PACE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PROPERTY II  -- VERSION A

FINAL EXAMINATION
PROFESSOR HUMBACH
May 12, 199
5       
TIME LIMIT: 2 1/2 HOURS

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DO NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES REVEAL YOUR IDENTITY ON YOUR EXAMINATION PAPERS OTHER THAN BY YOUR EXAMINATION NUMBER. ACTIONS BY A STUDENT TO DEFEAT THE ANONYMITY POLICY IS A MATTER OF ACADEMIC DISHONESTY.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

This examination consists of multiple choice questions. Answer the questions on the answer sheet provided. Write your examination number and the version (A or B) on the answer sheet. Write them NOW.

Answer each question selecting the BEST answer. Mark your choice on the answer sheet with the special pencil provided. Select only one answer per question or else the question will be marked wrong. If you change an answer, be sure to FULLY erase your original answer or the question may be marked wrong. Make sure your answer marks are dark. You may be penalized if you do not mark darkly enough.

When you complete the examination, turn in the answer sheet together with this question booklet.

Every even-numbered multiple choice question asks you to reanswer the preceding odd-numbered question. Question 2, for example, asks you to reanswer question 1. If you are fairly confident about your answer to the principal question, mark the same answer for the "reanswer" question. If you can narrow the choice down to two answers, however, and cannot decide which of the two is the better one, you may wish to mark a different answer on the "reanswer" question. IMPORTANT NOTE: If you decide to mark a different answer on a "reanswer" question, at least one of your two answers will be wrong.

Unless the context otherwise requires (such as where the facts are specifically stated to arise in New York), base your answers on general common law principles as generally applied in American common law jurisdictions. Do not assume the existence of any facts or agreements not set forth in the questions. Assume that the period of limitations on ejectment is 10 years.
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Facts for Seller-Perch questions
Seller owned a house that he wanted to sell. After Seller placed an ad in the newspaper, he received a call from a real estate broker, who said that he knew of some people who might be interested. Seller replied that he would very much like to meet them--adding, however, that he would not accept an offer of less than $350,000. The broker introduced Seller to Perch, a prospective buyer.

1. If Perch buys Seller's house for $355,000, the broker would be entitled to a commission from Seller:

a. Under the facts stated above, without any additional facts being necessary.

b. Only if Seller and the broker actually signed a contract in which Seller agreed to pay a commission.

c. Without a need for any contract between Seller and the broker, because the law imposes an obligation on sellers to pay commissions.

d. Cannot be determined, because the facts do not say whether Perch, when introduced to Seller, was "ready, willing and able" to purchase on Seller's terms.

2. Reanswer the previous question.


3. Assume that Seller and Perch have agreed on a price, and they intend to sign a detailed contract of sale as soon as practicable. In the meantime, the broker has suggested that the parties "hold" the deal by signing a binder form, prepared by the broker. The form sets forth the price, the location and the parties' names. Just above the signature lines is a sentence: "This agreement to sell and buy shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit the parties named above." If properly advised:

a. Seller should make sure that the quoted sentence is replaced with "This is not a Contract" (or the like) before he signs, though Perch would probably be just as well off leaving the quoted sentence in.

b. Perch should make sure that the quoted sentence is replaced with "This is not a Contract" (or the like) before he signs, though Seller would probably be just as well off leaving the quoted sentence in.

c. Both parties should make sure that the quoted sentence is replaced with "This is not a Contract" (or the like) before they sign, given that they want to sign a detailed contract of sale.

d. Neither party should allow the quoted sentence to be replaced with "This is not a Contract" (or the like). Such a change in the wording of the binder would make it legally meaningless, and there would be no point in signing it.

4. Reanswer the previous question.


5. Suppose that Seller and Perch entered into a simple contract for the sale of Seller's house to Perch at a price of $355,000. Under the majority rule, the broker would be entitled to a commission from Seller:

a. Even if Perch later changes his mind and defaults, causing the sale to fall through.

b. Even if the sale falls through because of title defects that Seller did not know about and could not remedy or cure.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. Seller would not be liable for a commission.

