirs." Under the rule in Shelley's case, A would have a fee simple absolute.

81. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B survives A by more than six months." B would have an executory interest.

82. If O conveys "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C before or after the death of A," B would have a contingent remainder and no other interest.

83. If, during B's lifetime, O conveys "to A for life, remainder to B's heirs," the remainder to B's heirs would be a contingent one.

84. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and his heirs if B is still living in Springfield 5 years after the death of A." B would have a remainder.

85. O conveyed "to A and his heirs, but if B is still living in Springfield 5 years after the death of A, then to B and his heirs." B would have an executory interest.

86. If O conveys "to A for life, then one day after A dies to B and her heirs," B would have a springing interest.

87. O conveyed "to A for life, remainder to R and his heirs." If P then entered into adverse possession during A's lifetime, both A and R would have thereupon have an ejectment action.

88. If O conveys "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C before or after the death of A," B would have an executory interest (among other things).

89. If O conveys "to A and his heirs beginning from and after my death," B would have a springing interest.

90. O conveyed "to A for two years, then to B and her heirs if B marries C." B would have a contingent remainder.

91. A conveyance "to A for life, then to B's first child born after the death of A, and his or her heirs" would create an executory interest.

92. O conveyed "to A for life, then to B and her heirs if B marries C." If B is still unmarried when A dies, B's remainder cannot take effect as an executory interest.

93. If O conveys "to A and his heirs so long as the land is used for educational purposes," O would probably have a right of re-entry.

94. O conveyed "to A and his heirs, but if A dies without any children surviving him, then the grantor or his heir may resume possession as of his previous estate." O probably has a right of re-entry.

<End of examination.>