6. Reanswer the previous question.


7. Suppose that Seller and Perch entered into a simple contract for the sale of Seller's house to Perch, and Perch paid Seller a down payment of $35,000. Then Perch notified Seller that there was no way Perch would complete the contract. Under the implied warranty of marketability, Perch should be entitled to get back the $35,000 down payment if the sale fell through because:

a. There was, across the backyard, an easement that was not referred to in the contract of sale and that Seller could not buy in or otherwise cure.

b. Perch discovered that the house had been the scene of a crime, a fact that was not mentioned in the contract of sale.

c. Perch discovered that the local zoning would prohibit converting the house into a dentist's office, the very purpose for which Perch was buying the property (although the contract made no mention of such a purpose or the zoning).

d. All of the above.

8. Reanswer the previous question.


9. Suppose again that Seller and Perch entered into a simple contract for the sale of Seller's house to Perch, and Perch paid Seller a down payment of $35,000. The contract contained a clause stating: "Purchaser's obligations to buy hereunder are subject to Purchaser's obtaining, within 45 days, a mortgage commitment for at least $300,000." Eight weeks later, no such commitment had been received, and Perch has notified Seller that there is no way Perch can complete the contract. Perch should be entitled to get back the $35,000 down payment:

a. If Perch tried diligently to obtain a mortgage commitment but failed because Perch's credit rating was not good enough.

b. If Perch tried diligently to obtain a mortgage commitment but failed because Seller's house was in such bad condition that nobody would lend $300,000 on it.

c. Both of the above.

d. Even if Perch made no effort to obtain a mortgage commitment.

e. All of the above.

10. Reanswer the previous question.


11. Suppose again that Seller and Perch entered into a simple contract for the sale of Seller's house to Perch, and Perch paid Seller a down payment of $35,000. A title search on behalf of Perch revealed that Seller's name does not appear in the grantee index at the Recording Office. Seller explains that the reason is that he acquired title by adverse possession. Perch would not be entitled to reject Seller's deed and get back the $35,000 down payment:

a. If Seller had previously brought a suit to quiet title which resulted in a final judgment declaring the title to be in Seller.

b. If Seller offers to indemnify Perch for any costs or loss that Perch might incur in the event someone sues him in ejectment claiming to be the owner of the property.

c. If Seller is willing to convey by means of a warranty deed.

d. All of the above.

12. Reanswer the previous question.


13. Suppose again that Seller and Perch entered into a simple contract for the sale of Seller's house to Perch. After Seller delivers the deed to Perch at the closing, someone notices that there is an error in the courses and distances description in the deed. As a consequence, the courses and distances description does not describe a "closed" polygon. This problem would be cured:

a. If Perch makes the necessary correction on the deed that has just been delivered to him.

b. If the deed, as delivered to Perch, also contained a map description that correctly described the premises to be conveyed.

c. Either of the above would (by itself) cure the problem.

d. None of the above. There is no problem.

14. Reanswer the previous question.

 
15. Suppose that Seller delivers a deed conveying his real estate to Perch, and the deed contains a provision reserving to Seller an easement to cross the rear of the property, at a definitely described location, in order to reach adjacent lakeshore land (Blueacre) still owned by Seller.

a. Perch should be able unilaterally to revise the location of the easement at any time, so long as such revisions do not unreasonably interfere with Seller's use of the easement.

b. If Perch records the deed promptly, a buyer to whom Perch later sells would take subject to the easement even if such a buyer purchased with no knowledge whatsoever of the easement's existence.

c. Seller's right to use the easement should continue for as long as Seller wants to use it, even if he later sells Blueacre.

d. The easement will continue only for as long as it is necessary to Seller's use of Blueacre.

16. Reanswer the previous question.


17. Suppose again that Seller delivers a deed conveying his real estate to Perch, but this time assume that the deed contains no provisions referring to any easements to cross the property conveyed. After the deed is delivered, Perch discovers that, before Seller acquired the property, someone named Faye had acquired an easement to cross it in order to reach the adjacent land, Blueacre.

a. Perch should be able to rescind the deal and get his money back under the implied warranty of marketability.

b. Under the implied warranty of marketability, Perch should be able to recover from Seller any damages that he sustains as a result of the easement, but he cannot rescind the deal and get all of his money back.

c. The easement would have constituted a clear breach of the implied warranty of marketability, but Perch is no longer able to assert a claim under the implied warranty.

d. None of the above. Such an easement would not constitute a breach of the implied warranty of marketability.

18. Reanswer the previous question.

 
19. Aaron Waters was an ardent environmentalist who owned a 300-acre tract of land in New York. By a recorded deed, Aaron placed a conservation easement on this land requiring it to be kept "as a nature preserve," except for a 4-acre plot in the center of the tract, where Aaron had his home and gardens. After Aaron's death, Skip Townes inherited the 300 acres. A fervent high-liver, Townes needs cash and wants to develop the land to the legal maximum. Local zoning authorities will let Townes build one dwelling unit for each acre that is "developable" under the local zoning. Townes has applied for approval to build a 300-unit high-rise on the 4-acre plot in the center of the 300 acre tract.

a. In New York, the cases would not let Townes use the "nature preserve" lands under conservation easement in determining his maximum dwelling-unit count for this project.

b. In New York, there is case authority supporting Townes' proposal to use the "nature preserve" lands under conservation easement in determining his maximum dwelling-unit count for this project.

c. Townes has a pretty good chance of having the conservation easement "extinguished" in court on the ground that it renders the bulk of his land unbuildable.

d. The conservation easement should no longer be in effect if Townes inherited the land without any actual notice of the easement.

20. Reanswer the previous question.


Facts for Martin-Block questions
Martin Metalflower erected a TV satellite dish antenna next to his house in the Catskills. The dish was aimed at a satellite low in the eastern sky. Martin later sold the part of his land with the house and antenna to Ima Deadwaite, an ardent TV viewer. For the (unexpressed) purpose of preventing interference with TV reception via the dish, the recorded deed from Martin to Ima contained a covenant that prohibited "the grantor or his successors" from putting "any houses, fences or trees" in certain definitely described areas of the land that Martin retained. After the conveyance to Ima, Martin conveyed the remaining portion of his land to Block.

21. Block now desires to plant tall trees in a location where they would prevent Ima from receiving TV broadcasts from the satellite. The covenant probably could not run with the land as to burden because:

a. The burden of the covenant does not touch or concern the land conveyed to Block.

b. There does not appear to be any basis for concluding that the parties to the covenant intended it to run with the burdened land.

c. The requisite privity of estate is absent.

d. None of the above. The covenanted prohibition probably would be capable of running with the land as to burden.

22. Reanswer the previous question.


23. Assume that Ima's antenna can be cheaply and easily moved (and Block is willing to pay to move it) to a different location on her land, while enforcement of the covenant would prevent Block from building a garage at any suitable location on his land. Even assuming that the covenanted prohibition would run with the land to Block, it may still not be enforceable to prevent Block from building a garage:

a. If Block can show that there would be disproportionate hardship to him if the covenant is enforced.

b. Because Block would not be considered (under the "direct chain of title rule") to be on notice of restrictions contained in the recorded deed from Martin to Ima.

c. Because garages are not "houses, fences or trees," and the traditional rule is to construe covenanted land-use restrictions strictly.

d. All of the above.

24. Reanswer the previous question.


25. Fellskap conveyed Greenacre "to Mark and Marsha Milsom and their heirs." Under the usual modern presumptions:

a. If Mark and Marsha were husband and wife at the time, they would have received a tenancy by the entirety (assuming that tenancies by the entirety are recognized under local law).

b. If Mark and Marsha were brother and sister, they would have received a tenancy in common.

c. Both of the above.

d. If Mark and Marsha were unrelated at the time, they would have probably received a joint tenancy.

e. All of the above.

26. Reanswer the previous question.


27. Fellskap conveyed Greenacre "to Mark and Marsha Milsom and their heirs," specifying that the estate was to be a "joint tenancy with right of survivorship." Mark and Marsha were brother and sister. Assume that Mark later died, and Mark, Jr. was held to be his sole heir. Under the usual modern presumptions:

a. If Mark died intestate without having conveyed any of his interest in the land to anybody else, Marsha would now be the sole owner of Greenacre.

b. If Mark died intestate after conveying "all my interest in Greenacre that I am able to convey" to Fastrack, Marsha would now be the sole owner of Greenacre.

c. If Mark died without having conveyed any of his interest in the land to anybody else, and left a will devising "all my interest in Greenacre" to Fastrack, then Marsha and Fastrack would now be tenants in common of Greenacre.

d. All of the above.

28. Reanswer the previous question.


29. Fellskap conveyed Greenacre "to Mark and Marsha Milsom and their heirs," specifying that the estate was to be a "joint tenancy with right of survivorship." Mark and Marsha are brother and sister. Mark comes to you and complains that Marsha has been the sole occupant of Greenacre for 11 years, and he wants to know what he can do about it. Under the usual modern presumptions:

a. Mark can probably do nothing about it because Marsha has by now probably acquired a sole title by adverse possession.

b. Mark probably still has an ejectment action against Marsha (that is, he is probably not yet barred by the statute of limitations), but partition is likely to be Mark's best course of action if he cannot reach a satisfactory accommodation with Marsha.

c. Mark cannot have relief in ejectment against Marsha, because Marsha is just as entitled to possess Greenacre as Mark is, so ejectment is not available.

d. In the majority of states, Mark should be able to recover from Marsha a sum of money compensating him for his share of Greenacre's fair rental value.

30. Reanswer the previous question.


31. Assume that Mark and Marsha Milsom are husband and wife, and Fellskap conveyed Greenacre to them as tenants by the entirety. Assume that Mark then dies, and Marsha is his sole heir. Marsha would now be the sole owner of Greenacre:

a. If Mark dies intestate without having conveyed any of his interest in the land to anybody else.

b. If Mark dies intestate after conveying "all interest in Greenacre that I am able to convey" to Fastrack.

c. If Mark dies without having conveyed any of his interest in the land to anybody else, and leaves a will devising "all my interest in Greenacre" to Fastrack.

d. All of the above.

32. Reanswer the previous question.


33. Assume again that Fellskap conveyed a tenancy by the entirety in Greenacre to Mark and Marsha Milsom, who are husband and wife. If Marsha is then involved in an accident, and the other party obtains a judgment in tort against her:

a. In some states, Marsha's tort creditor would have recourse against her interest in the tenancy by the entirety to satisfy the judgment.

b. In some states, Marsha's tort creditor would not have recourse against her interest in the tenancy by the entirety to satisfy the judgment.

c. Both of the above.

d. In none of the states that recognize the tenancy by the entirety would Marsha's tort creditor have any recourse against her interest in the tenancy by the entirety to satisfy the judgment.

e. In all of the states that recognize the tenancy by the entirety, Marsha's tort creditor would have recourse against at least her interest in the tenancy by the entirety to satisfy the judgment.

34. Reanswer the previous question.


Facts for Carver-Whittle-Tompkins questions
Carver owned a piece of city land. In 1977, he divided the land into two lots and sold one of them to Tompkins, who still lives there. Carver later conveyed the remaining lot to Whittle, and Whittle and Tompkins are now next door neighbors. Tompkins has recently become aware of the fact that Whittle's connection to the city electric lines runs across Tompkins' lot.

35. If the deed from Carver to Tompkins contained language that created an easement for the electric connection across the lot conveyed to Tompkins, the easement would be considered:

a. A negative easement.

b. An easement by express reservation.

c. An easement in gross.

d. An easement engrossed.

36. Reanswer the previous question.


37. Suppose that the deed from Carver to Tompkins did not contain language creating an easement for the electric connection across the lot conveyed to Tompkins. If Whittle wanted to claim an easement based on prior use (that is, use prior to the severance of the Tompkins lot from what is now Whittle's lot), Whittle would have to show:

a. That there was a quasi-easement while Carver was sole owner of the land.

b. That the use of the quasi-servient tenement for the benefit of the quasi-dominant tenement was apparent.

c. That the use of the quasi-servient tenement for the benefit of the quasi-dominant tenement was reasonably (and, in some jurisdictions, strictly) necessary.

d. All of the above.

38. Reanswer the previous question.


39. If the easements referred to in the preceding two questions were upheld by the court, they would presumptively be easements:

a. Prescriptive.

b. Attendant.

c. Appurtenant.

d. Appendant.

40. Reanswer the previous question.


41. The key distinguishing feature of an easement in gross is that:

a. It does not have a dominant tenement.

b. It does not have a servient tenement.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above.

42. Reanswer the previous question.


43. Suppose again that the deed that from Carver to Tompkins did not contain language creating an easement for the electric connection across the lot conveyed to Tompkins. If, prior to such conveyance, the present electric line was in place between a pole at the street and the roof of the house that now belongs to Whittle (as opposed to being entirely underground, as power lines often are):

a. Whittle would have a better chance of establishing that an easement by implication arose at the time of the severance.

b. Whittle would have a better chance of establishing that an easement by prescription has a arisen as a result of the line's existence since 1977.

c. Both of the above.

d. None of the above. The line's above-ground location is not relevant.

44. Reanswer the previous question.


Facts for Longpath-Frump questions
In 1992, Longpath purchased a substantial tract of undeveloped land from Frump. One boundary of Longpath's tract was only 300 ft from a major highway, but Frump retained a 300 ft strip between Longpath's land and the highway. Right after Longpath bought, Frump told Longpath that he could use an existing dirt lane across the 300 ft strip "for as long as you want." There is also a 1/2 mile gravel road that leads around from the highway to the back of Longpath's property, but it is an inconvenient access.

45. Without telling Frump in advance, Longpath has paved and widened the dirt lane.

a. Longpath should now be able to claim an executed parol license to use the lane.

b. Longpath should now have an easement by necessity to use the lane.

c. Longpath should now have an easement by prescription to use the lane.

d. Frump can revoke Longpath's access across the 300 ft strip at any time.

46. Reanswer the previous question.


47. Assume that, after selling the tract to Longpath, Frump sold Longpath an easement "for access on foot and by vehicles" on the dirt lane across the 300 ft strip. Now, some time later, Longpath desires to subdivide and develop the tract into 150 residential units. To give the residents of this development convenient access, it is necessary to pave and widen the lane. Frump prefers not to have the land behind his strip developed, and he opposes the paving and widening.

a. Longpath should be able to pave and widen the accessway as reasonably necessary to give the future residents convenient access to the subdivision tract.

b. Longpath should be able to pave and widen the accessway as reasonably necessary for his purposes, but he cannot expect to confer a right to use the accessway to all 150 proposed owners in his subdivision.

c. Longpath should have an easement by necessity to pave and widen the lane.

d. As the servient owner, Frump would not be allowed to make any use of the area to which the easement applies.

48. Reanswer the previous question.


49. Truggo owned lots A and B on the accompanying diagram. In 1990 he sold lot A to Breake. The deed mentioned no easements, and there were no quasi-easements. Truggo continued to reach lot B by driving across lot A, though without any express permission from Breake. In 1993, Truggo inherited lot C, and sold it later that year.

                      wpe1.jpg (5281 bytes)

a. Truggo would have acquired an easement by necessity in 1990.

b. Truggo currently has an easement by necessity to cross lot A.

c. Truggo temporarily lost his easement by necessity across lot A in 1993, but he regained his easement across lot A when he sold lot C.

d. All of the above.

50. Reanswer the previous question.

<End of Examination>